Diplomacy in the South China Sea

Tensions in the South China Sea seem to have reached a tipping point this year as the world began to take serious note of China’s construction of man-made islands – euphemistically dubbed “land reclamation” by many – in the disputed Spratly Islands. Though Beijing has only built artificial islands on features it previously occupied, similar to what other claimants in the South China Sea have done, it has drawn regional and global scrutiny for the vigor and scale at which it has done so. For the other claimants in the region, including Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, Beijing’s activities in the Spratlys are provocative, unwelcome, and worrisome.

For these states, all of which happen to be members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China’s island-building and construction in the Spratlys underlines the urgency of implementing some form of actor-specific legalistic regime in the area. Thanks to the Philippines, which has brought a case against China at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague under the rubric of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), some of this is already underway. Once it decides on the matter of jurisdiction, the Court is expected to rule on a range of issues, though not on sovereignty, that will have implications for how regional states and the international community come to view Beijing’s actions in the region.

At their core, current tensions in the South China Sea stemming from China’s increased activity boil down to one of the oldest problems in international relations: the ability of powerful states to do as they please and the obligation of weaker states to weather perceived injustices as they must (to crudely paraphrase Thucydides). This said, the Southeast Asian claimant states in the South China Sea haven’t accepted this fate just yet. Despite China’s unilateral “land reclamation” activities, diplomacy between ASEAN and China continues.

In late July 2015, senior officials from China and ASEAN member states converged in the Chinese port city of Tianjin to continue deliberations on the implementation of the landmark 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. The delegations also arrived in Tianjin with the considerably more ambitious and binding Code of Conduct for the South China Sea also on their agenda. The community of independent analysts studying the South China Sea had low expectations for the discussions in Tianjin this summer, which went formally under the moniker of the “Ninth Senior Officials’ Meeting on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.”

Although the meetings resulted in few major deliverables on either the Declaration or the Code of Conduct, they weren’t entirely fruitless. Officials left Tianjin having put into place a new mechanism that could help prevent any sort of dramatic military escalation in the South China Sea, which grows increasingly crowded with naval vessels, coast guard, and maritime law enforcement vessels from all claimant states. Specifically, the Tianjin negotiations resulted in a “hotline” connecting the foreign ministers of all involved states. Of course, such a mechanism will be limited in its efficacy in large part due to the fact that foreign ministries in the region – especially China’s – are far removed from the day-to-day activities of military and law enforcement vessels.

Top ASEAN officials who attended the Tianjin talks assessed the outcomes in realistic terms. The Malaysian foreign minister, Anifah Aman, noted that some progress was made despite the erosion of trust in recent months. “While we proceed with the implementation of the DoC and work expeditiously towards the establishment of the CoC, recent developments have raised tension and eroded trust and confidence among parties,” he noted. On the Code of Conduct, Aman added that ASEAN and China had made “important progress.” Thailand’s deputy foreign minister, Noppadon Theppitak, echoed Aman’s assessment, noting that all sides had agreed to “maintain stability” in the South China Sea by “implementing several points achieved as a result of this meeting.”

Looking beyond the peevish positivity of these statements, the Tianjin consultation fell far short of addressing the core issues that stand to threaten the fragile status quo in and around the South China Sea. For example, though Beijing claims that its island-building is complete, construction and militarization continues. Satellite imagery from earlier in the summer presents credible evidence that China is working toward completing a 10,000-foot runway capable of hosting any aircraft in the People’s Liberation Army Air Force, including its strategic bombers. Where other claimant states in the South China Sea had also built military facilities and airstrips in the past, what separates China’s approach is a perception that Beijing plans to project power out from the South China Sea instead of into it.

Viewed from another perspective, the establishment of a hotline is an accomplishment to be commended. After all, China hasn’t always been receptive to multilateralism when it comes to dealing with territorial disputes. Even today, Beijing remains wary of multilateralism. In the two short years since it acquiesced to participation in the ASEAN-led process toward a binding Code of Conduct for the South China Sea, Beijing has continued to pursue what officials have called a “dual track approach.” In Beijing’s view, bilateral disputes ought to be handled bilaterally between China and every claimant state, but overall peace and stability in the South China Sea are best discussed in a joint forum involving China and all ten ASEAN members.

China’s dual track diplomacy has served its interests by exploiting ASEAN’s internal divisions and by allowing Beijing to effectively set the pace for the ongoing process toward a finalized Code of Conduct. The Tianjin talks were a reminder of the gap that exists between the rate at which China is transforming the complex reality “on the water” and the state of regional efforts toward a legalistic regime to prevent escalation and misunderstanding. Beyond Beijing’s foot-dragging on the Declaration and Code of Conduct, South China Sea diplomacy is considerably hindered by divergent interests within ASEAN itself. Consider that just four of ASEAN’s ten member states are direct claimants in the South China Sea issue. The other six states, with perhaps the exception of an outward-looking Indonesia, have little interest in having South China Sea tensions derail a productive relationship China, which continues to bear tremendous economic relevance for this region. Perhaps the clearest manifestation of these divisions were seen in Cambodia in 2012, when ASEAN, for the first time in its history, failed to produce a joint statement after its leaders summit.

The time may have come for ASEAN to ask itself what the goals of diplomacy with China should be, and if they should be immediate. The United States, and certainly South China Sea claimant states in ASEAN, would welcome speedy progress toward the full implementation of the Declaration of Conduct and the conclusion of a Code of Conduct. The way matters stand today, however, China is steadily improving its man-made islands in the South China Sea and asserting its claims to disputed territory – all while sitting across the table from ASEAN officials. If diplomacy is to prove useful in stabilizing the South China Sea, ASEAN and other regional states, including the United States, must emphasize that the timeline for a binding Code of Conduct cannot be measured in years. It must be measured in months. If China succeeds in stringing out these negotiations over years, ASEAN states will have little choice but to tolerate and weather China’s provocations. Time is of the essence for diplomacy to have effect in the South China Sea.