Trilateral Diplomacy to the Rescue in Northeast Asia?

After years of poor relations, represented at the highest levels by the paucity of summitry diplomacy, Japan, South Korea and China are likely to have their first trilateral summit in late October or early November this year in Seoul. South Korean Park Geun-hye and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to restart three-way summit talks when they met in Beijing during Park’s visit to attend Chinese commemorations of victory in the “War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression.”

Trilateral meetings, once an annual event on Northeast Asia’s diplomatic calendar, were suspended in 2012 due to disputes between Japan its neighbors over territorial and historical issues – exacerbated by what South Korea and China saw as the new Japanese leader’s revisionist view of history.

The trilateral summit is an important opportunity for Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, because he is also likely to hold a bilateral summit with Park while in Seoul. Abe has managed to snag two meetings with Xi since November 2014 (and will likely have a third meeting on the sidelines of one of the handful of upcoming international events), but has yet to meet Park tête-à-tête. Meanwhile, Xi and Park have met six times already.

Although there have been discussions about a trilateral summit since March, it was difficult for either Xi or Park to make concrete commitments ahead of the much-anticipated “Abe Statement,” issued by the Cabinet on August 14 to commemorate Japan’s surrender in World War II. Now that the statement is out of the way, and Abe has demonstrated a sufficient effort at reconciliation for Xi and Park, planning can begin in earnest.

Abe and Park face pressure to patch up relations both externally, from the United States, their mutual patron-ally. In order to enhance contingency planning, increase deterrence, and amplify Washington’s ability to shape events in the region, the U.S. wants Japan and South Korea to get along – period.

The emphasis on reconciliation was evident in the U.S. statement commemorating the end of war. President Barack Obama’s statement on September 2 read in part, “The end of the war marked the beginning of a new era in America’s relationship with Japan. … [T]he relationship between our two countries over the last 70 years stands as a model of the power of reconciliation: former adversaries who have become steadfast allies and who work together to advance common interests and universal values in Asia and globally.” That can be read as a subtle hint for countries in the region to focus on what Japan has done since 1945.

Meanwhile, domestic pressure on Abe and Park to arrest the free-fall in relations is also building. According to the third Japan-South Korea joint public opinion poll conducted by Genron-NPO and East Asia Institute in May 2015, more than 80 percent of both Japanese and South Korean citizens believe a Japan-South Korea summit is needed.

Interesting differences emerge when you break down those numbers. In Japan, 81.5 percent of respondents said such a summit was needed. Of those, 38 percent believe “every effort should be made to achieve this” and 43.5 percent believe “it is not urgent.” Out of South Korea’s 86.8 percent in support of a summit, meanwhile, only 16.9 percent believe “every effort should be made to achieve this,” while 69.9 percent believe “it is not urgent.”

Differences in what Japanese and South Koreans believe should be the focus of such a bilateral meeting are even more revealing of the obstacles that Abe and Park have faced. According to the survey, 45.3 percent of Japanese consider a “broad ranging discussion on how to improve relations between the two countries” to be the most important agenda item, while 77.7 percent of South Koreans believe “issues on historical understanding and comfort women” to be the most important, followed by the “Takeshima/Dokdo” issues with 69.3 percent of respondents (respondents could give multiple answers).

With such public backing, Park made resolution of the “comfort women” issue a precondition to talks when she assumed the presidency in February 2013. This position has hindered talks because Japan wanted no preconditions. A senior official reiterated the view of the prime minister’s office to Asahi Shimbun on September 2: “The door is always open for dialogue [with South Korea] as long as Japan is not asked to apologize as a condition for talks.”

Compromise?

But halfway into her five-year term, Park needs to start thinking about her foreign policy legacy, and deteriorating relations with Japan is not a pretty one. She may be more willing to compromise now. Likewise, Abe also wants to improve relations with South Korea and China to moderate his image as a hawk – a diplomatic win is especially important for Abe right now after the passage of his controversial security bills.

Still, challenges remain in the Japan-South Korea relationship – most obviously, the “comfort women” issue. Another issue is the disputed island between Japan and South Korea, known as Takeshima in Japan and Dokdo in Korea. On August 28, the Japanese government posted 99 documents online that back Japan’s historical claims to Takeshima/Dokdo (along with 103 documents supporting Japan’s historical claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, disputed with China), which has had the unfortunate effect of again raising the saliency of the issue with the general public. And finally, there remains the delicate handling of UNESCO’s new World Heritage site, “Sites of Japan’s Meiji Industrial Revolution,” including the island of Hashima, where Korean laborers were forced to work.

On the Chinese front, there is pressure for China to improve relations with Japan because of economic concerns. Yet China is also actively promoting a remembrance of history that rubs Japanese pride the wrong way. It is important to understand that the September 3 military parade in Beijing is unique because it is the first time a military parade celebrated victory over Japan, instead of the October 1 anniversary celebrating the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. Upcoming state-level events with an anti-Japanese overtone include the commemoration of the Liutiaohu Incident on September 18, which triggered the Manchurian Incident, and commemoration of the victims of the Nanjing Incident on December 13.

Difficulties also remain in managing the East China Sea dispute between Japan and China. Reports in mid-September about China continuing gas field development in the East China Sea are raising Japan’s ire, and intrusions by Chinese government and non-government ships in waters around the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands continue. Throughout the month of October, keep an eye on the number of such Chinese patrols: M. Taylor Fravel and Alastair Iain Johnston argued in an April 2014 Washington Post article that China may reduce the number of incursions around disputed areas in an attempt to signal benign intent.

All three Asian leaders want rapprochement to advance their own domestic goals – be it a public relations win, a positive legacy, or economic development. While the trilateral summit is a hard-won victory, significant roadblocks remain to improvement thereafter. It is important to remember that a trilateral summit is not the end goal – it is only be the beginning of a very long and tortuous road to normalize relations among three powers that have yet to learn how to coexist peacefully in a non-hierarchical system.