Modi’s Eastern Act

Diplomacy is full of sloganeering and catchphrases, but they seldom seem to affect outcomes. In the early 1990s, India, untethered from its ties to the Soviet Union, fashioned a sensible slogan for its foreign policy: it would “Look East,” to the economic powerhouses of East and Southeast Asia. That policy, first enacted during the tenure of Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, lasted through the 1990s and the first decade of the new millennium. It was adopted by prime ministers from the Congress Party and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) alike.

So, when Prime Minister Narendra Modi recast the policy last year, after having spent a few months in office, as an “Act East” policy, expectations were high. Modi seemed unsatisfied with “Look” as the operative verb for this policy – it signaled inaction and a quiet observer role for India on the sidelines. By acting eastward New Delhi would not only push for its own interests, both economic and strategic, it would ostensibly play a role in the broader regional discussion about the future of Asia. Modi emphasized this approach when he arrived in Seoul, South Korea, the final node on his eastern tour: “Earlier, it was ‘Look East policy.’ We have had enough of looking east. We now have ‘Act East policy’ – a key component of my government’s foreign policy.”

Did the prime minister’s three-nation tour deliver on his “Act East” vision for India’s relations with East Asia?

Frank Talk

In China, Modi’s visit will be remembered for his sharp divergence from many of his predecessors – most notably, Manmohan Singh. Modi spoke frankly in China about the differences between the two countries, while still acknowledging areas of cooperation. After a brief convergence over their common anti-Western agenda in the 1950s, spearheaded by India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and China’s first premier, Zhou Enlai, relations between India and China have since been fraught. In 1962, the two countries fought a bitter war, which India lost. Since then, despite the continuing salience of their border disputes and overall strategic mistrust, bilateral diplomacy has been rife with platitudes and niceties, amid Chinese border incursions and a runaway $40 billion trade imbalance in China’s favor.

That’s why it mattered that Modi emphasized to China’s leaders “the need for China to reconsider its approach on some of the issues that hold us back from realizing full potential of our partnership” and he “suggested that China should take a strategic and long-term view of our relations.” Modi also told an audience at Tsinghua University that India and China needed to clarify the nature of their disputed border, which is currently demarcated by the Line of Actual Control, to “ensure that our relationships with other countries do not become a source of concern for each other.”

Of course, Modi’s willingness to address these issues publicly and directly on Chinese soil didn’t seem to detract from the more conventional and expected deliverables of an India-China bilateral summit: The Indian leader left China with 21 business-to-business deals worth $22 billion in, 45 memorandums of understanding on a plethora of topics, and assurances of a military hotline between the two countries, among other deliverables. He emphasized his months-old “Make in India” initiative – a bid to tap into India’s long-undercapitalized potential as a global manufacturing hub. Modi’s candid tone on the disputes between the two countries did not limit his emphasis on the need for India and China to address their trust deficit and increase people-to-people ties; Modi remarked that “Indians and Chinese don’t know each other well, much less understand each other.” In an attempt to address this dearth of interaction between the two countries, Modi announced an electronic visa program for Chinese citizens.

Modi, ever the image-conscious leader, tried his hand at novel modes of outreach to the general Chinese population. Ahead of his visit, Modi became the first Indian prime minister to launch an account on Sina Weibo to recreate his hugely popular Twitter presence for a Chinese audience. This experiment produced mixed results: Modi was greeted eagerly by thousands of Chinese netizens, but sure enough, more than a few trolls disparaged India. The Indian media, always alert to any mistreatment of Indian interests abroad, additionally seized on the fact that Chinese state broadcaster CCTV showed maps of India with the disputed territories of Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh omitted. This did little to derail Modi’s fondness for the optics of social media: The Indian prime minister became the first world leader – nay, person – to appear in a selfie with Premier Li Keqiang. (In another social media coup, images of Modi eagerly inspecting Xi’an’s famed terra cotta warriors launched an Internet meme: “Modi looking at things.”)

After his whirlwind tour of Xi’an, Beijing, and Shanghai, Modi set his sights on Ulaanbaatar. Mongolia and India maintain close ties despite obvious strategic synergies between their interests. Sandwiched between Russia and China, Mongolia has found its foreign policy agenda set primarily by its large, powerful neighbors. Still, Mongolia’s ambitious President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj has built a reputation for himself as a savvy diplomat, much like Modi, and has set Ulaanbaatar’s sights on geographically distant partners like India. In Mongolia, Modi and Elbegdorj signed 14 agreements, including on economic, security and defense cooperation. India extended a $1 billion credit line to Mongolia and committed to establishing a cybersecurity facility in Mongolia. The two leaders also agreed to “continue to participate in each other’s defence exercises.” In between official business, Modi managed to snag a photo op on the Mongolian steppes, where he dressed in traditional Mongolian garb, fired a bow and arrow, and even received a horse – perhaps historically and culturally one of the most significant Mongolian assets – as a gift. Of course, he didn’t depart Ulaanbaatar without a selfie, a grinning Elbegdorj by his side.

While China and Mongolia were relative wildcards in terms of deliverables, Modi’s visit to Seoul, South Korea was less so. India and South Korea have called each other “Strategic Partners” since 2010, and have enjoyed the benefits of a tariff-easing Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement for six years. Modi’s latest visit took the relationship to the level of a “Special Strategic Partnership,” an upgrade of sorts built on the two countries common values as democracies and close economic partners. Modi and South Korean President Park Geun-hye signed several agreements, including on defense cooperation and the avoidance of double taxation. Additionally, South Korea will become the second country with which India will hold a formal two-plus-two dialogue, comprising the two country’s top ministers for defense and foreign affairs (Japan is the first). Despite the optics surrounding the visit as an “upgrade” to an already-flourishing bilateral, Modi seemed to think India and South Korea were just getting started. “We have laid the foundation for a relationship that two major Asian countries with shared values should have,” he remarked, suggesting a commencement of sorts.

Being Seen

Despite the atypical focus on social media, cultural diplomacy, and selfies, Modi’s trip went a long way toward generating the longer-term momentum necessary for India to truly “act” east. It also ensured that India (or at least Modi himself) will be seen in the east. That in itself is a commendable achievement for the prime minister; before him, Indian leaders were hardly noticed during their foreign tours (an assertion that goes double for Modi’s soft-spoken, technocratic predecessor, Manmohan Singh).

Modi’s whirlwind tour of three very different East Asian states additionally bookended a diplomatically packed first year in office. Since his inauguration, Modi has visited 18 countries, proving himself to be an adept diplomat and a leader eager to represent India on the world stage. What’s been clear with Modi’s diplomacy – not just in Asia, but globally – is a focus on India’s economic development and growth: the closest thing India has had to a “grand strategy” driving its foreign policy in the new millennium.

Most importantly, Modi has been a confident messenger of India’s role in the world, a salesman of the closest thing to an “Indian Dream.” Speaking in China, Modi remarked that “no other economy in the world offers such opportunities for the future as India’s.” Implicit in these words was an invitation for China, and other states, to come to India out of their own self-interest. Perhaps that’s the unsaid angle in Modi’s bid to act east: convince the East to act toward India instead.