The Underwater Naval Arms Race in Asia

In 2013, the Asia-Pacific region saw an increase in defense spending of 3.6 percent, to $407 billion, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. For China, the increase was 7.4 percent, followed closely by the Southeast Asian states with a 5 percent annual increase. A considerable chunk of this money went into the modernization and expansion of naval forces, particularly the submarine combat arm of regional maritime powers.

With 62 active submarines (some sources say 70), the Chinese Navy is dominating this regional underwater naval arms race. “The PLA Navy places a high priority on the modernization of its submarine force,” according to the 2014 U.S. Department of Defense annual report to Congress tracking Chinese military developments.

For example, in addition to three Jin-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) already in use, five more will enter service in the next decade. The PLA Navy is also expanding its nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSNs) fleet and will add four Shang-class SSNs in addition to the two already operational. The DOD report also estimates that the PLA Navy will construct new guided–missile attack submarines (SSGNs). The biggest expansion will occur in the diesel-powered Chinese submarine force (SS) with up to 20 new Yuan-class SSs – which may be equipped with an air-independent power system – joining the PLA Navy in the near future.

In 2010, Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) announced that it would expand its submarine fleet from 16 to 22 ships. The backbone of the fleet will be 10 Soryu-class diesel electric submarines, five of which are already in service, with the rest commissioned by 2019. The Soryus are among the biggest and most technologically advanced diesel submarines in the world. For example, they are capable of traveling under water for up to two weeks without resurfacing. Australia and Japan are currently discussing a $21 billion weapons deal that would equip the Royal Australian Navy with 12 brand new Soryu-class stealth submarines, all outfitted with a new lithium-ion battery propulsion system that will increase the range and speed of the vessels.

In contrast, of the aging 14 diesel-electric submarines of the Indian Navy, only half are currently operational. The Indian government recently agreed to upgrade four Kilo-class and two HDW-class submarines and is slowly overhauling the rest of the fleet. However, the construction of six French Scorpene-class submarines has been caught up in bureaucratic red tape and delayed for more than four years. In October 2014, India renewed its pledge to spend $13 billion to build the ships locally in Mumbai. In late 2015, India’s first indigenously designed and built nuclear submarine, the Arihant, will be operational (the Indian Navy is also leasing one Russian Acula-class nuclear attack submarine). By 2020, three more Arihant-class subs will follow. In August 2014, India also put into service its first home-built anti-submarine combat vessel.

Southeast Asia

Smaller powers in the Asia-Pacific region are also embarking on an underwater spending spree: Last week, Vietnam received the HO-184, the third of six Russian-built Kilo-class submarines that will be entering the service of the Vietnamese Navy between 2009 and 2016. Thailand is also acquiring a submarine fleet in the near future and has already launched a submarine squadron and dispatched officers abroad for submarine warfare training.

In addition, according to a new acquisitions plan, the Philippine Navy intends to have its first three combat submarines operational by 2020. Indonesia has ordered three additional German Type 209 diesel-electric submarines to add to the two Type 209 subs already in service. Malaysia has also joined in the overall naval buildup and purchased two French Scorpene-class submarines. Lastly, the South Korean submarine fleet is projected to double over the next 20 years, and Singapore purchased two new German 218SG diesel-electric vessels in 2013 (the small city state already operates six Swedish diesel-electric submarines).

Behind this submarine-spending spree lies the latent fear of the growing economic and military influence of the People’s Republic of China. The PRC is embroiled in territorial disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea, where Beijing claims 90 percent of the ocean territory, and with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, to name two of the most prominent hot spots. China also has maritime disputes with Brunei, Malaysia, and Taiwan.

And while the United States, despite the much talked about “pivot,” is slowly retrenching from the Asia-Pacific region, it leaves behind a more fluid multipolar security environment with no new superpower ready to fill the gap. For example, neither China nor Japan have the capacity to protect all of the region’s strategic sea-lanes (for instance, about half of the world’s merchant tonnage – $5.3 trillion in goods – passes through the South China Sea) vital to the Asian and global economies.

While Chinese naval policy cannot be characterized as more aggressive than that of other Asian powers, its sheer size and potential military capacity suffice to raise concern. For now, though, Xi Jinping’s goal of a PLA Navy that is able to successfully fight “local wars” in the information age appears to be overambitious and premature. The PLA Navy is still years away from developing network-centric warfare capabilities – a key component of the United States’ AirSea Battle doctrine. A good benchmark for assessing the real strengths of a nation’s submarine forces is not to look at the numbers but to compare anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. In that regard, the United States and its allies are still vastly superior.

Ultimately, two things should be kept in mind. First, the current submarine-spending spree is largely focused on electric-diesel submarines, rather than nuclear-powered vessels. This emphasizes the regional rather than global ambitions of Asian navies (including the PLA Navy). Electric-diesel subs are less mobile and slower than their nuclear counterparts. Like nuclear submarines they can track high-value targets such as an aircraft carrier and if they have their engines turned off they can be almost undetectable. In modern naval ops, any submarine is an essential part of the defense of all deployed naval forces. It is an anti-ship platform. Yet electric-diesel subs are best used as virtual mines, silently waiting for their targets at strategic chokepoints as part of an overall anti-access/area denial strategy. They are not meant to project power beyond littoral zones and the region.

Second, the total number of submarines operating in Asian waters is still quite negligible compared to large-scale naval operations of the past. For example, during the Second World War, the German Navy lost nearly 1,000 submarines in its failed attempt to cut off shipping to the British Isles. While technology has seen big strides over the last few years, there are limits to what a single submarine can achieve – even in the increasingly crowded waters of the South China Sea.