Will Jokowi’s Maritime Doctrine Succeed?

Last month, at a speech to the East Asia Summit meeting in Myanmar, Indonesian president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo unveiled his new maritime doctrine for Indonesia. While the speech itself was praised for clearly articulating Jokowi’s vision for Indonesia as a “global maritime nexus,” the plans it unveiled may quickly run aground on familiar and formidable obstacles as he seeks to execute them over the next few years.

Widodo’s focus on the maritime domain makes sense. Indonesia is the world’s largest archipelagic state, sitting astride major global shipping lanes and between two oceans with more than 17,000 islands stretching over 3,000 miles. As a result, many of the country’s economic, security and diplomatic challenges are rooted in maritime concerns: poor port infrastructure that increases logistics costs; an undersized navy that is ill-equipped to address myriad problems from illegal fishing to piracy; and a range of unresolved boundary disputes with neighboring states that periodically flare up and threaten to undermine bilateral cooperation.

The Indonesian president and his advisers have stitched together these parts into a coherent doctrine termed the “global maritime nexus.” The essence of the doctrine is that that Indonesia should enhance connectivity between the Pacific and Indian Oceans and position itself as a “fulcrum” to support stability in an integrated Indo-Pacific (or PACINDO) region. Widodo’s advisers say the strategy dates back to the Srivijaya kingdom in the 7th century, which was able to position itself as a pivotal actor in a similar manner. For Indonesia to do this effectively, the doctrine says it must boost its maritime capabilities with a focus on five pillars: rebuilding the country’s maritime culture; enhancing the maritime economy; improving maritime infrastructure and connectivity; engaging in maritime diplomacy; and strengthening Indonesia’s maritime defense power.

Yet actually achieving the economic, security and diplomatic components of these five pillars will be easier said than done. Economically, improving maritime connectivity rests partly on building an integrated network of ports and tollways over the next few years that would reduce logistics costs. While Widodo has already outlined a vision for how this would work, the challenge will be actually getting individual projects off the ground. The chairman of the Sea Transport Forum of the Indonesian Transportation Society, Ajiph Razifwan Anwar, warned last month that constructing 24 ports alone will cost around $24 billion, and that local investors may have trouble financing them because of the large funding requirements. Bringing in foreign investment for maritime infrastructure is also more difficult than meets the eye. It will probably require some bold changes in the regulatory environment, including streamlining the permitting process, harmonizing the various regulations in place, and reining in corruption.

Security-wise, getting the Indonesian military to embrace a maritime-centric vision will require significant reorientation. The military has traditionally been land-focused and organized around a territorial-based command structure, with the army playing a more prominent role among the services. Changing that decades-long outlook will not be easy, and Widodo will likely encounter fierce resistance. Capacity-wise, Widodo will be building Indonesian naval power from a very low base. For instance, according to Indonesian navy chief of staff Admiral Marsetio, the navy only has two submarines and four frigates to handle the nation’s maritime defenses, far short of the minimum 12 submarines and 16 frigates it needs. While raising Indonesia’s paltry defense budget to 1.5 percent of GDP will help procure new equipment, this will need to be accompanied by more difficult reforms such as greater inter-service coordination and better platform alignment.

In the diplomatic realm, Widodo may find that improving relations with Indonesia’s neighbors while pursuing the country’s own interests may prove much more difficult in practice. For example, while Widodo agreed with Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak during their first bilateral meeting in October that they would work to resolve their long-standing sea border dispute, the issue is in fact extremely complex as it relates to a number of separate geographical areas. Indonesia’s smaller Southeast Asian neighbors also continue to harbor insecurities about Jakarta’s rise due to its geopolitical heft and historical animosities, which means that even small irritants can upset bilateral relations. In February, Singapore suspended military ties with Indonesia because of Jakarta’s decision to name a warship after two marines who were behind a deadly bombing in the 1960s in the city-state. More recently, the Widodo administration’s tough crackdown on illegal fishing – which has included publicly sinking empty boats – has raised concerns in the region, especially in Vietnam and Thailand.

Beyond these three realms, Jokowi’s maritime doctrine could also encounter more general challenges. The doctrine’s wide geographical reach may play into a narrative within some Southeast Asian circles – already developing – that Widodo will not place as much importance on ASEAN as his predecessors did. Indonesia’s greater involvement in the Indian Ocean during its chairmanship in the Indian Ocean Rim Association from 2015 to 2017 could exacerbate these worries. The president’s willingness to play a role of “honest broker” between ASEAN claimant states and China on the South China Sea issue may also strain Sino-Indonesian ties, particularly since part of Beijing’s nine-dash line map overlaps with Jakarta’s exclusive economic zone emanating from the resource-rich Natuna Islands chain which it claims. More broadly, if Widodo’s foreign policy inexperience leads him to delegate much of the implementation of the doctrine to his advisers, potential disagreements – like those between the foreign ministry and the military – could undermine progress on issues like resolving border disputes with Jakarta’s neighbors.

To his credit, Widodo has made some initial progress towards his vision during his first few weeks in office, the aforementioned challenges notwithstanding. Already under his watch, Indonesia has slashed fuel subsidies to increase government revenue for priorities like infrastructure development, set up a coordinating ministry for maritime affairs to enhance interagency collaboration, and initiated a review of its current military strategy to introduce some potential adjustments. While these are encouraging first steps, it will take much bolder steps to reduce the gap between his lofty doctrinal aspirations and the grim realities his country actually faces. Whether or not Widodo and his team will be able to take those steps in the next five years remains to be seen.