Japan and Asia: Dances with the Dragon

In every discussion of Japan’s relations with Asia, especially since the return to power in 2012 of Shinzo Abe, there is a need to specify “which Asia.” 

On the one hand, there is, in Northeast Asia, Japan’s isolation amid its lingering history-related frictions with neighbors, and, on the other hand, its relatively friendly ties with the rest of Asia.

The rise to power of a hawkish nationalist and revisionist prime minister in Japan has coincided with a sharp transformation in China’s foreign policy. In this game-changing turn, the newly invigorated China discarded three decades of Deng Xiaoping’s “keep a low profile” policy to evolve towards a muscle-flexing new power under its current President Xi Jinping.

The Japanese voters may not have intended it this way, but the fact is that while nervousness mounted in Asia in the face of an increasingly assertive China and the unsettling context of declining American influence, Japan, the second most powerful country in the region, has elected a leader in the person of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe with the potential to offer a badly needed alternative to China’s growing shadow in the region.

Inconvenient Past

Too bad that this potential had to come with a strong dose of nationalistic revisionism that ended up adding unnecessary tensions to an already volatile Northeast Asia. Add Abe’s excessive subservience to America’s strategic interests, and the resulting poison in the geopolitical atmosphere of the region has unfortunately contributed to weaken Japan’s weight as a reliable regional counterbalance to China.

Seventy years after the last world war, it is unfortunate that Japan’s diplomatic agenda in Asia is still largely weighed down by its failure to properly address its inconvenient wartime past and to resolve the subsequent emotional antagonism.

To be fair, the blame is not Japan’s alone. With their endless populist exploitation of the “history” issue for domestic political purposes, China and South Korea have managed to create “apology fatigue” in Japan, pushing an exasperated Japanese population into the embrace of revisionists like Abe. They thus helped vindicate the revisionists in Japan who advocate a patriotically “correct version” of history wherein Imperial Japan not only did nothing wrong but was rather a victim that was forced into war, that suffered tremendous atrocities (two atomic bombs!), and that heroically “liberated” most of Asia from European colonial rule. Advocates of this version believe Imperial Japan deserves to be “thanked” by the rest of Asia for its wartime behavior.

Northeast Asia: China and Korea

When China dropped Deng Xiaoping’s “low profile doctrine” and started – in its own way – to seek more respect as a new power, Japan, until then the sole Asian power, could have reacted with tact by acknowledging China’s inevitable rise and by cooperating and orienting the new power in the direction of bringing prosperity to all of Asia, without of course neglecting the necessary vigilance against Chinese military expansion. Instead, jealous of losing its leading role in Asia, Japan has opted for the quixotic approach of trying to “contain” China’s rise.

Tokyo first got itself embroiled in a bitter territorial feud with China. This was the last thing the already volatile region needed, being the consequence of mismanagement and misunderstandings on both sides. It did not help that the dispute was politically exploited on the Chinese side into a violent anti-Japanese nationalist campaign in the context of Beijing power struggles. On the Japanese side, the feud helped Abe promote a popular fear of China which in turn helped advance his cherished agenda of ridding Japan of its long-held pacifism to re-emerge as a military power.

The emotional spat could only worsen with Abe defiantly attempting to whitewash Japan’s wartime record while embarking on a vast diplomatic drive aimed, among other purposes, at rallying countries around the Middle Kingdom to a China-containing coalition.

While motivated primarily by the threat of a rising military power next door, Abe’s drive to contain China also stems from his eager cooperation with the U.S. strategy in Asia, making almost no effort to hide his aspiration of serving as a “sheriff’s deputy” in this region. Nevertheless, time and again, the “sheriff” – that is, Washington – had to intervene to rein in its over-zealous ally from overdoing it and provoking China into a disastrous war. It took almost two years for Barack Obama’s administration to ram the message through to Abe about the need to be more flexible in dealing with China. Flexible means mixing containment with engagement while refraining from unnecessary provocations with a revisionism that convinces nobody outside Japan.

Fortunately, while Abe is pushed by America to seek a thaw with China, the latter has also come to realize that, with a slowing economy at home, it can no longer afford to shun the neighbor that is the world’s third economy, however despicably revisionist this neighbor might be.

After three years of bitter quarrel over who owns the small rocks in the East China Sea known in Japan as the Senkaku (and in China as the Daioyu) and also over whether Japan did invade China or not (not sure, according to Abe, “because the definition of invasion has not been academically and legally established”), there is now finally a mutual willingness to at least talk to each other.

Depending on how China reacts to the much-anticipated statement that Abe is to put out in mid-August for the 70th anniversary of the end of the war (notably to how the Japanese leader addresses Japan’s wartime responsibilities in this statement), there is hope for a further thawing in the still icy ties between Asia’s two giants.

The fact that the Japanese premier is contemplating a hitherto unthinkable visit to China in the coming fall seems to indicate that the hawkish revisionist is ready to swallow his nationalistic pride and come up with a conciliatory statement acceptable to China (and South Korea) and therefore capable of defusing the tension in the region. Beijing’s milder than expected reaction to Tokyo’s adoption of a new “proactive” defense policy, as well as the unusually warm reception it accorded to Abe’s national security advisor in mid-July can be interpreted as additional signs of a willingness to lower the temperature.

South Korea

As much as Japan’s relations with China are shackled by the history of war, its ties with South Korea are hampered by Japan’s colonial history on the peninsula. The messy exchanges of Korean popular resentment and angry Japanese denials regarding this history have dominated the landscape of bilateral relations even though both countries share democratic values and are vital partners in the American-led trilateral alliance facing the Communist regimes in Asia.

The endless squabbling between the two “allies” took a turn for the worse with the return to power of Abe and his flagrant display of revisionism, denying Japan’s past misdeeds in Korea. It has reached the point where America had to seriously worry about seeing Abe’s revisionism push angry South Korea to form an anti-Japanese alliance with China. The rapid rapprochement between Seoul and Beijing was of such concern for Obama that he personally stepped in last year and literally coerced the Japanese and South Korean leaders into talking to each other again.

Under U.S. pressure, the reluctant bilateral dialogue has recovered to the ministerial level, but the hard feelings remain and there is still no prospect of a summit between Japan’s Abe and Korean President Park Geun-hye.

Here again, Abe’s scheduled “70th Anniversary Statement” will be a determining factor for the future of bilateral ties. The Korean president is under pressure to mend fences with Japan. But if the staunchly revisionist Japanese prime minister persists in his convenient version of history, notably regarding the emotive issue of comfort women, the statement could derail any budding hope for an end to Japan’s isolation in Northeast Asia.

Southeast Asia

If there is a place in Asia where Japanese diplomats can be spared the bitter contentious issue of their country’s wartime past, it is in Southeast Asia.

This is not to say that bitterness over Japan’s wartime misdeeds is nonexistent in Southeast Asia. People in the region still remember the brutality of Imperial Japanese occupation, such as the massacre perpetrated in Singapore. But overall, unlike China and Korea, ASEAN countries, in their struggle for postwar economic development, have generally preferred to put a lid on such memories in favor of economic cooperation with Asia’s most developed country.

This pragmatic attitude of the Southeast Asians has led many Japanese to believe the revisionist myth that Southeast Asians are “grateful” to the Imperial Japanese Army for having “liberated” them from European colonial rule. Trying to correct the misunderstanding, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, for one, has diplomatically advised the Japanese to “acknowledge their past wrongs.” His words have fallen largely on deaf ears.

Anyway, the (official) Japan-friendliness of the region has for decades made Southeast Asia a favorite destination for Japanese investments, especially in 2013 when Japanese business fled from the violent anti-Japanese riots in China.

But with the rise of China and its growing assertiveness in South China Sea, combined with its economic offensives in the region, Southeast Asia is becoming ground for a tug-of-war between Japan and China. ASEAN stands to benefit from this competition.

Since his return to power in 2012, Abe has visited Southeast Asia three times, while hosting in Tokyo a special ASEAN summit in 2014 as well as a summit of the Mekong countries in July this year. 

Given the pressing threat of Chinese expansion, it came as no surprise that, despite their lingering memories of Japanese wartime atrocities, ASEAN countries have welcomed Abe’s policy for a greater Japanese defense role abroad, with talk of an increased Japanese military presence in the South China Sea.

However, Japan needs to take into account the division within ASEAN countries in their attitudes towards China. In general, the Philippines and Vietnam, who face a Chinese threat on their doorsteps, tend to welcome the prospect of increased Japanese strategic involvement. On the other hand, “inland” countries like Cambodia and Laos are more sensitive to Chinese influence and correspondingly less receptive to Japanese defense-related proposals.

Moreover, Japan must keep in mind that the general Japan-friendliness in ASEAN cannot be taken for granted. Despite a traditional Sinophobia in the region and renewed vigilance against Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, the region’s economy is closely linked to China’s and, forced to choose sides, Japan is hardly a shoo-in. One such example can be seen in the recent rush of ASEAN countries to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, in defiance of strong Japanese objections.

India

The Sino-Japanese competition for influence in Southeast Asia is primarily over the strategic sea lanes through the region. In this sense, the Indian Ocean is of no less importance for both.

China is stepping up its presence in South Asia, promoting its Maritime Silk Road project, planning an Economic Corridor through Pakistan, and stationing a naval fleet off Somalia in the framework of international policing against pirates.

In this part of Asia, Japan is finally free of the burden of its wartime history. Both Tokyo and New Delhi have territorial disputes with China and they share a strong wariness of the growing Chinese presence. Since Abe’s return to power, there has been a marked rapprochement between Japan and India, in terms of economic cooperation but also in defense areas such as joint military exercises and arms sales. The two countries are collaborating in helping Southeast Asian countries beef up their defense capabilities, with India helping where pacifist Japan cannot. They are also negotiating the sale of Japanese-built amphibious transport aircraft.

With Abe lifting Japan’s self-imposed ban on the export of armament, there is even speculation about the possible sale of Japan’s sophisticated submarines and the state-of-the-art missile defense system it is jointly developing with the United States.

However, as with Southeast Asia, and despite a shared eagerness to counter Chinese advances in South Asia, Abe’s Japan has had to again adapt its approach to India’s reluctance to unnecessarily provoke Beijing’s ire. For example, the Japan-India bilateral foreign affairs and defense dialogue (the so-called 2+2) remains at the level of vice-ministers due to New Delhi’s hesitation to upgrade it to the ministerial level, for fear of Chinese displeasure. India has also recently joined the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization, attracted by the economic potential of China and Central Asia.

Australia

Since Abe’s return to power, Australia has figured more prominently on Tokyo’s diplomatic agenda. Both close allies of United States, the two countries share common security concerns in the Pacific.

Bilateral relations have not always been smooth, since many Australians still harbor resentment over Japan’s wartime conduct, notably its brutal treatment of Australian POWs. Australian antipathy toward Japanese whaling is another obstacle. And Japanese economic inroads in Australia also prompted concerns in the 1990s, until eclipsed by the growing Chinese presence.

Despite ups and downs in the bilateral ties, the rise of China and its impact on regional security have prompted the two countries to overcome their differences and come together, particularly on matters of defense. Talks are underway for the sale of Japanese submarine technology to Australia.

It certainly helped that the prime ministers of the two countries seem to have a particular affinity for each other. In 2014, in a landmark speech to the Australian parliament, Abe achieved the stunning feat of putting to rest the bilateral “history” issue without a formal apology. For his part, Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott in the same year became the first foreigner to take part in a meeting of the Japanese National Security Council. He also declared Japan “Australia’s best friend in Asia,” even though China now has the uncontestable position of Australia’s largest trade partner.

Exasperated by decades of Chinese and Korean demands for a proper apology for their country’s wartime conduct, many Japanese find relief in the Australian attitude of foreswearing such politics of apology, despite residual memories of the suffering inflicted by Imperial Japan. But as polls reveal, Australian public opinion does not necessarily hold Japan in higher esteem than it does China. Tokyo would err if it were to take the generous attitude of Australia for granted.

Limits

Since regaining premiership in 2012, Abe has travelled extensively in Asia but has yet to pay a bilateral visit to China. However, “China” has been unquestionably present in the minds of everyone Abe has spoken with in Asia.

Japan encounters in Asia partners who are eager to benefit from its economic cooperation and modern technology, and who moreover welcome what the new strategically “proactive” Japan can offer to help hold in check Chinese assertiveness. Nevertheless, these partners will baulk if they sense an attempt by Abe to recruit them into what looks even remotely like an anti-Chinese coalition.

Tokyo may feel vindicated by the positive reactions of Asian countries to its new “proactive” defense posture. But this welcoming mood is conditioned within the context of the general attitude in the region: “The new proactive Japan may assist America in guaranteeing our safety and continued prosperity, but ultimately it’s China that will make us richer.”

This ambivalence regarding Japan shows that, despite Tokyo’s boasting about Japan’s diplomatic success under Abe’s watch, Japan is still viewed as no more than a loyal proxy of Uncle Sam, albeit a rich one, and that, when push comes to shove, few would be willing to give up the overwhelming economic potential of China in favor of Japan.

The embarrassing diplomatic isolation Japan experienced in March with the creation of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (almost every “friend” in the world joined the AIIB in total disregard of U.S. and Japanese objections) should underscore that point for Tokyo.