A South China Sea ADIZ?
Despite repeated warnings from the U.S., China has continued laying the groundwork for a South China Sea ADIZ.
Although it won’t be discussed when Xi Jinping and Barack Obama meet following the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation leaders meeting in Beijing this month, China and the U.S. are on a collision course over Beijing’s likely declaration of a South China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).
Exactly a year ago this month, China surprised the region by establishing an ADIZ over the East China Sea. The unilaterally declared ADIZ covered two-thirds of the East China Sea, including the disputed Diaoyu/Senaku Islands; overlapped with many existing ADIZs, including South Korea and Japan’s ADIZs; and required that planes flying through the ADIZ identify themselves to China’s Ministry of Defense even if their ultimate destination was not China itself.
Beijing claimed the East China ADIZ was a “necessary measure taken by China in exercising its self-defense right,” and also warned that “China’s armed forces will adopt defensive emergency measures to respond to aircraft that do not cooperate in the identification or refuse to follow the instructions.” Later that month, a People’s Liberation Army official said that if a plane does not cooperate with China’s ADIZ, “our pilots have the right to shoot it down.”
Perhaps most ominously, at a press conference on the same day that the ADIZ was unveiled , a spokesperson for China’s Defense Ministry said: “China will establish other Air Defense Identification Zones at the right moment after necessary preparations are completed.” This pronouncement created alarm throughout the region, as it was interpreted by most to mean that, at a minimum, China intended to eventually establish an ADIZ over the parts of the South China Sea it claims. At the very least, this would conflict with the territorial claims of the six Southeast Asian nations that also claim part of the South China, as well as Taiwan. It could also very well target the Natuna Islands that Indonesia and China both claim. Indeed, in February of this year, then-Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa told a parliamentary committee: “We have firmly told China we will not accept a similar [Air Defense Identification] Zone if it is adopted in the South China Sea.”
The U.S. responded to China’s announcement of the East China Sea ADIZ by strongly condemning the measure and pledging to defy the new regulations. For example, in the immediate aftermath of the ADIZ being announced, Chuck Hagel released a statement saying point blank: “This announcement by the People’s Republic of China will not in any way change how the United States conducts military operations in the region.” True to his word, just two days after China unveiled the East China Sea ADIZ, a pair of U.S. B-52 bombers flew over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The U.S. did not inform Beijing of the drill ahead of their flight.
In the months that followed, the U.S. warned China on multiple occasions not to unilaterally establish more ADIZs, particularly over the South China Sea. For example, in December 2013, following a meeting with Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario, John Kerry stated: “Today, I raised our deep concerns about China’s announcement of an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone…. The zone should not be implemented, and China should refrain from taking similar unilateral actions elsewhere in the region, and particularly over the South China Sea.” Kerry and other U.S. officials said they also stated this position to their Chinese counterparts in later meetings.
The U.S. went further in February 2014. Specifically, during an interview with Japanese press, Evan Medeiros, the senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council, stated “We oppose China’s establishment of an ADIZ in other areas, including the South China Sea... We have been very clear with the Chinese that we would see that as a provocative and destabilizing development that would result in changes in our presence and military posture in the region.”
Despite these warnings, and its own occasional vague denials, China has continued actively laying the groundwork for the establishment of another ADIZ over the South China Sea. Even as there have been indications that the PLA has struggled to enforce its existing ADIZ in the East China Sea, a South China Sea ADIZ presents a much more formidable challenge for China’s military given the vast sway of airspace it would have to cover as well as its distance from the Chinese mainland.
To help overcome these and other challenges involved in enforcing its claims in the South China Sea, China in 2012 created the Sansha Prefecture covering some of the Parcel Islands in the South China Sea, and established a military division there. Woody Island, the largest of the Parcel Islands, was declared the capital of Sansha Prefecture, and it is here that Beijing has been most active. Besides building a new harbor on the western end of the island, China recently completed a large expansion of the runaway on the island that will allow new military aircraft to use it. As IHS Jane’s noted, “The moves to extend the runway and rebuild the harbor on the west side of the island will enhance Woody Island’s utility as a military base from which to project power in the SCS.”
Indeed, Jane’s noted that Woody Island’s strategic location made it the perfect base for China to conduct “constabulary operations.” It is not the only base Beijing is eyeing for this purpose. Earlier this year the Philippines began claiming that China was undertaking massive reclamation projects on Spartly Island reefs that it administers. These claims were confirmed by a BBC reporter who visited one of the reefs, and reported in September that, while China had only a very small presence in the region at the beginning of the year, “Millions of tons of rock and sand have been dredged up from the sea floor and pumped into the [Johnson South] reef to form new land…. China seems to be preparing to build an air base with a concrete runway long enough for fighter jets to take off and land.”
This was confirmed in October by Lee Hsiang-chou, the director general of Taiwan’s National Security Bureau, who told parliament that China has seven reclamation projects in the Spratly Islands, five of which have been approved since Xi Jinping took office. Lee also said that Xi had personally approved the reclamation efforts, and that “The goal of [the reclamation effort] is to turn islets into ramparts and islands into battlefields.”
It has already made extensive progress. According to an investigation by Taiwanese media, China has artificially increased the size of the Fiery Cross Reef eleven-fold already, making it the largest Spratly land feature and the fifth largest “island” in the whole South China Sea. State-run media in China have been reporting since May that Beijing ultimately intends on building an airstrip on the newly enlarged Fiery Cross Reef, which the Sansha government will administer.
A Chinese airstrip in the Spratly Islands would greatly enhance the PLA’s ability to enforce a South China Sea ADIZ. “The artificial island at Fiery Cross Reef will be an unreplaceable military base with great strategic significance due to its location and size. Such a base will realize the value of the South China Sea for China and ensure China’s status in South East Asia,” a state-run media report said earlier this year.
One of the final challenges Beijing faces in establishing and enforcing a South China Sea ADIZ is acquiring long-range aircraft. On this front, it is getting help from Russia. According to Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, Russian and Chinese officials will meet sometime this month to finalize a deal that will see Russia selling China as many as 24 of its Sukhoi-35 fighter jets. The acquisition of the 4++ generation aircraft simplify China’s efforts to develop its own fifth generation jets, while the Su-35’s speed and large fuel tanks make it ideal for China to use in enforcing a South China Sea ADIZ. Not only does the Su-35 have a 20 percent larger fuel tank than the Su-27/J-11 which the PLA already operates, but unlike the Su-27, the Su-35 has aerial refueling capability. This will be essential for maintaining long flights over the vast sways of the South China Sea.
Thus, all signs point to China’s intention to establish a South China Sea ADIZ in the not so distant future. This will set off a crisis in Sino-American relations as it will be a direct challenge to the U.S. which, as noted above, has warned China against the move. The U.S. will feel that its credibility in the eyes of regional allies and partners is at stake, and it will therefore have to respond forcefully to China’s moves. The time for Washington to begin planning how it will respond is now.
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Zachary Keck is Managing Editor of The Diplomat.