How History Dooms Japan’s UN Security Council Bid

Japan’s foreign policy energies have historically been directed toward two ends: maintaining the strength, and hence deterrent effect, of the U.S.-Japan alliance and advancing its goals through diplomacy in the United Nations. While Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has gotten a lot more attention for his domestic security reforms and efforts to upgrade the U.S.-Japan alliance, he has been no less active on the UN front, as he strongly supports Japan becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC).

When Abe gave a speech at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2014, he declared that “Japan seeks to become a permanent member of the Security Council, and take on an appropriate role that the status requires.” Abe also declared 2015 and 2016 as “years for taking concrete action” on UN reform. However, despite Abe’s aspirations for Japan to make a more “proactive contribution to peace,” his goals are undermined by his own words and his government’s actions, which stir old wounds and antagonize Japan’s neighbors.

The structure of the UNSC is historically rooted in the aftermath of World War II. Even today, 70 years after the war’s end, the five victor states – the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China – are recognized as permanent members with veto powers, regardless of their current contributions to the international body. In 1995, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the UN’s founding, there were some attempts at reform, which were repeated in 2005. Japan, along with Germany, India, and Brazil – the so-called Group of Four – is trying build momentum to reform the UNSC this year, the body’s 70th anniversary.

In 2005, the Group of Four tried to push forward a reform agenda, but their plan was not even put to a vote because of opposition from the United States and China. The U.S. wanted Japan to become a permanent member but opposed increasing the overall number of permanent members. China simply opposed Japan’s entry. A different set of four states – known as the “coffee club” – organized to counter the aspirations of each of the Group of Four countries: South Korea, Italy, Pakistan, and Argentina opposed permanent UNSC membership for Japan, Germany, India, and Brazil, respectively.

Japan got the message and has demonstrated that it recognizes the importance of working with other countries to advance its bid. On May 8, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga stated that “in order to promote UNSC reform, we will more positively ask other countries” to support Japan’s UNSC reform plan.

The proposal being discussed this time is different from the 2005 version in two ways. It still aims to increase the number of permanent UNSC members from the current five to 11 (the six new additions will be chosen by secret ballot voting in the UNGA, where each state must attain support from two-thirds or more of UN member nations). One difference, however, is that the 2015 reform plan aims to increase the number of nonpermanent UNSC members from the current 10 to “14 or 15” instead of simply 14. “One or two” of these nonpermanent positions will be allocated to an African country, instead of just one. The support of African countries for the proposal is key because amending the UN Charter requires two-thirds support in the UNGA – and African countries combined have 54 seats in the assembly.

Japan is trying to coordinate reform efforts with the African Union (AU), but differences remain over new permanent members’ veto rights. The AU wants new permanent members to have veto rights, while Japan is willing to freeze this right for 15 years out of deference to the United States, which opposes granting vetoes to new permanent members.

Despite the limits imposed by Washington, the United States fully supports Japan becoming a permanent member – in contrast to a decade ago. The recent U.S.-Japan Joint Vision Statement stated: “The United States looks forward to a reformed UN Security Council that includes Japan as a permanent member.”

Japan, under Abe’s leadership, will lead the drive for UNSC reform. After reaching a consensus with the other Group of Four  nations, a new reform plan will be jointly submitted to the UNGA this fall. However, even if Japan can secure the support of African countries, the final hurdle remains: getting all five Permanent Members, including China, to accept a plan that would necessarily curtail their own power and diminish their privileged position.

Historical Revisionism

For Japan in particular, there’s another challenge. Charges of historical revisionism leveled against the Abe government are particularly damaging for any Japanese initiative in a multilateral setting. Case studies of how Japan’s controversial history textbooks affected Japan’s relationship with China, South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam in 1982, 1986, 2001, and 2005 found that, while these countries reacted to differing degrees, there was usually very minimal direct impact on the bilateral relationship.

However, although Japan’s unapologetic remembrance of its past does not have a significant direct security impact, it does have indirect consequences. In 2005, the textbook issue caused a popular outpouring of anti-Japan sentiment in China. That, in turn, sent a credible signal to third-party states – such as the Philippines and Vietnam – that foiling Japan’s UNSC bid was an issue that China cared deeply about. Though the Philippines and Vietnam were initially supportive of Japan becoming a UNSC permanent member, they eventually succumbed to Chinese pressure.

What Abe and his government should learn from recent history is that comments and behavior that can be interpreted as historical revisionism give China and South Korea an easy means of criticizing Japan. China and South Korea, of course, have tangible, modern conflicts of interest with Japan, but they can gain the moral high ground over Japan in the international community so long as Japan continues to be seen as unrepentant.

Japan, the other Group of Four states, and AU countries all face an uphill battle if they want to reform a power structure that was wrought in war and institutionalized in peace. While it may seem unrelated, Japan can move toward this goal by accepting responsibility for its past, and reconciling with its immediate neighbors before trying to take on the formal role of a global leader.