Russia’s New Military Doctrine

In December 2014, Russia adopted a new military doctrine. It is a revised version of the 2010 doctrine, which mostly emphasized the dangers of domestic terrorism and extremism. In 2010, external threats did not play a prominent role. This has now changed: External threats – especially the military capabilities of NATO – as well as the threat of regional destabilization – specifically the conflict in Ukraine – are the principle focus of this new document, which was released on December 26, 2014.

President Vladimir Putin had announced the drafting of a new doctrine in the wake of the NATO Wales Summit Declaration, which condemned Russia’s actions in Ukraine. In September 2014, Putin emphasized that, “the crisis in Ukraine, provoked and created by some of our Western partners, demands a response for the security of our country.” In December 2014, he accused the West of trying to split up Russia, which had become too powerful. He also stated claimed the West is using the Ukraine conflict as pretense to be able to impose strong sanctions on Russia.

The new doctrine bluntly classifies NATO’s eastward expansion and the conflict in Ukraine as a danger to the internal security of the Russia. NATO, according to the document, has installed, a “worldwide missile defense system” and has increased its “military potential on the Russian border.” According to a translation done by Defense News, the doctrine emphasizes that there are, “many regional conflicts which remain unresolved. There is a tendency to force their resolution, including those which are in the regions bordering the Russian Federation. The existing architecture of the international security system does not provide an equal level of security to all states.”

The new doctrine reiterates the 2010 version when it comes to nuclear deterrence, stating that nuclear weapons, which are meant to deter conventional as well as nuclear war – are only used in the event of an existential threat (however, the document for the first time mentions the deterrence capacity of conventional forces). The doctrine further notes that NATO is “undermining global stability and violating the balance of power in the nuclear-missile sphere.” According to Putin, Russia will still only use military force for defense, and as the absolute last option.

The new doctrine departs from its predecessor when it singles out the U.S. Prompt Global Strike system – the ability to conduct a conventional precision weapon strike within an hour – as a direct danger to Russia and promises to oppose efforts like these of other states to “attain military superiority.” Moscow is also more aggressive when it comes to missile defense: The new doctrine stipulates that Russia and allied countries can jointly set up missile defense systems (it singles out Belarus as Moscow’s closest ally).

Other novelties are the mentioning of Russia’s interest in the Arctic (Russia has already set up an Arctic Strategic Command), Moscow’s military diplomacy to forge ties with new partners – especially in the Asia-Pacific region (a principle target is India, which is a major buyer of Russian military hardware) – and an emphasis of the dangers of non-state actors operating in cyberspace to destabilize and politically subvert pro-Russian regimes.

Responsible for drafting this new document – which, according to the RAND Corp. researcher, Olga Oliker, happened, “remarkably fast for a government bureaucracy that has traditionally taken years to vet such documents” – was a team of experts led by the secretary of the Russian National Security Council, Nikolai Patruschew, longtime head of the domestic intelligence agency FSB, consisting of both military and intelligence experts. The paper is part of a much larger strategy and intrinsically connected to Russia’s top-secret defense doctrine, which specifically outlines allies and enemies, and also identifies potential missile strike targets.

Russia’s National Security Council published a short commentary on its website addressing the new doctrine, specifically focusing on the dangers of outside interference in Russian domestic politics. In it the National Security Council stated that the new doctrine is to some degree a response to developments in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Northern Africa. “Leading states” (code for the United States), the commentary continues, have to face the reality that they are threatening many independent states with a multitude of instruments, in order to promote their own national interests. The commentary cites the use of private military contractors (which means both ISIS-like organizations as well as U.S. military contracting firms), the stirring of discontent among local populations (“color revolutions”), as well as the support of radical and extremist organizations within a country, as the principle tools of “leading states” to achieve their national security objectives within the domestic boundaries of other states.

Addressing this point the doctrine specifically states, that Russia faces, “actions aimed at violent change of the Russian constitutional order, destabilization of the political and social environment, disorganization of the functioning of governmental bodies, crucial civilian and military facilities and informational infrastructure of Russia.”

NATO’s predictable response was that the alliance, “poses no threat to Russia or to any nation. Any steps taken by NATO to ensure the security of its members are clearly defensive in nature, proportionate and in compliance with international law (…) In fact, it is Russia’s actions, including currently in Ukraine, which are breaking international law and undermining European security,” according to alliance spokeswoman Oana Lungescu.

Russia analysts had feared that the doctrine might designate the United States and NATO countries as the likely adversaries in a future conflict or, more threatening, that the Kremlin would adopt a new preventive nuclear strike posture. Both fears proved unfounded. However, NATO-Russia military contacts have been downgraded to Cold War levels, there is no end in sight to the conflict in Ukraine, and Moscow sees the West as its fiercest competitor. That is a dangerous cocktail for 2015 and one that will likely prove a headache for policymakers in the East and West for some time to come.