Japan’s Southeast Asian Friends

Even as Japan’s troubled relations with South Korea and China continue to dominate headlines, an aspect of Japan’s regional diplomacy that receives far less attention is the country’s very positive relationships with the majority of Southeast Asian nations. In a 2014 Pew Global Attitudes survey, all of the five Southeast Asian countries surveyed viewed Japan quite favorably. Seventy seven percent of Indonesians, 75 percent of Malaysians, 80 percent of Filipinos, 81 percent of Thais, and 77 percent of Vietnamese had “favorable views” of Japan. Japan’s positive image in Southeast Asia puts it ahead of Pakistan, India and China.

Japan’s presence in the region was not always so well-received, of course. When Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei toured Southeast Asia in 1974, he was greeted by protests in Bangkok, Jakarta, and elsewhere. Protests were directed against Japan’s increasing economic presence in these countries and Japanese business methods. But relations with Southeast Asia began to improve in 1977, with the adoption of the Fukuda Doctrine, which pledged that Japan would never again become a military power or produce nuclear weapons, would  promote “heart-to-heart” contacts with the nations of Southeast Asia, and would endeavor to support the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and improve relations with Vietnam.

Since then, Japan has sought to play a more independent role from the U.S. in the region and has increasingly been seen as a constructive partner and mentor, though concerns about Japan as a threat did linger. Those concerns were particularly heightened during the 1980s when the U.S. began encouraging Japan to take on a more active role in their bilateral security alliance.

However, unlike Japan’s relationships with South Korea and China, issues of historical remembrance do not feature prominently in its diplomacy with Southeast Asia. During the 1982 and 1986 textbook controversies, precursors to the ongoing disputes today, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam never made the same connection between unapologetic histories and militarism that South Korea and China did. The relative insignificance of memory-related issues – in addition to Japan’s role as a significant trade partner, creditor, and source of development aid to Southeast Asia – explains why these relationships continue to quietly hum along today, in contrast the turbulence in Northeast Asia.

The focus on the economic aspect of the relationship has meant that until recently Japan was not seen as a major strategic player in the region. That is beginning to change. With greater uncertainty about Chinese intentions and actions in the South China Sea, Japan is engaging in capacity building with a defensive purpose in the region.

In December 2013, the Philippines announced that it would receive a $184 million soft loan from Japan to purchase 10 new, multi-role patrol boats for the Philippine Coast Guard from Japan. Two to three of those 10 boats are expected by the third quarter of 2015. The Philippine Coast Guard also received a 1.15 billion yen ($9.5 million) grant to install a communication system throughout the archipelago.

Similarly, Japan announced in August 2014 that it would provide six used surveillance vessels to Vietnam. The used vessels are worth 500 million yen ($4.16 million), and would come with equipment and training to help build Vietnamese maritime patrolling capabilities.

All of the rhetoric surrounding this equipment cooperation is couched in Japan’s desire to uphold the status quo, which dovetails nicely with its professed pacifist identity. Foreign policies often take time to change – particularly in postwar Japan – but signs of a shift are unmistakable, albeit one designed to maintain continuity in Japan’s international identity.

For example, Japan’s Development Cooperation Charter was revised this March for the first time since 2003. Under the updated charter, Japan’s Official Development Aid (ODA) can be used to support foreign militaries in noncombat operations such as disaster relief, infrastructure building, and coast guard activities. Until the revision, ODA was limited to infrastructure building and poverty fighting. The 2014 ODA White Paper also called for stronger ties with ASEAN states to ensure Japan’s own national security.

However, there is only so much that cash-strapped Japan can do alone, even if it redirects its significant ODA resources toward new priorities. Yet these constraints, ironically, provide another opportunity for Japan to build partnerships throughout the Asia-Pacific: Japan’s limitations, if properly recognized, can foster greater trilateral cooperation between Japan, the U.S. and Australia to coordinate their engagement with Southeast Asia. Fiscal constraints can force like-minded donors to increase their engagement with each other in order to build the surveillance and deterrence capabilities of maritime and littoral states in efficient and non-redundant ways. Greater coordination with the U.S. and Australia to increase cooperation with Southeast Asia is a win-win for Japan.

Neighboring populations with hostile emotions toward it in South Korea and China, it is easy to forget the considerable “soft” (and for that matter, financial and economic) power that Japan still exercises in Southeast Asia. The Japanese themselves are very conscious of this – and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has demonstrated his acumen in this regard by becoming the first Japanese prime minister to have visited all 10 ASEAN states while in office.

Of course, these friendships cannot be taken for granted. Southeast Asia will continue to be a region where China and Japan contest for influence. However, recent developments represent a greater willingness by Japan to increase the repertoire of tools with which it can engage a region that has hitherto not played a meaningful role in Japanese diplomacy.