The China-Russia Honeymoon: Beyond Ukraine

On July 8, Xi Jinping arrived in Ufa, Russia for the twin BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization summits. It was his second trip to Russia in two months, coming after his attendance at the May 9 “Victory Day” parade in Moscow. Russian President Vladimir Putin has promised to return the favor by attending China’s own parade commemorating the end of World War II. All told, Xi has visited Russia four times, and Putin has come to China twice, since Xi assumed office in March 2013. The frequency of those exchanges provides clear evidence of the growing closeness between two neighbors who have had their share of friction over the years.

There’s a tendency to chalk the blossoming Sino-Russian friendship up to the Ukraine crisis. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for rebels in eastern Ukraine drove a wedge between Russia on one hand and the United States and the European Union on the other. U.S. and EU sanctions forced Russia to turn east to try to keep its economy afloat – and China is a natural partner. On an economic level, energy-hungry China provides a much-needed alternative market for Russia’s oil and gas exports. Politically, China is a large enough world power to allow Russia to reject claims by U.S. President Barack Obama that Moscow has been successfully isolated.

There’s no denying that the Ukraine crisis accelerated the growth of China-Russia relations. However, the roots of Sino-Russian cooperation can be traced back before the spring of 2014. In March 2013, Xi chose Russia as the destination for his first trip abroad as president, sending a clear signal about China’s foreign policy priorities under his leadership. Back then, a year before the Ukraine crisis broke, Xi told a Russian audience that the China-Russia relationship is “one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world” and “the best relationship between major countries” (a clear dig at the United States, which dismissed Xi’s formula of a “new model of major country relationship”). Xi added:

China and Russia will forever be good neighbors, good friends, and good partners, taking concrete actions to firmly support each other on respective core interests, on respective development and renewal, on following the development paths suited to our national conditions, and on success in our affairs and endeavors.

Perhaps the most surprising aspect of China-Russia relations is how well they have been able to cooperate in the region most analysts expect will eventually tear them apart. Central Asia has traditionally fallen under Russia’s purview. As China seeks to expand its influence in the region (in part as a bid to ensure stability in Xinjiang), many analysts expected that China and Russia would inevitably enter into a competition for primacy. That hasn’t happened. Instead, China has seemed content to let Russia play the dominant security role while China limits its cooperation to the economic sphere. Even here, Moscow and Beijing have promised to wed what could be competing initiatives: Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union and China’s Silk Road Economic Belt. In Central Asia, the resiliency of China-Russia relations has surprised Western analysts.

What likely leads observers to underestimate the strength of the China-Russia relationship is the fact that the two countries are bound together less by shared strategic interests than by a shared dissatisfaction with the status quo. Both have repeatedly stated their desire for changes to the international order that give the developing world (and, accordingly, China and Russia themselves) more influence. This is the raison d’être for the BRICS grouping, of which China and Russia are both a part.

But unlike their fellow BRICS, China and Russia are also deeply embedded in the current system, both holding permanent seats on the UN Security Council. For them, the quest for a “more democratic” international system is less about gaining voice and influence (which both already enjoy, albeit not to the extent they would like) and more about lessening the control of the West – particularly the United States. Both Putin and Xi share a strong desire to put an end to the Pax Americana. As Xi put it in March 2013, “No country of group of countries can dominate world affairs single-handedly.”

This pushback against a unipolar world, more than any other single factor, is the root of China-Russia cooperation. Both chafe at the power wielded by Washington under the current system, a dissatisfaction compounded by the fact that the governments in Moscow and Beijing are intensely wary of the liberal views on universal rights that characterize U.S. global leadership. The idea of “responsibility to protect,” for example – the argument that the international community has not only the right but the moral duty to intervene in a sovereign state if human rights atrocities are being committed – is anathema to Moscow and Beijing alike. When Xi spoke of China and Russia supporting each other on “following the development paths suited to our national conditions,” it was thinly veiled code for “telling the U.S. to butt out of our political systems.” Both China and Russia frequently come under fire for human rights violations; sticking together gives more credence to their curt dismissals.

Distrust in Western leadership may seem like a nebulous unifying force, but it has led to real outcomes. China and Russia routinely protect each other’s interests, most notably on the UN Security Council. China stuck with Russia in vetoing four separate UNSC resolutions that would have held Russian partner Bashar al-Assad accountable for atrocities committed during the Syrian civil war. In turn, Russia stood alone with China in voting against holding a UN Security Council briefing on human rights violations in North Korea. So closely do China and Russia generally work in concert on the UNSC that U.S. officials claimed a diplomatic victory when China merely abstained from voting on – rather than vetoing, as Russia did – a resolution declaring the Crimea referendum invalid.

The tensions inherent in China-Russia relations (including the potential for competition in Central Asia and the global arms market) are real. After all, 40 years ago the countries were at such odds that the United States normalized relations with China largely to get under the Soviet Union’s skin. But it’s past time to stop viewing potential flashpoints as insurmountable obstacles to China-Russia cooperation. As long as both countries prioritize their shared goal of remaking the international order, they are likely to find far more commonalities than differences on the international stage.As long as Washington maintains its position of dominance, Moscow and Beijing will have many a common cause to celebrate. Should they achieve their goal of creating a multipolar world – that’s when things will get truly interesting.