The Carrier Question

In the past five years, both China and India have put refurbished Soviet aircraft carriers into service. This has moved each country to the forefront of global naval aviation; due to the very high barriers to entry, few countries can operate a modern carrier of even modest capabilities.

Where did these carrier forces come from, and where are they going? Although India and China are now in a similar place, they took very different paths. These paths matter a lot for the future of the two carrier programs.

Origins

No doubt in part because of the heritage of the Royal Navy, India has considerably more experience with naval aviation than China does. INS Vikrant, a former Majestic-class carrier for the Royal Navy, was commissioned in 1961 and equipped with steam catapults and an angled flight deck. Displacing 20000 tons, Vikrant carried a mix of Hawker Sea Hawks, Sea Harriers, and various other aircraft. She served in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, helping the Indian Navy blockade East Pakistan. Vikrant decommissioned in 1997, and was scrapped in 2015.

India followed up INS Vikrant with the 1987 acquisition of INS Viraat, a Centaur-class carrier that had recently served in the Falklands War. Although larger than Vikrant, Viraat represented a step back in some ways, as she carries a ski-jump, and cannot launch CATOBAR aircraft. Viraat will leave service within the next year.

China came late to the carrier game. Although Mao Zedong periodically suggested the construction of aircraft carriers, China lacked the resources to seriously consider the project until near the end of the Cold War. In many ways, the heritage and purpose of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) worked against the acquisition of a carrier. The PLAN took the Soviet Navy as its most immediate model, and concentrated for most of its early history on developing anti-access, coastal defense capabilities.

 In the 1980s and 1990s, China acquired several carrier hulks, including two Russian Kievs and the former Australian HMAS Melbourne. All were eventually scrapped or converted for recreational purposes. The adventurous purchase of the Ukrainian Varyag (half-complete sister of RFS Admiral Kuznetsov) in 2001 appeared to be headed in the same direction, until the PLAN began to refurbish and complete the warship.

Present Status

India currently operates INS Vikramaditya, a 40,000 ton ski-jump carrier converted from a laid-up Soviet VSTOL carrier. Vikramaditya entered service in 2013, and currently carries an air group consisting of up to 24 MiG-29K fighters, along with a collection of recon, utility, and ASW helicopters.

Vikramidtya is undoubtedly a step forward from Viraat, which carries an aging group of Sea Harriers along with the collection of helicopters. The MiG-29Ks are newly built and superior to the Sea Harriers in every respect, although the ski-jump limits their range and payload. The modified Fulcrums should also serve as the core of the air group of India’s next carrier, also named INS Vikrant.

As for China, the ex-Varyag, now dubbed Liaoning,  entered service with the PLAN in 2012. Her current air group includes 24 J-15 multirole fighters (developed from the J-11, itself developed from the Su-27) and around a dozen helicopters of various vintage. Liaoning is half and again as large as Vikramaditya, an advantage that likely plays out in maintenance and storage facilities, as well as a somewhat heavier defensive armament, including intrinsic anti-submarine weapons. Like her Russian sister Admiral Kuznetsov (and INS Vikramaditya), Liaoning launches aircraft via ski-jump, limiting the range and payload of her J-15s. Given China’s lack of experience with carrier aviation, many analysts doubt that Liaoning has yet reached her full potential, even after three years of trials.

The Future

India plans to construct two or three additional carriers over the next two decades. The first, INS Vikrant, is already under construction and could enter service by 2020. Vikrant will resemble a modernized Vikramaditya, equipped with a ski-jump but presumably with more modern fittings and an updated design. After that, the Indian Navy may go nuclear. India expects to build one or two carriers using a 65,000-ton design, complete with nuclear propulsion and electromagnetic catapults. The first, INS Vishal, is expected to enter service in 2023, although this date is almost certainly too optimistic. India also needs to work on its support crew, as it lacks sufficient frigates, destroyers, and submarines to support several carrier battle groups.

India’s hole card is the prospect of cooperation with the United States. The U.S. Navy (USN) has, by far, more experience than any navy in the world in the field of carrier aviation. The USN also has the world’s most sophisticated carrier technology, including advanced nuclear propulsion and, on the CVN-78 class, an electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS). Reports suggest that the United States has been forthcoming with regard to sharing these technologies, as well as its broader wealth of expertise on carrier aviation.

The biggest questions for India revolve around air-group composition. If cooperation with the United States works out, the U.S. could transfer (or facilitate the development of) some carrier aircraft types, including the E-2 Hawkeye. Conceivably, India could purchase carrier-capable Rafales from France, more capable than the existing MiG-29Ks, but less so than a fifth generation fighter. If India and the U.S. sort out a variety of intellectual property related difficulties, the F-35C could be on the menu. The worst option is a navalized version of the HAL Tejas, an indigenous fighter that was obsolete before its first flight.

China’s first domestically produced carrier will reportedly launch in late December 2015, although the PLAN has remained characteristically quiet about its progress. What vague reports we have suggest that the new carrier will resemble Liaoning, of similar size and with a ski-jump. Although it has not reached the same degree of specialization as the USN, the PLAN has a wide enough array of potential escort vessels (including nuclear submarines) that it can reasonably manage the problem of protecting its carriers.

Of any carriers beyond that, we have little knowledge. China cannot rely on a partner like the United States, and there is little to indicate that France or the United Kingdom would offer much help, either. Russian naval aviation has stagnated. But then China may not need much help. Chinese military authorities have claimed that they can, and will, come up with their own version of EMALS, the launching technology that may set professionals apart from amateurs in the naval aviation world.

Most analysts suggest that the J-20 stealth fighter is too large to fly from a carrier, and certainly from any carrier that China might soon build. Attention has focused on the prospect of using the J-31, although Chinese military authorities have seemed lukewarm regarding its capabilities. China may also be developing an early-warning aircraft, which would strongly signal intent to build CATOBAR carriers.

Advantage: India

Neither China nor India will compete with the United States in carrier aviation for the foreseeable future. The USN has larger ships, more sophisticated technology, and decades of experience to its advantage. However, within the next decade and a half China and India will likely become the undisputed leaders outside of the United States. Russia has yet to demonstrate that it can recapture the vigor of Soviet-era shipbuilding, the French have not decided how to replace or supplement the Charles de Gaulle, and the British opted for a pair of large jump jet ships to carry the F-35B.

Despite the larger size of China’s economy, and the greater willingness of the Chinese government to commit to naval spending, the Indians have two major advantages. First, they have a heritage of naval aviation that extends directly to 1962, and indirectly to 1917 (in the form of the Royal Navy). Even as the technical aspects of the carriers themselves change, the fleet has accommodated itself to the idea of the centrality of naval aviation. Second, India has the help of the world’s foremost authority in naval aviation, the USN.

It’s hardly impossible that India will squander these advantages; dysfunction in the Indian defense sector is well known. China has also shown the capacity to devote enormous energy and resources to accomplish the ends that it desires. For the moment, however, the Indians have the advantage.