Uncertainties Take Shine Off Cobra Gold 2015

On February 9, Thai and U.S. forces held the opening ceremony for Cobra Gold 2015 – the Asia-Pacific’s largest annual military exercise – at the Armed Forces Academy Preparatory School in Nakhon Nayok, Thailand. This year’s exercises were mired in controversy given deteriorating relations between the two allies which have affected both the scope of the exercise itself as well as perceptions regarding geopolitical dynamics in the region.

In more than three decades, Cobra Gold, which began as a bilateral drill between the United States and Thailand – Washington’s oldest ally in Asia – has grown into one of the world’s largest multinational exercises, involving some 30 countries. It has become a leading example of how ritualized multinational engagements can serve to build the kind of familiarity between the region’s militaries needed to jointly respond to disasters, be it a tsunami, a typhoon or a plane crash. Last year, more than 13,000 service members from the United States, Thailand, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea participated, with China taking part in humanitarian projects and others – including Myanmar for the first time – sending observers.

Cobra Gold 2015, however, has been complicated by strained U.S.-Thai relations. The May 2014 coup led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha had already forced Washington to cut aid and nix some exercises and exchanges. But relations took an official turn for the worse when Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel publicly rebuked the junta in a January 26 speech in Bangkok, citing increased restrictions on freedom as well as the “politically driven” impeachment of former prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra. Though his comments were not particularly surprising, they irked the junta. U.S. chargé d’affaires W. Patrick Murphy was subsequently summoned to the Thai foreign ministry, while a February 2 joint press meeting ahead of Cobra Gold was abruptly canceled.

The exercises themselves went ahead as scheduled but have been “refocused and scaled down”; a decision the Obama administration reached in October last year in order to both continue the annual engagement with a close ally and other regional states but also signal its discontent with the coup. At the opening ceremony of the exercises on February 9, Murphy was more polite, calling Cobra Gold 2015 “modified.” Cobra Gold traditionally includes three main parts – field exercises, humanitarian exercises, and staff planning exercises – and the “modification” was taken to mean that that the field exercise would focus more on noncombat operations, relatively speaking, rather than on live-fire drills.

Aside from this, other components of the exercise continued as usual. Thai, Japanese and U.S. forces carried out a mock non-combat evacuation operation; experts united to plan for responding to emerging global health threats at a medical symposium;  and Chinese, Indian, Thai and U.S. forces joined together to build community centers and a library. India’s participation was particularly notable as this is the first year that New Delhi has joined as an “observer plus” nation following China’s addition last year. As is usually the case, many of the activities had been planned months in advance and some of them – such as the construction of new buildings – had started weeks before the actual exercises officially began.

Perceptions about changing geopolitical dynamics hung over Cobra Gold 2015 ahead of its opening. Chinese defense minister Chang Wanquan’s February 5-7 visit to Thailand, and the defense proposals announced by the two sides, were read by some to be a sign of Bangkok’s further tilt towards Beijing and away from Washington. But while the junta was more than happy to show the world that there are other partners willing to do business with it without fretting about democracy, the proposals themselves were neither novel nor far-reaching. An agreement for joint military exercises between their air forces had already been settled last November, while China’s offer of more favorable terms for equipment like submarines may not achieve much if Bangkok turns to other potential candidates like South Korea.

More generally, even if Sino-Thai military relations are on the uptick, they still lag far behind those between Bangkok and Washington, which have been allies for nearly two centuries. As with previous coups in Thailand, much of the deep and broad security relationship between the two allies – including cooperation in counterterrorism, counternarcotics and intelligence-gathering – has continued quietly in spite of the public squabbles that have taken some of the shine off of Cobra Gold 2015.

Nonetheless, uncertainties remain for Cobra Gold moving forward. Washington has made it clear that it wants democracy restored in Thailand soon. But the junta, which initially pledged to hold fresh polls in October 2015, has since pushed back that date to early 2016, and experts say there may be further delays. The outgoing Obama administration may thus face a similar dilemma next year about how to balance rights concerns with preserving a critical engagement that is not only the “crown jewel” of the U.S.-Thailand alliance but an opportunity to foster cooperation between the region’s militaries and showcase Washington’s commitment to the Asia-Pacific.

If this is indeed the case in 2016, a scaled down, refocused Cobra Gold would still be preferable to more radical options such as temporarily shifting to or basing the exercises in another country in the region, something that would be politically and logistically challenging. Planning the existing exercises alone takes months, and there were fears last time around that the administration’s dithering on a final decision until October meant that it might be too late to hold them in February. But should we witness a sequel to this saga, the voices that clamored last time around for the Obama administration to suspend the Asia-Pacific’s preeminent exercises to punish the ruling junta will probably grow even louder.