Untangling Japan’s Stake in the South China Sea

Japan’s emergence as an active extra-regional player in the South China Sea disputes is a relatively recent phenomenon. Even though the only concrete step that Japan has actually taken so far is to help build the maritime capacity of non-Chinese disputant states such as the Philippines and Vietnam, there is increasing chatter about the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) participating in joint patrols of the South China Sea.

To give just one example, on July 16, Admiral Katsuyoshi Kawano, chief of the Self-Defense Forces’ Joint Staff, said during a speech given in Washington, D.C. that “we consider [patrols and surveillance activities in the South China Sea] as a potential future issue to be considered depending on how things pan out.” An ambiguous and minimalist comment for sure, but, significantly, one that did not close the door to greater Japanese involvement.

But why has Japan even been drawn into this region? To be clear, Japanese concern over the South China Sea disputes goes back to as early as the February 1995 Mischief Reef incident. But Tokyo’s willingness to openly contemplate the use of the JSDF is new. What are the “interests” that Japan must defend in these distant waters? And why does it feel the need to talk about its willingness to defend these interests now?

There are a few distinct dimensions of Japanese concerns that are worth untangling and exploring in greater depth.

First, Japan is concerned about the impact of tensions in the South China Sea on Japanese shipping and, by extension, its economy. Japan’s main economic concern is that tensions in the region could have a spillover effect on freedom of navigation through the South China Sea. As a resource-poor island nation, Japan is extremely dependent on imports and exports – most of which are transported by sea. There is not yet serious anxiety that China will directly restrict commercial shipping through the South China Sea; however, as Scott-Cheney Peters, chairman of the Centre for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), has pointed out, if Chinese actions continue to escalate, shipping through the area could be indirectly restricted by rising regional tensions.

Second, Japan is also concerned about the political impact on Southeast Asian states in the absence of U.S. balancing. While economic effects are worrying, they could be mitigated and absorbed through stockpiles and other unilateral measures. However, the geopolitical concern about the “Finlandization” of Southeast Asia’s littoral states still looms large, and these worries cannot be addressed without directly engaging China. Robert Kaplan raises the possibility of the Finlandization of Vietnam, the Philippines, and Taiwan – in the absence of balancing by more capable outside actors – multiple times in Asia’s Cauldron (2014). Japan wants to help maintain the freedom of action of Southeast Asian littoral states so they can keep their independence and autonomy in choosing how to deal with Japan.

This point brings us to Japan’s third concern: a general obsession with upholding international law – which includes norms about state sovereignty and the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes – and specific concerns about how the South China Sea disputes could set negative precedents for how China deals with the East China Sea.

As I have argued previously, if Chinese leaders see their strategy of changing the “facts on the water” through unilateral actions that contravene international norms go unchallenged in the South China Sea, they are likely to be more emboldened to try the same strategy in the East China Sea. For Tokyo, what is really at stake in the South China Sea is the credibility of Japan’s allies to stand in support of smaller states’ claims to sovereignty and their right to settle border disputes without using force or the threat of same. Japan cannot afford to let the major powers sit passively on the sidelines while China solidifies de facto control over disputed features in the South China Sea through a series of fiat accompli carried out through intimidation.

Basic differences in geography between the East and South China Seas mean that the issue is much simpler in the East than the South China Sea (for example, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are indisputably islands, unlike many of the features in the South China Sea), and therefore, Chinese tactics would likely be different. Still, the same basic norm is at stake: states’ rights to peacefully resolve disputes within a transparent legal framework. Having constitutionally renounced the use of force, Japan is a state dependent on, and enamored of, international law.

All these are good reasons for Japan to get involved. Yet one last piece of the puzzle remains: Japan’s alliance considerations. This also helps explain the timing of Japan’s response. At first glance, Japanese willingness to discuss deterrence activities in the South China Sea now is mostly a direct response to China’s naval buildup and increased island reclamation activities. But it also has to do with Japan’s fourth set of concerns: about proving to the U.S. that Japan can be, and is, a serious, credible partner in the United States’ rebalance to Asia.

In order to alleviate its abandonment concerns vis-à-vis the U.S., Japan wants to show off its willingness to get involved in the South China Sea to demonstrate to the U.S. that Japan is a reliable security partner. As Cheney-Peters of CIMSEC told The Diplomat:

Although the capabilities will provide significant benefits for the duration of [intermittent or occasional] participation, it will mostly amount to a signaling of intentions to China and partners that Japan sees the South China Sea and issues involved as a crucial security interest and is willing to commit its forces to defend it.

Japan’s eagerness to cooperate with Australia on submarine purchases, for example, is due to its desire to put a “down payment” in support of the U.S. rebalance while Washington tries to figure out how to deal with the external challenge of a rising China and the internal challenge of an economic downturn. Japan’s willingness to cooperate with the U.S. and non-Chinese disputants is another “down payment” to show Washington that U.S. engagement in Northeast Asia will be reciprocated with Japanese engagement in other parts of the world important to U.S. interests, and that Japan is willing to burden-share.

The purpose of the much-discussed joint patrols would be to defend all these multifaceted interests – safeguarding Japan’s economic stability; protecting the autonomy of Japanese partners in Southeast Asia; upholding the norm of peaceful resolution of territorial disputes; establishing the precedent that the world cares about what China does and will vigorously defend the rights of small states; and proving to the U.S. that Japan is an ally worth defending.

However, joint patrols carry the inherent risk of escalation. Michael D. Swaine, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Asia program, argued in a June publication that “Washington should not encourage the JSDF to join the United States in patrolling the South China Sea. Having the JSDF in an area where Japan has no territorial claims (unlike China) and its security and freedom of navigation are not threatened would intensify the emerging security dilemma between the U.S.-Japan alliance and China, as well as promote instability.” A classic security dilemma mixed in with a heavy dose of historical rivalry is a dangerous cocktail.

One way that Japan could still get involved, but much less provocatively, is through a multilateral maritime patrol initiative, what Hiroshi Waguri notionally introduces as the “Asian Multi-Role Patrol Aircraft Coalition” in his July publication. This nonmilitary institution would focus on serving civilian needs, “including maritime patrol and other surveillance operations such as those for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, antipiracy, and anti-trafficking.” As Waguri, a Japan Chair visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, argues, such a civilian-oriented and multilateral approach should ensure that Chinese reactions remain “limited and easier to manage.”

A proposal at the other end of the spectrum, in terms of both provocativeness and likelihood of actualization, would be Japanese minesweeping operations. Such operations will not be necessary in the near future, and, one hopes, will never be necessary. But on July 29, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said during Upper House special committee deliberation on the new security legislation that Japan could – if the security situation in the South China Sea deteriorated that badly – conduct minesweeping operations in the South China Sea: “We will consider it if the situation meets the three conditions [on the use of force under collective self-defense].”

The three conditions are: when an armed attack against a Japanese ally occurs that threatens Japan by posing a clear danger to the people’s right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; when there is no other appropriate means available to protect the Japanese people; and when the use of force is kept to the minimum required level. That’s a pretty high bar and one hopes that it will never be met.