India’s Emerging Indian Ocean Strategy

A few weeks ago, India released its latest maritime guidance document for security operations. Ensuring Secure Seas, the new Indian Maritime Security Strategy (IMSS-2015) is an exposition of India’s nautical challenges, existing maritime practices, shifting technological trends, and evolving operational posture at sea. No sooner was the document released than it prompted a discussion on India’s security role in the Indian Ocean. The new publication focuses attention on India’s maritime imperatives in its near littorals, giving credence to reports that the Indian Navy is preparing to expand its sphere of operations in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

New Delhi’s concern for its maritime neighborhood seems well-founded. Recent developments have given India’s security managers good reason to be worried about the growing threats in the IOR. Despite a decline in piracy off the coast of Somalia, the Indian Ocean has been witnessing a sudden rise in non-traditional challenges. Maritime crime has been increasing, with a record number of drug hauls in the Asian littoral in the last two years (a recent seizure of more than 150 kg of heroin from a smuggling vessel by an Australian warship off the east coast of Africa, serving as the latest reminder of the severity of the drug threat in the IOR). While the Eastern Indian Ocean hasn’t seen the same level of crime as the Western theater, the Indian Coast Guard has been reporting elevated levels of narcotics smuggling in the sub-continental littorals.

Migration and human trafficking in South and Southeast Asia too has registered a surge in numbers. Last year, a rise in refugee movement from Bangladesh and Myanmar, resulted in a humanitarian crisis of unprecedented proportions. While India is still largely unaffected by maritime migration, its coastal communities have been at the receiving end of severe climate-related events, which have over the past few years grown in duration and intensity. The Indian Navy got a preview of the destructive potential of climate change during the floods in Chennai last month, when it had to urgently deploy warships and aircraft to provide aid and assistance to citizens marooned in the city.

Meanwhile, humanitarian operations are an increasing component of the Indian Navy’s security operations matrix. One of the highlights for the Navy in 2015 was Operation Rahat, a massive evacuation exercise involving the rescue of nearly 4000 non-combatants from Yemen, where a Saudi-led air campaign against Houthi rebels have left scores dead and wounded. The benign turn has played a significant part in the projection of the Indian Navy as a regional security provider by underlining its indispensable role in cooperative missions, emphasizing its ideology of “building bridges of friendship” for regional peace.

It is maritime terrorism, however, that most concerns India’s security officials – particularly reports that the Indian coast line is still not fully secure from the threat of terrorist infiltration. While coastal security measures have improved significantly since the 26/11 incident in Mumbai, the Indian Navy and Coast Guard (ICG) have been apprehending Pakistani boats in Indian waters with alarming regularity. In an incident earlier this year, a Pakistani trawler with alleged smugglers is reported to have blown itself up when accosted by the ICG. Another small boat from across the border was found drifting off the Indian side in the Sir Creek region recently, very close to the venue of a major security conference. While the Indian Navy claims to have developed a high level of coordination with the Coast Guard and state police, reports have not always agreed with that assessment.

Not surprisingly then, India’s evolving maritime strategy lays emphasis on “security operations,” in the IOR, redefining the constabulary and benign approach to account for the entire spectrum of non-traditional threats in the region: terrorism, piracy, armed robbery, humanitarian crises, peace support operations, and non-combatant evacuation missions. In assessing India’s maritime compulsions, its maritime managers know their over-riding priority in the distant seas is the protection of national overseas investment and Indians residing abroad.

Chinese Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean

 While irregular challenges in the Indian Ocean demand the constant attention of security agencies, what most bothers Indian security planners are traditional threats – particularly those emanating from the east. In recent years, PLAN piracy patrols in the Indian Ocean have grown in size and sophistication, even as Beijing has sought to expand its diplomatic sphere of influence in the IOR. The PLAN’s counter-piracy patrols now consist of advanced frigates and destroyers (the Type 052C Luyang II guided-missile destroyer and the Type 054A Jiangkai II frigate), Type 71 amphibious transport docks, and anti-submarine helicopter squadrons. Notably, most Chinese anti-piracy task forces spend as much time visiting Indian Ocean ports and exercising with regional navies as they do on their main mission.

Indian observers worry that the use for Chinese counter-piracy operations for maritime diplomacy, provides Beijing with an excuse to expand its peacetime maritime presence in the IOR – then rationalized by that all-encompassing benign expression “maritime operations other than war” (MOOTW). Indeed, in the past few years, PLAN warships have been involved in every major humanitarian contingency in the IOR, raising China’s maritime profile in the region. These include evacuating Chinese citizens from Libya and Yemen, escorting Syrian chemical weapons for their destruction, and the search for Malaysia Airlines Flight 370.

From an Indian perspective, the most disquieting trend has been the sudden rise in Chinese submarine deployments in the Indian Ocean. Over the past two years there have been at least three Chinese undersea missions in the IOR – including a visit by a nuclear sub in December 2013. Many of these visits have involved dockings in the sub-continental littorals without prior intimation to New Delhi. For some Indian observers, the increase in PLAN submersible visits points to an intricate game-plan for a larger operational footprint in the Indian Ocean. In the name of anti-piracy operations, they aver, Chinese submarines have been performing specific stand-alone missions – a process meant to lay the groundwork for a rotating but permanent deployment in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

PLAN’s undersea missions in the Indian Ocean have also been rising in scope and complexity. The Chinese Yuan-class deployment at Karachi earlier this year, Indian observers say, was meant to test its capabilities in coastal South Asia. It is also a sign that PLAN commanders have instructions to fine-tune standard operating procedures, gain critical undersea experience, and secure vital hydrological and bathymetric data for sustained operations in the IOR.

Meanwhile, New Delhi is perturbed by reports that the PLA is planning an overhaul of its military structure – reordering its seven military areas into five new defense zones, with the India-facing West zone accounting for a third of Chinese land-based forces. Already China is in an advantageous position on its land border with India. As Beijing consolidates its position with the impending reorganization, New Delhi is bound to come under pressure to maintain its maritime domination of the Eastern Indian Ocean.

Towards a Doctrine of Sustained Engagement

 China’s growing military presence in the Indian Region is also widely thought to be the main reason behind New Delhi’s intensifying maritime engagement in the region. In a visit to Sri Lanka, Seychelles and Mauritius earlier this year, Narendra Modi, outlined a bold policy framework for the Indian Ocean littorals. The prime minister laid out the contours of a putative doctrine for greater maritime cooperation in the South Asian littoral, reiterating India’s robust commitment to securing regional maritime interests, a stronger Indian role in maintaining the “regional security and stability,” and a prioritization of security-related assistance to smaller Indian Ocean states.

A key aspect of the new engagement strategy is the elevation of bilateral ties to strategic partnerships. India is keen to co-opt Indian Ocean states as partners in ensuring greater strategic security in the IOR, for which New Delhi has been fast-tracking security assistance proposals. Not surprisingly, recent months have seen the induction of two Indian Dornier aircraft into the Seychelles Air Force, the launch of India’s first export warship to Mauritius, and the approval of a proposal to construct two off-shore patrol vehicles (OPV) for the Sri Lankan Navy. New Delhi also intends establishing a maritime domain awareness network across the Indian Ocean by installing multiple surveillance radars in Mauritius, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, and Maldives.

Meanwhile, agreements have been signed to allow India to develop infrastructure in Seychelles (Assumption Island) and Mauritius (Agalega Islands), allowing for a greater Indian presence in critical locations in the South Western Indian Ocean. Crucially, New Delhi has been promoting the cause of multilateral cooperative security is the Indian Ocean. Alongside creating regional governance structures to combat maritime crime and piracy, India has played an important role in reviving the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and vitalizing the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), which looks at operational maritime coordination in the IOR.

While assuming a facilitating role in the Indian Ocean is significant enough, New Delhi is also bolstering its strategic partnerships with big maritime powers. The Indian Navy’s maritime exercises with the United States, Japan, Australia and Russia this year were all held in the Indian Ocean and involved greater high-end maritime drills. With a growing emphasis on maritime intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and antisubmarine warfare capabilities, the Indian Navy is displaying a new vigor and purpose in its operational engagements. Notably, the India-U.S. bilateral naval drill Malabar has now been expanded to include Japan, and formal maritime exercises have been instituted with the Royal Australian Navy and the Indonesian Navy.

Dealing with the Maritime Silk Route

Despite seeming gains in the IOR, however, India still finds itself in a geopolitical fix. New Delhi’s dilemma stems from China’s growing economic and diplomatic leverage in the Indian Ocean, in particular Beijing’s maritime silk route (MSR) proposal that has found wide acceptance in the region. Indian observers recognize the merits of the Chinese proposal, but reckon Beijing’s hard-sell of the project conceals its real purpose: ensuring the security of vulnerable Indian Ocean sea-lanes through greater PLAN presence in the region. Indeed, with increased Chinese interest in African oil and minerals, it does appear military facilities in the Indian Ocean are the eventual objective. Even so, smaller Indian IOR states do not share New Delhi’s skepticism about the MSR, which promises substantial economic benefits in the long run. 

China’s confirmation of its first Indian Ocean logistics base in Djibouti last month, lends credence to Indian claims of an alleged Chinese plan for multiple logistical hubs in the Indian Ocean under the auspices of the MSR. In late November, the Chinese government signed a 10-year agreement with Djibouti to set up a naval base in the northern Obock region to serve as a logistics hub for PLA-N engaged in anti-piracy operations off the coast of Yemen. Yet, Xi Jinping, the Chinese President, chose to describe the development as “Djibouti’s participation in Beijing’s 21st-century Maritime Silk Road,” setting off conjecture about a possible connection between Chinese naval bases and the MSR.

Indeed, there are doubts about the true nature of China’s non-military sites in the Indian Ocean. While Beijing acknowledges a desire for trade-related maritime complexes in the IOR, suspicion persists over the “dual-use” character of the facilities – the possibility that existing civilian infrastructure could be upgraded to accommodate naval ships, stores and armament. Despite the rising acceptability index of the MSR among Indian Ocean states, therefore, New Delhi continues to be apprehensive about the proposal.

From an Indian vantage-point, China’s large-scale reclamation efforts in the South China Sea appear as a strategic adjunct to its Indian Ocean politics, and a precursor to greater Chinese maritime power projection into Bay of Bengal. For analysts in New Delhi, the dispute over maritime territory in Southeast Asia could provide Beijing with a useful excuse for a strategic thrust in the IOR, invoking the threat of containment by democratic powers along the Asian Rim-land.

The China-Pakistan Nexus

India’s geopolitical dilemma is complicated by a deepening China-Pakistan nexus in the Indian Ocean. Beijing has been expanding its assistance to Pakistan’s naval modernization effort – including an offer of eight S-20 variants of the Yuan class submarine, four improved F-22P frigates, and six Type-022 Houbei stealth catamaran missile boats. New Delhi suspects many of these assets will be used by Pakistan to actively limit India’s strategic sway in the Indian Ocean region.

Indian watchers do not discount the possibility that China might seek Pakistan’s assistance in establishing greater naval presence in the IOR. In recent years, the Pakistan Navy has welcomed the prospects of a Chinese naval facility in the Western Indian Ocean. Since February 2013, when a Chinese company took charge of the management of Gwadar port, the Pakistan Navy has appeared willing and ready a PLAN naval facility in Pakistan. Islamabad, Indian analysts fear, could well be China’s strategic lynch-pin in the Indian Ocean.

Regrettably, India’s own submarine arm continues to languish. With just eight operational submarines, and the new Scorpene submarine project still on its way, the Indian Navy lacks the wherewithal to dominate the Indian Ocean Region. Moreover, Indian maritime planning has, in recent times, been distracted by the evolving threat of maritime terrorism in South Asia, particularly the possibility of the Islamic State or Al-Qaida seizing naval assets and using them to launch an attack in Indian waters – as almost happened in a daring attempt in February 2014 at Karachi, fortuitously foiled by Pakistani security agencies

Fittingly then, India’s new Maritime Strategy document acknowledges the complex nature of India’s maritime challenges – the blurring of lines between traditional and non-traditional threats and the need to simultaneously tackle both fronts. In this, it emphasizes a “seamless and holistic” approach, involving greater national and regional coordination. Ensuring Secure Seas makes it clear that not only is the Indian Navy intent on safeguarding the near-seas for economic purposes, it will also protect Indian and regional strategic interests in the Indian Ocean. Beyond constabulary and benign operations, however, the Navy will be guided by the needs of preserving Indian influence in its maritime neighborhood.