China’s Guiding Philosophy

The “rule of law” has become a buzzword in China ever since the Fourth Plenum of the 18th Party Congress of CCP formally announced a push to “rule the country in accordance with the law.” Many Chinese expect the country to move toward the “rule of law” and away from the “rule of man.” But does that mean that CCP leadership has started to emphasize a more Legalist approach to governing the country, following the advice Han Feizi (sometimes called “China’s Machiavelli”) gave thousands of years ago?

The Party’s top leader, Xi Jinping, has proven particularly enthusiastic about quoting traditional Chinese philosophers and authors. A collection of those references, published as Xi’s Quotes of the Classics (from People’s Daily Press), indicates that it is the classic works of Confucianism that are the most frequently quoted sources in Xi’s works, articles, and speeches.

Viewing China’s political culture from a historical perspective, it’s only natural that the governance philosophy of the CCP and Xi would reference (while not directly copying) Chinese classical political philosophies, such as the ideas and practices of Legalism and Confucianism. But which is a more attractive model for Xi as he seeks to govern contemporary China? Does Xi prefer the Legalist ideas of Han Feizi (centered on law, or fa 法) or the Confucian ideas of Confucius and Mencius (centered on ritual, or li 礼)?

Most observers agree that Xi is a leader with very a strong sense of mission. As I have written previously, revolutionary idealism plays a central role in Xi’s political philosophy. So we can say that Xi upholds lofty ideals, his “China Dream” illustrates this.

On a policy level, Xi insists on carrying on Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms, which accord with the needs of both Chinese society and individual citizens. But on a deeper, societal level, Xi seems to expect society as a whole, the entire Chinese nation, to return to an idealized version of a previous spiritual state – a sort of “spiritual idealism” where everyone is continuously inspired and united together by righteous ideals and common goals. The idea of a ruling zeitgeist in China might remind people of the revolutionary spiritual fanaticism under Mao Zedong, but Xi is not blindly revisiting former political policies and practices to promote his own hidden agenda. This is one of the main differences between Xi and recently fallen political figures (such as Bo Xilai) in Chinese domestic politics.

So how do the ideas of fa and li factor into Xi’s “spiritual idealism”? In China, there are a number of harmful social issues that will only continue to get worse without a strong Legalist hand – an emphasis on fa. But looking more closely at Xi’s political philosophy, we find that Xi actually seems to have an overall preference for the Confucian ideal of li. In Xi’s philosophy, Legalism serves as a temporary, surface-level solution, while Confucianism is a long-term cure that gets to the root of various ills.

For Xi, it’s not a question of favoring one philosophy and discarding the other. Xi has particularly emphasized the important implications of “governing by combining li and fa” (礼法合治). To phrase it another way, Xi wants to “to use virtue as the main approach and to use punishment as a supplement” (德主刑辅) – relying on morality first and legalistic methods of control second.

Political Tradition

By combining fa and li, Xi is following a long-standing Chinese political tradition. There are a wealth of different and even contradictory opinions on how to understand and describe ancient Chinese political philosophies, but one strand of thought has proven especially popular: “to outwardly embrace Confucianism while inwardly implementing Legalism” (wai ru nei fa 外儒内法). Xi, however, might be said to be doing the opposite – outwardly extolling the fa so admired by Legalism while working more subtly to push forward Confucian principles of li.

In Chinese culture, fa focuses on establishing and consolidating authority, and using that power to regulate people’s behavior. Thus, fa can achieve instant outcomes through the use of coercion and punishment. Meanwhile, li focuses on educating, shaping, and changing people’s minds and spirits. A leader who relies on li uses cultural molding to influence and reform the behavior patterns of individuals and society. Hence, over the long term, li is a more subtle and more effective measure of obtaining desired behaviors. Naturally, then, fa and li can work perfectly well together – one as a short-term fix and the other as a long-term solution.

For decades, constructing “a rule of law society” has been regarded as a critically important mandate for the CCP. But China still suffers from a prevalence of the “rule of man” (renzhi 人治) rather than the “rule of law” (fazhi 法治), which is a major criticism when the public discusses how to “rule the country in accordance with the law.”

Obviously, simply relying on the “rule of law” is not enough to initiate and finally accomplish a change from “a rule of man society” to “a rule of law society.” However complicated the legal system is and however strong the enforcement, ultimately it is people who come out and implement the laws. That means leaders must rely on Confucian appeals to virtue – instilled through ritual or li – to ensure the transition to “rule of law.”

Hence, even as Xi and the whole Party leadership pledge to forge “the rule of law” as a principle of governance for the CCP, we should not assume that this indicates an absolute preference for fa over li. Both from a historical perspective and with an eye on the unique issues of contemporary China, it might be more appropriate and practical to incorporate Legalism and Confucianism. By making use of both fa and li, China can move toward a society that follows the principle of a “unity of knowing and doing” (知行合一).