Japan’s South China Sea Strategy

In recent weeks, the world has turned its collective attention to China’s intensive artificial island building activity in the South China Sea, where the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, the Scarborough Shoal and a number of other features are disputed territory. Although Japan is not directly involved in the disputes – China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei have overlapping claims – it is nonetheless an interested party.

Japanese policymakers closely monitor developments in the South China Sea and seek to shape both actual Chinese behavior and the global discourse about such behavior. For Japan, a major concern is that the handling of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea could set a precedent with the potential to negatively affect how China will act vis-à-vis Japan in the East China Sea, where the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are disputed between Japan and China.

If Chinese leaders see their strategy of unilaterally changing the “facts on the water” through increased patrols and island-building go unchallenged in the South China Sea, they may be emboldened to try a more aggressive strategy in the East China Sea. Island-building specifically is not an issue in the East China Sea – what is really at stake for Japan in the South China Sea is the larger issue of offering credible support for smaller states’ sovereignty claims, or at least supporting their right to settle border disputes without threats or the use of force. Japan cannot afford to let the major powers passively sit on the sidelines while China solidifies de facto control over disputed features in the South China Sea through a series of faits accomplis achieved through intimidation.

As Japan has neither the intention nor the capability to act unilaterally to direct outcomes in the South China Sea, it has instead focused on cooperative tactics: trying to operationalize security relationships with interested regional actors; raising awareness of the issue among extra-regional actors; and using multilateral forums to project Japan’s concerns as universal concerns that ought to be shared by all states.

The most prominent example of a regional state with which Japan has increased security cooperation is the Philippines. During a state visit to Tokyo in the first week of June, Filipino President Benigno Aquino declared that the two U.S. allies would begin discussions on a visiting forces agreement so that Japan can use Filipino bases to refuel aircraft and vessels. The Japan Times reported that when such an agreement comes into effect, it would allow Japanese forces to carry out activities in the South China Sea.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe also expressed sympathy for the Philippines’ position toward China’s actions. In a joint press conference with Aquino, Abe said, “On the issues regarding the South China Sea, we express our concerns on the large-scale land reclamation works and reiterate our opposition to any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo.” Tokyo and Manila prepared to hold a joint maritime drill near the South China Sea toward the end of June.

Around the same time as Aquino’s visit to Tokyo, Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani was meeting with his Australian counterpart, Kevin Andrews. After their meeting, Nakatani told reporters that they both shared “serious concern” about China’s reclamation work and would oppose any use of force to unilaterally change the status quo in the South China Sea. The meeting also increased practical cooperation between the two states by moving forward discussion on Japan’s bid to build Australia’s next submarine fleet.

Japan’s South China Sea strategy extends beyond the bilateral level. Trilateral talks between Japan, Australia, and the U.S. held on the sidelines of the Asia Security Summit meeting in late May produced a joint statement in which the three countries pledged to cooperate with the Philippines and other disputant countries to shore up their maritime surveillance capabilities. Another trilateral relationship that has been given added impetus by Chinese activities is the Japan-Australia-India relationship. Freedom of navigation in the South China Sea was one of the issues discussed at the first ever high-level trilateral dialogue in New Delhi between Indian Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar, Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Akitaka Saiki, and Australian Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Peter Varghese.

Not only has the Abe government been focusing on increasing cooperation with Asian states that already recognize their stake in this maritime engagement, but Japan has also been working to pique the concern of states more geographically removed from the sites of conflict.

Abe used his meeting with French President Francois Hollande on the sideline of the Group of Seven (G7) meeting held June 7-8 in Germany to share his concerns about China’s island-building activities. As a member of Abe’s inner circle told The Nikkei Asian Review, it is hard to get Europeans to care about maritime security in Asia because “to Europe, its something happening off in the Far East… Deep down, they don’t want to broach [the subject], in the interest of maintaining relations with the world’s second-largest economy.”

Yet by drawing parallels between Russian actions in Crimea and Chinese actions in the South China Sea, Abe succeeded in keeping his promise to make Asian affairs a key component of the G7 meeting. As a result of his efforts, language was included in the G7 statement that implicitly condemned China’s past and current actions: “We are concerned by tensions in the East and South China Seas… We strongly oppose the use of intimidation, coercion or force, as well as any unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo, such as large scale land reclamation.”

Of course, “a rules-based maritime order,” “maritime security,” “peaceful dispute settlement,” and “free and unimpeded lawful use of the world’s oceans” are goals that all G7 states ultimately benefit from pursuing. However, relatively speaking, Japan stands to gain the most compared to the other G7 states – the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, and Italy – because Japan benefits most from sending a loud and clear signal to China that its escalatory behavior is being monitored.

China increasing patrols or building islands in disputed areas provokes a similar response by other claimants scrambling to “maintain” or “return” to the status quo ante. China is currently probing the major powers’ willingness to do something to stop its escalatory behavior, which impinges on the interests of its smaller Southeast Asian neighbors. To prevent similar behavior from intensifying closer to the home islands, Japan is actively working to forge a unified stance among China’s neighbors and the world’s major powers.