America’s Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific: On Course, On Speed

Since the United States’ rebalance to Asia was first codified in policy some four years ago, there has been no shortage of criticism and debate surrounding Washington’s diplomatic, economic, and security initiatives in the region. American “hawks” claim the administration of President Barack Obama has not matched its verbal commitments to the region with substantive diplomatic action, trade deals, and – most particularly – defense posture and investments. “Doves,” meanwhile, fret that the rebalance flexes too much American military might in the region, running the risk of provoking China. Both arguments are wrong, and their follow-on debates entirely miss the reality of the U.S. role in Asia. While the rebalance is not, and was not meant to be, a purely military strategy focused on China, it is still real. The United States has no plans to leave Asia.

Grounding 21st-century American foreign policy in Asia has long made eminent sense. Indeed, even in America’s fraught political climate, there remains strong bipartisan consensus on the importance of Asia to U.S. national interests. Maintaining peace and stability in Asia remains vitally central to American prosperity – Asia represents the United States’ largest economic trade partner (outside North America) and is home to six collective defense treaty allies and numerous other important strategic partnerships. Dramatic economic growth across the region, along with a rising and increasingly assertive China, has marked a shift in the regional distribution of power. With these changing economic and geopolitical dynamics also come new opportunities. The rebalance is an acknowledgement that the time is right for Washington to redefine and strengthen U.S. leadership in the Asia-Pacific, allowing it to play a large and persistent role in shaping the region and its future.

On the security side, the rebalance is meant to addresses a laundry list of existing issues: the threat of North Korea and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; terrorism and piracy; the grave costs of natural disasters to regional and global stability; and the guarantee of continuing peace through the promotion of the rule of law and freedom of navigation. Although tangible evidence does exist to demonstrate Washington’s resolve, the clearest litmus test for the rebalance lies with those countries that stand to be most directly affected. Do the actors and nation states directly affected by the rebalance see the results of Washington’s renewed focus? And do their perceptions match the reality?

Ironically, it seems that China is the country most convinced of the reality of the rebalance, largely because of the perception that Washington is out to counter or contain Chinese strength.

Despite concrete steps taken in the U.S.-China relationship to reinforce the message that the U.S. welcomes the responsible rise of China – including cooperation in counter-piracy efforts and humanitarian/disaster response, cooperation on sanctions toward North Korea, and inaugural trilateral military exercises with Australia – the Chinese perception remains one of an inherently flawed U.S. strategy with the aim of deepening U.S. influence across southeast Asia while also maintaining a strong, strategic presence in east Asia. Moreover, there is a growing awareness that the rebalance has implications for Chinese strategy which Beijing must choose to react or adapt to. Chinese strategic calculus is influenced by increased U.S. military pressure on China, a complicated set of relationships along the Chinese periphery, an American presence that challenges China’s influence in the Asia-Pacific, and a perceived infiltration of Western values into China and elsewhere.

By contrast, other actors across the region express strong support for the rebalance while also conveying skepticism about the real level of U.S. commitment. Leaders of numerous Asian nations appear to welcome the idea of a stronger American presence. A 2014 poll of Asian “strategic elites” conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, for instance, found 79 percent of respondents in support of the U.S. rebalance. In practice, however, Asian elites fret that the rebalance is more rhetorical than material. Japanese government officials may be vocally supportive of a strong American presence, but they remain privately critical of a perceived lack of U.S. action. Some worry that Washington may be tempted to cozy up to China to avoid a breakdown of the Asian security order and to reassure Beijing that the rebalance is not focused on “containing” China. For those nations most focused on China’s increasingly aggressive regional posture, the U.S. rebalance cannot come fast enough.

Given these conflicting perceptions and mixed assessments, how are we to make sense of the actual progress and trajectory of the rebalance? Critics and supporters throughout the region, like the proverbial blind men touching different parts of the elephant, have distinct perceptions of the strategy depending on where they stand. Moreover, like hawks and doves in the United States, each appears to have a different set of expectations and are thus using different score cards to judge intent and progress.

A proper analysis of the Asia-Pacific rebalance must begin with an understanding of the strategy itself. What, exactly, was Obama’s intent with the inauguration of this significant, long-term policy shift? What have been the precise military, economic, and diplomatic initiatives to date, and what more might be expected in the future? Answers to these questions will shed light on the most strategically significant, perpetually misunderstood foreign policy initiative of the Obama presidency.

Judging by the actual intent of the policy, there has in fact been significant progress. That said, obstacles remain to the long-term viability of the rebalance. Various U.S. domestic and geopolitical events could stymie the rebalance for good, fulfilling the prophecies of its many vocal critics. Such events are not insurmountable, but the U.S. leadership will need to take action to ensure the long-term sustainability of the rebalance and of America’s leadership role in the region.

Understanding the Rebalance

When the rebalance was unveiled in late 2011, the message could not have been more clear: “The United States has been and always will be a Pacific nation.”

After a decade of war in the Middle East, the U.S. sought to reassure its Asian allies, partners, and friends that despite inevitable security challenges elsewhere in the world, the United States would not surrender its presence in the Asia-Pacific. Building upon more than a century of U.S. involvement in the region, the U.S. sought to strengthen bilateral alliances, deepen ties to emerging powers (particularly China), engage with regional multilateral institutions, expand trade and investment, broaden the U.S. military presence, and advance democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. These goals remain a primary focus of the Obama administration.

Although few objectives of the rebalance were focused on explicitly military elements, U.S. military posture in the region is critical to underwriting the stability on which prosperity and growth occur. Accordingly, defense officials at the Pentagon detailed what a rebalance of U.S. armed forces in support of these objectives should look like. Military assets were assessed to have been too concentrated in Northeast Asia, where U.S. forces had been stationed since the end of World War II and the Korean War. Sustaining such a posture would not accommodate the geopolitical changes in the region, nor the evolving bilateral and multilateral relationships. To adapt to these new dynamics, American military posture is becoming more “geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable.” A robust presence in the Northeast remains, and is balanced by enhancements to the South. In places like the Philippines, Singapore and Australia, the policy of remaining “politically sustainable” means that the United States will not seek to maintain large, American-run “bases,” but focus instead on growing multilateral military exercises and access agreements for more rotational presence with partners and allies.

The goal of these efforts is forward presence and interoperability. The United States seeks the right level of basing, infrastructure, access, and flexibility across Asia to allow it to train and exercise regularly with allies and partners. These elements of the rebalance ground the strategy, focus on shared security challenges and values, and communicate U.S. intent and resolve.

Concrete evidence of the military part of the rebalance can be seen in policy plans and actual movements to date. Recognizing the importance of the region’s air and maritime domains, the Pentagon plans to position 60 percent of U.S. Air Force and Navy forces in the Asia-Pacific by 2020; a commitment well underway with already 55 percent of the Navy’s 289 ships patrolling in the region, including 60 percent of its submarine fleet. As the U.S. Army withdraws troops from Afghanistan, it will re-focus the efforts of more than 80,000 soldiers in Hawaii, Alaska, and Japan to support its Pacific Pathways training and exercising initiative with other countries throughout the region. And in Australia, a country that is caught between closer security ties with Washington and vital Chinese economic linkages, the U.S.-Australia Force Posture Agreement (FPA) nonetheless ensures both that 2,500 Marines will rotate annually through Darwin for the next 25 years and that U.S. military and intelligence representation at Australian facilities continues.

This presence is further bolstered by earmarking advanced, newly developed military capabilities for service in the Asia-Pacific. The Pacific has seen the main deployment of the Zumwalt-class destroyer, the principle basing for the advanced F-22 and (eventually) the F-35, the introduction of the advanced P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, increased rotation of U.S. Air Force and Navy airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), and the replacement of the USS George Washington with the more capable Ronald Reagan. In Japan, two additional Aegis ballistic missile defense-capable ships, joint high-speed vessels, and a second TPY-2 missile defense radar are being deployed. Additional submarines will rotate regularly to Guam as part of a new, higher volume presence. And in Singapore, a regular rotation of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) will join those forces already in the region by 2018.

This robust forward presence confers a range of strategic and operational benefits. Beyond reassuring U.S. allies, such force posture efficiently manages tensions and facilitates collective responses to regional crises. Deploying forces from continental bases in San Diego or Anchorage not only takes more time, but risks creating false perceptions of escalatory or provocative intentions. It was thanks to this forward presence that the United States was able to rapidly deploy ballistic missile defense capabilities in the midst of the 2013 North Korea missile crisis, and it is this steady presence that can help defuse potential confrontations in the South China Sea. The American response to the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami, Operation Tomodachi, would not have been nearly as expeditious without these available and forward staged forces, nor would cutting-edge search-and-rescue technology have been on hand to assist in the search efforts for the downed AirAsia and Malaysian Airlines flights.

Running concurrent with the redeployment of U.S. assets has been another, less visible shift within the Department of Defense: what senior military leaders have described as an “intellectual rebalance.” Drawing from the U.S. Army’s “foreign service officer” (FAO) program – which ensures that culturally astute officers can spend their careers in a particular area of operation – the U.S. Navy has inaugurated a similar policy as part of the rebalance. Leaders have the opportunity to chain multiple deployments in the Asia-Pacific, accumulating regional expertise and building lasting relationships with their counterparts in other nations. By the time these officers assume senior-level commands, they should have a wealth of experience to draw on – and deep familiarity and relationships with those foreign military leaders who have risen in the ranks alongside them.

All of this means that the rebalance has provided impetus for deeper, more meaningful military-to-military cooperation and substantive agreements with U.S. allies across the Asia-Pacific. In addition to the U.S.-Australia FPA (which leaves open other avenues for cooperation beyond those 2,500 Marines in Darwin), Washington also inked the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the Philippines last year, authorizing access by U.S. forces to predetermined locations across the islands. Of course, multilateral military exercises across Asia also continue at a steady clip, ranging from the annual Cobra Gold exercise (the largest in the region) to Southeast Asian Cooperation Afloat and Readiness Training (CARAT), Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training (SEACAT), and Operation Malabar, a bilateral U.S.-Indian exercise whose status was upgraded earlier this year.

Beyond these cooperative efforts, the rebalance has encouraged tackling one of the region’s longstanding security threats: that of an increasingly provocative North Korea. A new intelligence sharing program between South Korea and Japan – brokered by Washington – is aimed at cementing trilateral efforts to address North Korea’s nuclear program. Similarly, sanctions toward Pyongyang that once excluded China have since shifted to include even the hermit kingdom’s communist neighbor. The fact that Beijing broke longstanding support for the Kim regime in 2013 in a vote supporting UN sanctions on North Korean banking, trade, and travel, signals an important shift in China’s attitude toward its antagonistic neighbor. Additionally, Seoul is looking to host a U.S.-backed ballistic missile defense system – a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD) – to counter North Korean ballistic missiles. While it remains to be seen if a THAAD deployment can be successfully negotiated between South Korean and U.S. officials, it is clear that the system would further boost X-Band radar systems that Washington has deployed to Japan, creating a trilateral defensive capability.

America’s Asian allies are also using the rebalance as an opportunity to bolster their own military and security capabilities and relationships. Most significantly, an Australian two-star general serves as one of the two deputy commanding generals under the four-star Army commander of U.S. Army Pacific Command. On the maritime front, recent years have seen a notable increase in those nations volunteering to participate in the United States’ annual Rim of the Pacific Exercises (RIMPAC). Over 22 U.S. allies and partners, including China, spent considerable time and money on a strong showing in Hawaii in 2014. India made its debut at RIMPAC with a guided-missile frigate, while South American countries, such as Colombia and Chile expanded their involvement, sending forces and vessels to train with and learn from U.S. forces and other partners in the Pacific. Significantly, for the first time a Japanese admiral led the core civil-military humanitarian/disaster-relief (HA/DR) portion of RIMPAC.

This increased participation by Japan comes alongside changes in Japan’s military and security policy. With 250,000 uniformed personnel, the size of the Japanese military now exceeds that of other midlevel powers like France and Israel. Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) is an increasingly capable allied fleet, replete with destroyers, advanced submarines, and even small aircraft carriers, and is built to ensure close interoperability with the United States. This Japanese expansion reflects the geostrategic shifts in the region, the continued threat from North Korea, and the extraordinary growth of China’s own maritime capabilities, which include sophisticated anti-ship ballistic missiles, Coast Guard vessels with more than twelve tons of displacement, and a Chinese goal to have as many as 351 ships by 2020.

Continued progress on the rebalance relies on robust participation and partnership with various countries in the region, from exercises like RIMPAC to cost sharing and access agreements. Regional allies are significantly complimenting the U.S. rebalance with their own expenditures, such as Japan’s $7.6 billion in contributions to infrastructure realignment in Okinawa and Guam, and South Korea’s $9.7 billion to support infrastructure realignment of U.S. forces on the peninsula. The U.S. is not pursuing the rebalance alone.

Overall, this emphasis on bilateral and multilateral relationships in the military portion of the rebalance reflects Obama’s more cooperative model of American 21st century leadership. This model acknowledges the need for cooperative action to address the today’s thorny, transnational challenges. Unilateral approaches – even by the United States – are simply ill-suited to threats such as terrorism, trafficking, cybercrime, piracy, and natural disasters associated with climate change. America’s primary role through the Asia-Pacific rebalance is to provide leadership and resources toward tackling these challenges. In this way, the U.S. military posture in Asia is meant to ensure freedom of navigation, freedom of the seas, and freedom of access to the global commons.

The Softer Side of the Rebalance

While military components of the rebalance may be the most visible, it is a range of economic and diplomatic initiatives that ultimately enable the United States’ forward presence. U.S. diplomatic leadership has played a pivotal role in promoting stability and prosperity across the Asia-Pacific. As Obama noted in his 2014 speech to graduating West Point cadets, “If we don’t [lead], no one else will….But U.S. military action cannot be the only – or even primary – component of our leadership in every instance.”

The economic centerpiece of Asia-Pacific rebalance, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), would link the American economy with eleven other countries ranging from Chile to Brunei. American interests in the TPP are focused on economic engagement with Asia, which allows the U.S. to be present when the rules of international trade are established in the region. Exports and priority access to U.S. markets will, no doubt, benefit America’s Asian trade partners, but the TPP also gives Washington a voice in shaping the evolving Asian economic order. Beyond the TPP, Washington has also looked to free trade agreements (FTAs), beginning with South Korea, as an opportunity for deepening economic ties and setting new norms.

Finally, rounding out the U.S. rebalance is diplomatic engagement and alliance management. Washington recognizes that dealing with significant regional challenges requires smart relationships and strategic depth to partnerships in the region. Simply “living and let live” – working together only where shared interests and ambitions closely align – is insufficient. The United States can benefit the Asia-Pacific most by investing in strong and enduring multilateral institutions. Accordingly, Washington has increased its diplomatic footing at both the East Asian Summit and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, in 2011 appointing a resident ambassador to ASEAN who heads a dedicated mission to the organization in Jakarta.

Other, often overlooked diplomatic elements of the rebalance include the February 2015 announcement of the Sustainable Mekong Initiative, which in partnership with European allies seeks to encourage Southeast Asian investment and innovation in environmentally friendly energy sources. Additionally, over the last three years, the U.S. has relaxed restrictions on international financial assistance and development programs with Myanmar in an effort promote economic growth, democracy and human rights as the nation emerges from sixty years of military rule. Although the final outcome is still uncertain, this U.S.-Myanmar policy reflects Washington’s more hands-on approach, as well as a willingness to take diplomatic risks for greater gain.

What is important to understand about the rebalance – and what analysts so often overlook – is that reallocating U.S. troops in Asia, negotiating new trade frameworks, and deepening diplomatic ties with our partners and friends takes time. The rebalance was never meant to be a flip of the switch; a spontaneous “pivot” of American strength in the region. To be sure, the absence of immediate results is not the only criticism the Obama administration has heard. Other rebalance naysayers point to a static military-first strategy aimed primarily at northeast Asia, with the broader intention of containing China. Such critics miss the forest for the trees, confusing individual operational movements with what is intended to be a broad, long-term, multi-dimensional strategy. That is not to say that the policy does not face obstacles going forward. U.S. leaders, along with America’s partners and allies in the region, will need to be alert to challenges, real and imagined, to sustain this positive trajectory, identify misperceptions, and avert backsliding.

The Rebalance Can Still Be Derailed

While some critics of the rebalance essentially miss the overarching strategic point, there are still significant obstacles that threaten to derail America’s “Pacific Century.” The United States may be a potent, global superpower, but its capabilities are not limitless. Accordingly, challenges to the rebalance fall into two general categories: shrinking U.S. capacity and uncertain geopolitical developments abroad. In America, dwindling budgets threaten to siphon away the resources necessary to make the rebalance a success. At the same time, continuing volatility in eastern Europe and the Middle East require increasing attention by U.S. leadership.

Tune in to the right sources, and you will get a pretty grim assessment of the United States’ future. “America is in decline!” doomsayers often cry. Pessimistic predictions of a post-American world order have been given fuel by National Intelligence Council projections that U.S. dominance will be “much diminished” by 2025, even if the United States remains the preeminent global power. Political knife fights over the Budget Control Act of 2011, which imposes mandatory defense spending caps and budgetary sequestration, have seemed to confirm many of these fears. Looking to the double-digit military spending increases and robust economic growth of Asia-Pacific nations (China passed the United States to become the largest economy by purchasing power parity in 2014), some observers even dismiss the whole rebalance policy as the last, flailing grasp of a wounded giant.

These declinist narratives are vastly overstated. The United States remains the largest economy in the world by gross domestic product; its 2015 military spending totals $554 billion, roughly four times China’s $145 billion defense budget. Power, as Joseph S. Nye, Jr. writes, is defined by the “ability to attain the outcomes one wants, and the resources that produce it.” By this measure, America still stands as an unrivalled global force. The position of the United States in 2015 hardly resembles that of previous, faltering superpowers like the post-1945 United Kingdom. America continues to enjoy a significant material advantage; the question is how best to marshal these resources, and just how far they can be stretched.

In domestic U.S. politics, the specter of budgetary sequester complicates many of the redeployment decisions being made in support of the Asia-Pacific rebalance. Although America is the largest defense spender in the world, a significant portion of this budget is essentially untouchable, tied up in long-term weapons procurement, excess and costly stateside infrastructure, and health care and compensation of service members.

The Army, is facing significant cuts to troop numbers (from a wartime peak of 560,000 to 450,000), while budget caps and ballooning costs have kept the U.S. Navy’s inventory at roughly 280 ships – well short of its original goal of 304 ships by 2019. In addition to straining the active fleet, lower-than-expected acquisitions numbers have also helped accelerate the decline of the U.S. shipbuilding industry. Meanwhile, a quest for exquisite technology and ballooning costs of high-end weapons systems like the F-35 has resulted in a supremely capable, but significantly smaller fighter jet inventory. If this trajectory continues, there will simply be fewer ships, planes and troops stationed everywhere, including in Asia.

This is to say nothing of the significant sustainment, restoration, and modernization investments required of the Asia-Pacific rebalance – a budgetary line item that very often ends up last in the queue. The majority of supporting infrastructure in the Pacific and on the West Coast of the U.S. mainland was established during World II and the early years of the Cold War; it has seen little modernization since. Failure to build and maintain this critical infrastructure significantly complicates the U.S. forward presence strategy, limiting the number of assets that can be reliably based in the region.

While many of these internal resourcing challenges are self-inflicted, the Asia-Pacific rebalance is also buffeted by events beyond policymakers’ ability to control. Analysis from Asia experts, and the sinologist community in particular, often claim that the rebalance has been thrown “off-kilter” by more recent geopolitical developments. Specifically, they argue that Obama’s energy and focus has been hijacked by the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and by revanchist Russia. Add to this the choir of regional experts who insist the United States must “pivot” its attention back to their geographic area (the Middle East or Europe respectively), and it is easy to assume that the rebalance is doomed to drift off course.

While this constitutes a real threat to America’s Asia-Pacific policy, the visibility of crises in the Middle East and Europe is not yet matched by the need for large quantities of U.S. assets. Although the United States leads an impressive 62-nation effort to destroy the Islamic State, this does not require a the type or size of force presence required in the region during the past decade. While American airpower will remain in high demand, total U.S. “boots on the ground” number only roughly 3,200 military advisers. Likewise, while healthy reassurance measures have been taken to bolster U.S. European Command’s NATO contribution in response to the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, total troop presence in the region still stands at roughly 30,000, where it has sat for some time. Should escalating events in the European theater demand an enhanced military presence, some Asia rebalance plans could be placed on pause.

If crises in the Middle East and Europe have not yet undermined the rebalance, however, they still illustrate how events could quickly stretch U.S. capabilities and bandwidth beyond their limit. Another significant contingency in the Middle East or further escalatory steps by Russian President Vladimir Putin would divert real attention and resources, slowing progress toward the rebalance. This dynamic will be exacerbated if downward pressure on the budget and associated partisan gridlock remain. It is these two factors in combination – dwindling resources and escalating crises – that pose the most pressing risks to U.S. Asia-Pacific policy.

Sustaining America’s “Pacific Century”

Ultimately, reports of the rebalance’s demise have been greatly exaggerated. Since 2011, there has been a significant redeployment and modernization effort for U.S. military assets in the region, with much more in the years to come. This robust presence has been complemented by a series of economic and diplomatic initiatives, from the TPP to the growth of ASEAN and quiet, sustained leadership by the United States. Although significant challenges loom, they have not yet derailed the most critical foreign policy initiative of the Obama presidency.

The meat of the strategy can be seen in vocal, persistent U.S. initiatives across the region. Despite the seeming dominance of military pieces of the rebalance, the core of the rebalance is deeper, sustained U.S. engagement with Asia. American leadership, neither bullying nor overly prescriptive, has served as a critical convening authority to address issues of terrorism, economic downturns, humanitarian crises, and disaster response. Still, a series of low and high-level political initiatives must begin now, to help mitigate the inevitable challenges and ensure that the rebalance continues apace for the foreseeable future.

Efforts to keep the United States’ Asia policy on track must begin at home. Most immediately, the TPP must be released from its long-suffering role as a congressional hostage and enacted to promote a more tightly interconnected and economically stronger Asia-Pacific. In addition to its importance as the economic centerpiece of the U.S. rebalance, a successful implementation of the TPP could spur other arrangements, adding members to the agreement or even fostering similar regional agreements with Southeast Asian economies. By the same token, sustainment of the rebalance should be the latest reason – added to a long and growing list – for the repeal of the Budget Control Act of 2011. Sequestration’s nondiscretionary, brute force budget caps threaten to cut deep into the U.S. military’s procurement and infrastructure spending, critical to the success of the rebalance. It is ironic that one of the gravest threats to the rebalance should be self-inflicted.

Beyond domestic politics, the United States should continue to encourage Myanmar in its process of democratization, trading selective political flexibility for the nation’s broader drift toward full-fledged democracy. America should also redouble its efforts, in tandem with regional partners (and particularly China) to impose sufficiently high costs to halt North Korea’s provocative nuclear testing policy. Finally, the United States should build upon two memoranda of understanding signed by Beijing and Washington in late 2014, maintaining robust military-to-military communications between the two great powers to ensure a stable, prosperous region.

The most significant potential boost for the rebalance strategy will come on January 20, 2017. Whoever the next American president, he or she will need to hit the ground running with a strong endorsement and reiteration of the United States’ Asia-centric future. The inauguration of a new president and introduction of fresh cabinet members will mark a powerful, symbolic opportunity to further strengthen U.S. commitment to the rebalance. If the chance is seized, America’s “Pacific Century” will no longer belong to a particular administration at a particular moment in time. Instead, it will evolve to encompass multiple presidencies and decades, becoming a truly national policy. As the Asia-Pacific becomes more and more important politically and economically, sustaining the rebalance strategy will prove to be a very smart move indeed.