Clever, Clever Karimov

Uzbek President Islam Karimov is having a great year. Indeed, if the past month is any indication, 2015 may be his finest year yet. While Karimov deftly juggles geopolitics in Uzbekistan’s favor, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan experience currency devaluations and energy shudders, while plunging migrant remittances threaten to gut the GDPs of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Karimov and his regime are the most sought-after entity in Central Asia. Skirting the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), acting as a linchpin in gas delivery to China, and remaining one of the few leaders willing to cater to American security needs, Karimov looks set to clinch another election this March and ride into yet another term with more geopolitical capital than he’s known in some time.

In fact, Karimov’s recent geopolitical maneuvering has been more than impressive – and harkens back to a time when Moscow, Washington and Beijing were vying for regional influence in earnest. The past few months have seen a discernible warming between Tashkent and the Kremlin, culminating in a meeting between Karimov and Putin in December. While Karimov reiterated that Uzbekistan would remain firmly beyond EEU membership, he nonetheless managed to wean $865 million worth of forgiven debt from Moscow. The deal appears to be something of a quid pro quo resulting in Uzbek gas once again flowing to southern Kyrgyzstan, nearly nine months after it was initially shut- off. The two presidents also made noises about a possibly security rapprochement, two years after Karimov removed Uzbekistan from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a regional military alliance led by Russia.

Framed by American retrenchment and the end of the ISAF combat mission in Afghanistan, it appeared Karimov was making something of a logical turn toward the region’s primary security patron. Tashkent and Moscow have had their share of issues over the past decade, but the warming seemed a logical, forgone conclusion, from both sides.

And then in January, without any prior notice, Dan Rosenblum, the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of State for Central Asia, announced that the U.S. had begun delivering more than 300 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles and 20 Armored Recovery Vehicles (ARV) to Uzbekistan. Contrary to assumption, these vehicles would not be surplus from the war in Afghanistan, dropped off the train as it passed through Uzbekistan. Rather, the U.S. is making these vehicles available, free of charge, to Tashkent. The only cost on Uzbekistan’s side comes through shipping. The deal appears to not only be the largest the United States’ Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program has yet seen, but also the largest single donation the U.S. has ever bestowed on Central Asia.

The reasons Rosenblum gave for the delivery – to be used in counter-terrorist and counter-narcotics efforts – appear largely specious. Perhaps not coincidentally, soon after the announcement, a CENTCOM publication breathlessly hyped the potential threat ISIS poses to Uzbekistan, despite the group’s current lack of discernible presence in the region. Not only are the massive supplies of MRAPs and ARVs the wrong tool if the U.S. were truly concerned about counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics efforts in Uzbekistan, the vehicles seem far more likely to be used for crowd control.

Rosenblum’s announcement comes a decade after the Karimov regime oversaw perhaps the worst government-led civilian slaughter the region has seen in the last few decades. More than 1,500 died during the Andijan massacre in 2005, according to a former major in the Uzbek state security service. Subsequently, Uzbekistan evicted American forces from the Karshi-Khanabad base. Uzbekistan’s human rights atrocities have not abated since the massacre. Washington, however, didn’t seem to mind, or at least pay more than lip service to the Karimov regime’s brutality: In 2012, the U.S. reversed its military aid ban on the country. That, followed by Rosenblum’s recent pronouncement, has cemented Washington’s preference for security over humanitarian concerns. 

Karimov’s recent swing from Moscow to Washington, gaining fiscal and security concessions from both, stands as one of the more remarkable moves the president has made during his 24 years in power. “It’s genius,” Luca Anceschi, a lecturer in Central Asian Studies at the University of Glasgow, says. “It was, what, four weeks, five weeks between his deal with Russia and the U.S.? Who does that? This is a perfect example of how shrewd these people [in Tashkent] have become, of the sophistication of their thinking.”

But Karimov’s recent successes are not limited to scoring deals with Russia and the U.S. Soon after the American materiel announcement, a report in WantChinaTimes noted that China would soon be getting in on the security game in Central Asia. As the report detailed, “China plans to sell HQ-9 surface-to-air missiles to its Central Asian neighbors of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to reduce the price it has to pay the two countries for natural gas[.] … Yet there is a catch. If China successfully convinces both nations to purchase FD-2000s, they will then have to purchase Chinese radars, early warning aircrafts and even fighter jets to coordinate with the air defense system.” 

The trajectory of China’s security presence – its timing and form, as well as how Moscow and Washington would react – remains one of the largest questions in the region. These deals help indicate the composition of the potential security presence – as well as China’s preferred partners, Karimov included. As if that weren’t enough, Karimov has even managed to dissuade the World Bank from investigating claims that its funds are used to aid Uzbek organizations pushing child slavery – despite the Bank’s admission that their funds may well be used for just such a purpose.

There are few indications Karimov’s constant swinging between Moscow, Washington and Beijing, will stall anytime soon. For as long as the Kremlin requires geopolitical sway for domestic legitimacy, the Americans are willing to discard humanitarian concerns to remain relevant in the region, and the Chinese continue delivering security components to ease their energy burden, then Karimov will only stand to gain.