Nice Belt, Bad Road?

It was a busy May for Xi Jinping. From May 7 to 12, he visited Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus, timing his visit around the Victory Day parade in Moscow on May 9. Then on May 14, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrived in Xi’s hometown, Xi’an, for talks with the Chinese president. All along the way, Xi continued to push his administration’s signature foreign policy initiatives, the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road – with very different results.

Often referred to collectively as the “Belt and Road,” the two projects are undeniably linked, but they are unfolding quite differently. The overland version – the Belt – has found a welcome audience in Central Asia, South Asia (Pakistan and Afghanistan), and even Eastern Europe. These countries are eager for development funds, particularly loans that will help build up crucial infrastructure networks. More importantly, these states generally do not see China as a strategic competitor.

Thus Xi’s tour in Central Asia and Eastern Europe was heavy on wins for the Silk Road Economic Belt. In Kazakhstan, President Nursultan Nazarbayev renewed his country’s commitment to the Chinese project. In the last six months, Kazakhstan has already received Chinese promises for infrastructure, energy, and industry project funding worth nearly $40 billion – it’s well satisfied with the prospect of the Belt and eager to reap the benefits.

In Moscow, too, Xi made headway, as he and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to link their separate (and some would say competing) visions for Central Asia. The Silk Road Economic Belt and the Eurasian Economic Union should, in theory at least, reinforce each other moving forward.

And in Belarus, Xi found a country willing to play the role of the Silk Road’s gateway to Europe. In practice, Belarus will probably not be an integral part of the Belt – according to official maps in Chinese state media, the main trunk will move from the Middle East to Turkey, and then up through southern Europe via Greece. Still, Belarus’ welcoming attitude is indicative of the reception Beijing’s project will receive in Eastern Europe as a whole. 

It’s a different story when it comes to the other half of the Belt and Road – China’s “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” (often simply called the MSR). In this regard, Modi’s visit to China, coming so soon on the heels of Xi’s Silk Road successes abroad, are telling. Despite a warm, almost jovial, atmosphere, and a concerted effort to focus on economic cooperation, Modi has not signaled any intention to link India to China’s MSR. It was the same story when Xi visited India in September 2014. Despite the fanfare and the need for deliverables, New Delhi showed no interest in joining the project.

India is suspicious about the MSR for a number of concrete reasons, but at heart the main issue is strategic. India sees China as at best a complicating factor and at worst a liability on many issues of great importance to New Delhi, from its fraught relationship with Pakistan to China’s maneuvering in the Indian Ocean (not to mention the border dispute between the two states). As a result, there simply isn’t much strategic trust between the two neighbors. New Delhi views China as at least a potential (if not an active) strategic competitor, and thus has little incentive to join the MSR.

India also has specific concerns about the Belt and Road – including China’s plans for investing in Pakistan as well as Indian Ocean maritime states like Sri Lanka and the Maldives – that will need to be addressed before it embraces the concept. But China may never be able to explain its motives to India’s satisfaction, given the strategic trust deficit that exists between the two capitals.

Not having the Indian Ocean’s most influential maritime power on the MSR is a blow, but not an insurmountable one. The problem is that India is not alone in its concerns. A number of maritime states in Southeast Asia have strategic concerns about China that complicate their participation in the MSR. Territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and impressions of Chinese assertiveness in pursuing its claims, may ultimately doom the MSR.

When it comes to China’s rival claimants for maritime features in the South China Sea, Vietnam and the Philippines are the two most vocal. It’s not surprising then that these countries are also the most reticent to join the MSR. The Philippines has made no official announcements regarding the MSR – some analysts even speculate that it had not been invited to join, though China denies this. Even if invited, Manila is likely to be extremely hesitant about participating, just as it appears to be rethinking its participation in China’s new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

Vietnam, meanwhile, initially made approving comments about the MSR. However, Beijing’s decision to deploy an oil rig in what Vietnam claims as its exclusive economic zone last summer seems to have altered that calculus. Though Hanoi and Beijing have been making moves to repair their relationship, Vietnam’s participation in the MSR is now an open question. In April, during a visit to China by Vietnam’s Communist Party secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, Beijing felt the need to publish a commentary urging Vietnam to take China up on its invitation to join MSR. “It takes two to tango,” Xinhua said, pointing to the benefits of the project. Apparently, Vietnam has not decided to “tango” just yet. 

It’s not just China’s rival claimants that have their doubts, either. Indonesia is in the midst of a push to develop its maritime prowess by becoming a “global maritime fulcrum.” China hopes that the MSR can complement Indonesia’s own project, a plan that was officially agreed to during President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s visit to China this March. However, Jokowi still has questions. He told South China Morning Post, “I don’t know the details of the Silk Road agenda… But if the cooperation can give benefit to my people and can give benefit to our national interest and also to China, OK.” The key word there is “if” – if the project is seen as beneficial to Indonesia’s national interests, not just to China’s.

The MSR thus faces suspicion among some of the most high-profile partners – those right in China’s backyard, no less. While the Silk Road Economic Belt enjoys concrete progress, with pipelines, roads, and railways putting the plan into action, the MSR is falling behind.