Southeast Asia: Democracy Under Siege

Throughout much of the 1990s and early 2000s, Southeast Asia was one of the world’s bright spots for democracy. Even Myanmar, long one of the most repressive nations in the world, seemed to be changing. In 2010 and 2011, the xenophobic leadership of the Myanmar army, which had ruled the country since 1962, began a transition to civilian government by holding elections that ultimately helped create a partially civilian parliament. The country seemed poised for free elections in 2015 that would solidify its democratic change

Since the early 2010s, however, Southeast Asia’s democratization has stalled and, in some of the region’s most economically and strategically important nations, it has even reversed. Over the past decade, Thailand has undergone a rapid and severe democratic regression and Malaysia’s democratic institutions and culture have regressed as well. While less drastic, there have also been troubling developments in a number of other countries.

In Malaysia, the long-ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition has cracked down on dissent and tried to destroy what had been an emerging, and increasingly stable, two-party system. However, this has changed since Malaysia’s BN government won a narrow victory in the 2013 election in large part because of its strong support from the most conservative and anti-opposition ethnic Malays. Following the election, the government has “rewarded” these loyal constituents by proposing a raft of new legislation that aims to suppress the opposition  and entrench economic and political preferences for ethnic Malays, disempowering ethnic Indians and Chinese, who together represent about one-third of the country’s population For example, the government essentially reinstated the despised Internal Security Act (ISA), which allows Malaysia’s government to detain people without trial indefinitely, often on vague charges.

Things have been just as bleak in Thailand, which has been mired in political crisis since 2006, when the Thai military launched a coup while then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was abroad. Since that time, Thailand has been plagued by repeated cycles of street protests and counterprotests, rising street violence and political instability, short-lived governments brought down through extra-constitutional means, and the return of harsh crackdowns on dissent. Thai institutions have become increasingly polarized and politicized, and few Thais now trust the integrity of the judiciary, the civil service, or other national institutions. Even the king, once so revered that Thais worshipped him like a god, has had his impartiality questioned by many Thais.

Since their high point in late 2012, Myanmar’s political reforms have regressed as well. After initially loosening media restrictions, the government has tightened them again. To cite just one recent instance, five journalists were arrested in February 2014 for reporting on the construction of a weapons factory in the country, alarming press watchdogs. Meanwhile, initial hopes that Myanmar’s military would scale back its role in politics have proven unfounded. The military has written clauses into the constitution reserving a quarter of the seats in parliament for the armed forces, effectively giving itself veto power over any constitutional amendments. Members of the military have also allegedly been involved in new anti-Muslim paramilitary groups that are emerging throughout Myanmar. These groups have been accused of bombing entire Muslim neighborhoods, as well as burning down Muslim homes and shops, and massacring Muslim families. President Thein Sein has alternated between ignoring the atrocities, defending the paramilitaries, or denying that mass killings of Muslims have taken place at all.

Meanwhile, Southeast Asia’s most authoritarian states have halted reforms. Over the past three years, Vietnam launched its largest crackdown on activists, religious leaders, bloggers, and other civil society leaders in more than a decade. It has also passed one of the most restrictive online speech laws in the world, forcing Internet providers to block and filter content more thoroughly.

Similarly, in Laos, which had cracked its door slightly open over the last two decades, the government has resumed tightening its grip over politics and society. In 2012, for example, the government shut down one of the few radio shows that discussed Lao politics and began forcing foreign aid workers to leave the country for making mild public criticisms of the government.

To be sure, democracy has enjoyed some successes in Southeast Asia in recent years. For example, Indonesia’s presidential election this year brought to power former Jakarta Mayor Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, the first non-establishment candidate to hold the position. Moreover, outside observers deemed the elections free and fair, with some calling them the most transparent in the country’s history.

Still, the general trend of democracy regression in the region is undisputable.

There are numerous reasons for Southeast Asia’s democratic regression: the poor quality of leadership in the region; the unwillingness of many elites to accept that electoral democracy might empower poor people; the rise of China as an alternative model of authoritarian development; ASEAN’s failure to effectively advocate for democracy and human rights; and the mistaken decision by several Southeast Asian leaders to link democratization with rising growth.

While many of the reasons why Southeast Asian democracy is in retreat are unrelated to Washington, the U.S. pivot to Asia is undoubtedly one culprit. U.S. military ties with several mainland Southeast Asian nations have done harm to democracy in the region. Although the Obama administration initially argued that increasing military-to-military relations would help make the region’s armed forces more accountable and less abusive, it has been hard to find evidence to support this view. Indeed, As political scientists Jonathan Caverley of Northwestern University and Jesse Dillon Savage of Melbourne University have noted,  a U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) analysis of International Military Education and Training (IMET) and other military-to-military training programs showed that, despite promises to the contrary, human rights are rarely a significant part of the curriculum. The report noted that of the 29 training plans for foreign officers attending IMET, only 11 even mentioned learning about human rights as a goal of the program. A majority of the IMET course managers interviewed by the GAO said that human rights were simply not a priority in their training programs.

Time and again the White House has been willing to look the other way on human rights issues in order to maintain close ties with regional militaries. For instance, the Barack Obama administration has deemed close ties with the Thai armed forces necessary for cooperation on issues like regional security, narcotics interdiction, counterterrorism, and intelligence gathering. This is despite the massive abuses by the Thai armed forces in southern Thailand.

The Obama administration’s desire for stronger military and diplomatic relationships throughout Southeast Asia has also made it reluctant to take significant action when elected governments in the region are overthrown or undermined. Most notably, after the May 2014 coup in Thailand, Secretary of State John Kerry condemned the putsch and the administration suspended some military aid to Bangkok – as it is required to do by law – but stopped short of applying tougher sanctions on Thailand. For example, the U.S. elected not to follow Australia’s lead in imposing asset freezes and travels bans on military leaders.

The U.S. has also not moved the Cobra Gold multilateral joint exercises – which take place in Thailand each year – to another location. Although some in the Obama administration have justified Washington’s actions by saying that the White House is waiting to see Thailand’s roadmap back to democracy, five months after the Thai coup, it is now evident that this putsch will be what some Thais call a “hard coup,” to differentiate it from earlier “soft coups” that quickly gave way to electoral democracy again. The military has released only a vague timetable for a return to democratic rule, and has made it clear that when coup leader Prayut Chan-o-cha actually steps down as prime minister, Thailand will not return to electoral democracy as defined by any standard definition. In addition, since May the Thai military has repressed civil liberties extensively, detaining hundreds of activists, academics, journalists, and opposition politicians for reeducation sessions that allegedly included various types of torture.

Although there have been no other recent coups in the region, the Obama administration has offered only muted criticism when democracy in Southeast Asia has been thwarted in other ways. For example, the May 2013 parliamentary elections in Malaysia were plagued by massive irregularities. Nonetheless, just days after the results were announced the White House congratulated Prime Minister Najib Razak’s coalition on winning control of Parliament, even though Najib’s coalition had lost the popular vote to the opposition and election monitors had reported that the coalition would have lost a majority in Parliament, too, if not for widespread fraud. In contrast, the European Union and the United Kingdom were much more cautious about endorsing the ruling coalition’s alleged victory. Obama also declined to meet with opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim, who had led the coalition against Najib, when he visited Malaysia in April 2014 (although National Security Adviser Susan Rice did meet with Anwar). At the time of Obama’s trip, Anwar had just been sentenced on charges of sodomy, charges that would have been thrown out by any impartial court, given the shakiness of the evidence. During his visit to the country, the president spent a mere fifteen minutes at a session with “Malaysian civil society.”

Similarly, in Cambodia, the White House took little action on allegations that Prime Minister Hun Sen’s ruling Cambodian People’s Party stole the 2013 national elections from the opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party. Hun Sen supporters allegedly committed massive fraud during vote counting, but the country’s highly partial election commission declared that the Cambodian People’s Party had won the most seats in parliament. The opposition’s leaders appealed to foreign donors including the United States to push for a recount monitored by impartial observers or a new election altogether. Instead, the United States and other donor nations applied minimal pressure on Hun Sen and did not halt joint exercises with the Cambodian armed forces. The Obama administration approved a congressional spending bill that suspended only a tiny portion of American aid to Cambodia. In 2014, the opposition coalition, realizing it had failed to rally international backing for pressure on Hun Sen, settled for a deal in which Hun Sen’s party retained control of parliament and all other essential institutions of government, according to several opposition leaders.

The Obama administration has also largely ignored the threat that Myanmar’s 2015 national elections, the first contested national elections in the country since 1990, will be sabotaged by the military and its favored political party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). Well before the 2015 elections, Myanmar political scientists and many foreign diplomats in Yangon report that the USDP and the military are building up paramilitary squads that could be used for intimidation on election day, distributing cash to co-opt opposition supporters, and purposefully instigating Buddhist-Muslim violence to show the public that an unstable Myanmar cannot be turned over to a political opposition with no governing experience. Despite these worrying developments, the Obama administration has continued its rapid rapprochement with the Myanmar government. In fact, President Obama hosted Thein Sein in Washington in 2013 and the U.S. has invited Myanmar military officers to observe Cobra Gold.

The pivot’s contribution to democratic regression is harmful to U.S. strategic interests in the region in part because U.S. policy is alienating young Southeast Asians who overwhelmingly support democratic change. These young men and women will be the future of the region and have repeatedly expressed their preference for democratic change in polls by voting for reformist opposition parties in countries like Myanmar, Malaysia and Indonesia. For now, young people in much of Southeast Asia also tend to have relatively positive views of the United States and of the importance of maintaining strategic ties, a contrast with popular anti-Americanism in regions like Latin America and the Middle East. It is unlikely that free elections in any Southeast Asian nation would bring to power politicians more anti-American than the authoritarian leaders currently in place.

Democratic regression is harming America’s long-term interests in Southeast Asia in other ways as well. For starters, it is likely to make the region more unstable. Overall, numerous studies of political regimes and conflict have shown that hybrid or authoritarian governments are more likely than democracies to face prolonged internal conflict or even civil war. They are more likely to face internal conflicts because authoritarian regimes are inherently unstable, prove poor negotiating partners for insurgent groups, and usually are reluctant to make the kind of political and economic compromises that are often necessary to resolve insurgencies. Countries that sustain democracy, too, tend to enjoy more stable growth rates, even when those rates, over time, are roughly equivalent to authoritarian peers. Over time, democracies also tend to provide the kind of transparency and stable growth that investors desire. In the World Bank Group’s ease of doing business rankings, nearly all of the countries in the top ten were democracies, with Hong Kong the sole exception.

By boosting ties with authoritarian states in Southeast Asia in the name of the pivot, the Obama administration is undermining its own claims to be supporting democracy in the region. Additionally, the effects of the Asia pivot are blurring distinctions between U.S. Southeast Asia policy and China’s Southeast Asia policy, and thus ultimately damaging America’s long-term interests in Southeast Asia.

With more than two years left in Barack Obama’s presidency, the White House still has time to reconfigure its Southeast Asia policy to bring it more in line with American values and long-term interests in Asia. Although shifting the pivot would, in some ways, require an admission that some aspects of the current Southeast Asia policy were mistaken, it would ultimately achieve the goal of establishing a more effective strategy for American engagement with Southeast Asia.