The Nuclear Option in US-Pakistan Diplomacy

The U.S.-Pakistan relationship has long been a marriage of convenience between two so-called allies whose leaders have never quite agreed. Though this was put on full display primarily after the United States’ 2011 raid against Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, a sense of unease has colored both sides of the bilateral for some time now.

Since Pakistan came out as a declared nuclear power in 1998, its nuclear arsenal has been a constant source of worry and trepidation for U.S. policymakers seeking to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The theory behind U.S. policymakers’ fears about Pakistan is on firm ground, at least. Pakistan is embroiled in a seemingly perpetual rivalry with India, one that often manifests itself in cross-border skirmishes. The U.S. experience with Abdul Qadeer “AQ” Khan was instructive. Khan, a Pakistani nuclear physicist with a central role in the decades-long development of the country’s nuclear weapons program, was found culpable of directly proliferating nuclear weapons technology to third parties, including regimes hostile to the United States in North Korea, Iran, and Libya.

Beyond “insider” proliferation threats like Khan, Pakistan’s government and military have never truly manage to put a lid on militants affiliated with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist groups, who operate freely within their territory. In recent years, the Pakistani government has attempted to neutralize these threats, but the fight is far from over. U.S. intelligence officials have stated that they believe that extremist operatives have infiltrated Pakistan’s military and intelligence communities in the past, potentially presenting a threat to the security of nuclear materials and weapons in the country.

India and Pakistan fought major wars in 1947, 1965, 1971, and 1999. The addition of low-yield, short-range nuclear weapons into this mix is highly destabilizing given Pakistan’s self-avowed nuclear doctrine of asymmetric escalation – meaning the Pakistanis are willing to strike first and to do so even when faced with a conventional threat. In October, Pakistan’s foreign secretary, Aizaz Chaudhary, formally announced Islamabad’s intent to deploy low-yield, or so-called “tactical,” nuclear weapons in a potential future conflict with India.

The Pakistani rationale is that such a posture raises the threshold for Indian conventional escalation; but in reality, with these nuclear devices in the mix, the probability that the world may witness its third wartime use of a nuclear device grows considerably larger. U.S. officials are unwilling to accept the prospects of even a low-yield nuclear event in South Asia.

Is the answer to this well-placed concern a “nuclear deal” with Pakistan? There isn’t a consensus view on this question in the United States or in Pakistan, but the perspective depends on the extent to which analysts see Pakistan’s military and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the country’s infamous intelligence agency, as the prime drivers of its foreign and security policy.

Historically, even during the few years where Pakistan was led by a democratically elected civilian leader, the military, specifically the Chief of Army Staff, represented the locus of control for the country’s foreign and security policy – certainly, this includes Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, which maintains and secures the country’s nuclear arsenal.

Nawaz Sharif is presently prime minister and was democratically elected in May 2013, but increasingly, General Raheel Sharif (no relation to the prime minister), the chief of army staff, is taking charge of security issues. In Pakistani politics, there is often a sense that plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose – the more things change, the more they are the same.

Analysts again disagree on the extent to which the military controls Pakistan’s security policy today. At worst, General Sharif is enjoying the benefits of a “soft coup,” at best, Prime Minister Sharif is free to call the shots as long as he doesn’t cross any red lines set by the military.

In the United States, pessimism about the wisdom of a nuclear deal with Pakistan seems to persist among experts who recognize that any decision for Pakistan on this issue will come down to the military, which has strong incentives to avoid signing up to voluntarily restrict Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

To be sure, there is little doubt that the Pakistani people would benefit from their country gaining access to the nuclear commerce that is available to a “normal” nuclear state. Pakistan is an energy-stressed country and its sudden opening up to civilian nuclear power could be a game changer with an immediate and short-term effect on the standard of living for many Pakistani households.

So far, China – Pakistan’s so-called all-weather ally – has been the sole provider of civilian nuclear technology to Pakistan. It constructed two reactors that went online in 2000 and 2011, respectively. Beijing recently gained approval to construct two more reactors in Karachi using advanced reactor technology. For its cooperation with Islamabad, Beijing has drawn harsh criticism from the international community, in particular the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) of states.

General Sharif visited the United States in late November 2015, a few short weeks after Prime Minister Sharif made a state visit to Washington. No doubt, given meetings with Secretary of State John Kerry, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, Vice President Joe Biden, CIA Director John Brennan, Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley, and his effective counterpart in the U.S. military, General Joseph Dunford, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, there is a good chance that the general will have broached the topic with his U.S. interlocutors.

U.S. officials will have tried to convince the general that Pakistan’s arsenal as it exists today is amply large to deter India and make up for the country’s lack of strategic depth and conventional military advantages. Most estimates note that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is 5 to 10 percent larger than India’s. This will nonetheless likely be an unconvincing line of argument. India will continue to modernize and expand its conventional forces – an eventuality that is plainly clear for Pakistan’s top leaders.

The idea of a nuclear deal with Pakistan is not prima facie bound to fail or harm U.S. interests, but it simply cannot be a diplomatic priority today. The bilateral has never quite sat right. Indeed, the United States has struggled to influence Pakistan’s behavior on other critical issues; “carrot and stick” maneuvering hasn’t worked.

Pakistan’s interest in bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table with the Afghan government waxes and wanes, as does its commitment to fighting U.S.-designated terror groups like the Haqqani network. Indeed, both of these issues were on the agenda as General Sharif visited Washington. The United States indicated that it would suspend reimbursements for Pakistan’s ongoing anti-militant effort, Operation Zarb-e-Azb, over its perception that the country’s military was not adequately focused on mission.

Amid these serious rifts and areas of divergence, the United States would do well to evaluate its critical interests in the subcontinent before entertaining this “nuclear option” seriously. Nuclear risk in South Asia is real and nothing to scoff at, but as long as the Pakistani military steers Islamabad’s foreign and security policy, a deal is likely to change little. Unfortunately, both Pakistan’s history and the status quo today between the two Sharifs suggests that the military’s dominance is not a variable but a constant.