The Daughters of Dictators

The presidents of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, at the ages of 77 and 75 respectively, are the region’s oldest leaders. Their countries may be young, barely 24 years old, but Islam Karimov and Nursultan Nazarbayev are certainly not. Both may have years yet in them but the obvious question remains: What happens when they die? It’s a multifaceted question but one interesting aspect is the possibility of Karimov and Nazarbayev being succeeded by their respective children. Such familial succession is certainly within the realm of possibility, although admittedly it is far from the most probable course of events.

Karimov and Nazarbayev have had divergent relationships with their offspring. Karimov’s eldest daughter, Gulnara Karimova, lived a whirlwind diplomatic-fashionista lifestyle – serving as Uzbekistan’s permanent representative to the United Nations, leading several NGOs, engaging in numerous business deals in communications, fashion, and music – up until the moment she was placed under house arrest after several corruption scandals broke. The scandals (some of which are still coming to light, over a year later) embarrassed her father and country.

Karimov’s younger daughter, Lola Karimova-Tillayeva, with whom Gulnara didn’t have the best relationship, was described recently by Eurasianet as the “more subdued sibling.” While some have speculated that Lola – who serves as Uzbekistan’s ambassador to UNESCO and thus lives a polished life in Geneva – could follow her father, she doesn’t seem inclined to the position. In late October she took to Instagram in a tirade against power. As translated by Eurasianet, Lola said:

I formulated my attitude to power when I was still a child. I will try to explain this in a way that is short and clear. There are certain primitive people that are certain that power can make anybody happy or that power is the source of absolute pleasure...People with such a mindset cannot even cope with a small amount of power, and use it inappropriately, causing great harm to people and the work they are meant to be performing.

So neither of Karimov’s daughters seem to be in a position to take over. Gulnara hasn’t been heard from in over a year and Lola, it seems, isn’t angling for the presidency either.

Nazarbayev, who has three daughters, more clearly appears to be grooming them for power – or at the very least, positioning them to remain powerful. In particular, his eldest daughter, Dariga, appears poised to step into her father’s shoes. However, experts lists long-time Nazarbayev confidants like Nurtai Abykaev and Karim Massimov – who is again prime minister, after a short hiatus from the office to serve as Nazarbayev’s chief of staff – as more likely successors.

For a time, it looked like Dariga would be pushed out of succession speculation altogether because of the scandals that in 2007 broke apart her marriage to Rakhat Aliyev – who died suddenly in a prison in Austria earlier this year after fleeing accusations of treason, torture, murder, and money laundering. But in recent months Dariga has reemerged, taking a position as deputy prime minister in September. In November she traveled with her father to Europe.

Dinara, Nazarbayev’s second daughter isn’t a public figure, but she is the fourth richest person in the country and married to the third richest, business mogul Timur Kulibaev. Kulibaev is often considered a possible successor, given his wealth and political connections. Being married to a Nazarbayev won’t hurt his chances – unless, like Aliyev, he causes trouble.

The youngest Nazarbayev daughter, Aliya, made headlines recently when news broke that she would star in much-anticipated historical soap opera. Apparently, Aliya is in discussion with the producers of a soap opera glorifying the Kazakh khanate, in which she would play a descendant of Tamerlane. Aliya hasn’t shown political inclinations, but has engaged in several business pursuits, such as owning a spa in Almaty and designing jewelry.

To be clear, there are a multitude of directions for post-Karimov and post-Nazarbayev power politics to take. There is still time for both to manage transfer of power to a chosen successor, for example via an election – albeit, unlikely a free or fair one – but neither has shown much inclination to do so.

Nazarbayev held presidential elections in April, over a year ahead of schedule, and though some speculated he might use the opportunity to step aside, instead the election served as a mandate of sorts ahead of expected (and since realized) economic turbulence. The election wasn’t much of a race; without holding any campaign events Nazarbayev captured an unbelievable 97.7 percent of the vote. In fact, the number is probably close to reality: Kazakhstan has few other politicians with a national profile and none who would think of running against Nazarbayev. As a Guardian article after the election commented, “All top officials are meant to fade into the background to allow Elbasy to shine.” Elbasy is a title that means “Leader of the Nation.”

Still, Nazarbayev is aware of his own dwindling days, in a way. Bloomberg reported in early 2014 – when the presidential election was still scheduled for 2016 – that Nazarbayev had said, “There definitely will be a transition of power – there’s nothing frozen, it will be changed… I was elected until December 2016. The time will come when we’ll talk about it.” That time just hasn’t come yet.

Kazakhstan, more than Uzbekistan, has a cadre of nominally competent politicians and wealthy businessmen with years of experience under Nazarbayev’s wing. In Uzbekistan, Karimov’s style has been decidedly more dictatorial; his purging of potential challengers much more ruthless. Like Nazarbayev, Karimov has engaged in repeated constitutional backflips to remain in power and perpetuates a political system which might not be able to seed a successor.