Sri Lankan Realignment: Is China’s Loss, India’s Gain?

The results of Sri Lanka’s early elections this January could have important ramifications for the small island state’s foreign policy both within South Asia and beyond. In a stunning result, Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa was voted out in favor of his former cabinet minister Maithripala Sirisena. Sirisena, who was sworn-in as president the same day election results were announced in early January 2015, will likely lead Sri Lankan foreign policy in a new direction. In broad strokes, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy in the Sirisena era, if the new president’s statements as a candidate are to be believed, will likely prove advantageous for India and less so for China.

Under Rajapaksa, the Sri Lanka-China relationship was growing rapidly. In the wake of the 2009 conclusion of the country’s civil war, China immediately seized on the opportunity to increase its presence in the Indian Ocean. Indeed, Beijing was already a crucial source of support for the Sri Lankan government in the final stages of the civil war. Rajapaksa pragmatically accepted Chinese overtures. By late 2014, Sri Lanka was acknowledged as an important peg in China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) initiative – a major Chinese push to increase maritime economic interconnectivity in Asia. Naturally, Sri Lanka’s strategic position in the Indian Ocean, at India’s southern tip, meant that China was also interested in maritime cooperation, including port access and development. In late-2014, Indian anxieties rose when a Chinese military submarine was spotted visiting Colombo. Beijing had committed to financing a $1.4 billion port facility in Colombo that would help the Sri Lankan capital city realize its role as a major node in the MSR. Rajapaksa accepted these Chinese overtures with open arms.

Sirisena seems to be far more cautious, if not outright hostile, to the prospect of closer relations with China. As a presidential candidate, Sirisena released a manifesto outlining his understanding of Sri Lanka’s national interests and his intended direction for Sri Lankan foreign policy. His election manifesto noted that  “Equal relations will be established with India, China, Pakistan and Japan — the principal countries of Asia while improving friendly relations with emerging Asian nations such as Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea without distinction.” While this doesn’t seem to push China out of the picture entirely, other language in the manifesto is more scathing: “The land that the White Man took over by means of military strength is now being obtained by foreigners by paying ransom to a handful of persons.” That phrase highlights Sirisena’s skepticism of Chinese checkbook diplomacy toward Sri Lanka. More overtly, Sirisena, as a candidate, had promised to scrap the $1.4 billion deal for port development in Colombo, citing environmental concerns. He cautioned that Sri Lanka would “become a colony,” and its citizens “would become slaves” should Rajapaksa’s acquiescence to Chinese offers of investment continue.

China’s loss with Sirisena’s ascent could easily become India’s gain. Notably, President Sirisena has chosen New Delhi for his first official trip abroad in February 2015. Additionally, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was particularly pleased with Sirisena’s triumph. The Modi government will be eager to seize the opportunity presented by Sirisena’s ascent to put pressure on Beijing, seeking to reestablish Indian influence in Sri Lanka. Despite Indian optimism about the election result, there remain considerable challenges in the India-Sri Lanka bilateral relationship. For example, legislators from the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu have criticized the Sri Lankan government’s treatment of the country’s ethnic Tamil population.

Back in 2013, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh capitulated to pressure from Tamil legislators and did not  attend the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Sri Lanka. Rajapaksa was vilified by Indian Tamils even before the United Nations recommended an investigation into possible war crimes committed in Sri Lanka’s Northern Province. Sirisena was formerly a member of the Rajapaksa cabinet and there is no immediate reason to believe that his victory will be a coup for minority rights in Sri Lanka. India and Sri Lanka have also struggled to resolve a dispute concerning the activities of Indian fishermen in disputed waters. In a  goodwill motion toward India, Sirisena moved to free all Indian fishermen in Sri Lankan custody shortly after being sworn in as president.

The good news for New Delhi is that none of these challenges are insurmountable. Sirisena will be perceived differently by Indian Tamils, particularly due to his popularity among Sri Lankan Tamils – his election win over Rajapaksa would not have been possible without a large share of the country’s minority vote. Additionally, one of the primary reasons India lost out to China in the wake of the conclusion of Sri Lanka’s civil war was a lethargic diplomatic instinct in New Delhi under the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), from the outset, have prioritized Indian leadership within South Asia. The perception in New Delhi is that if anyone is a natural partner to Sri Lanka, it ought to be India – not least given a common historic relationship and cultural closeness between the two countries.

All this said, perhaps the most likely path for Sri Lankan foreign policy is continuity rather than change. Sirisena’s tone during the campaign could have been intended to drum up populist support for his cause. As president, he may prove entirely open to prioritizing Chinese overtures. The true litmus test will be the cancellation of the Colombo port development proposal – turning down an investment project worth $1.4 billion would send a powerful message to China. This, however, seems very unlikely. China’s relationship with Sri Lanka wasn’t a cause of Rajapaksa’s electoral defeat; rather, domestic issues such as corruption, nepotism, and authoritarian tendencies left voters wanting change. 

What’s clear is that India will be eager to see Sirisena stick to his campaign pitch while China will do all it can to keep Sri Lanka a static and predictable actor in the Indian Ocean.