Taiwan’s Elections, China’s Response and America’s Policy

The January 16 Taiwan elections mark a major transition in Taiwan’s political leadership away from the Kuomintang (KMT) Party of President Ma Ying-jeou. The election represents a turn from Ma’s policy of the past eight years stressing reassurance and accommodation of China in the interests of cross-strait peace and closer interchange and development. From a historic perspective, Ma’s policies toward China were a fundamental reversal of the highly competitive, militarily tense, and often confrontational policies of previous Taiwan governments since Chiang Kai-shek retreated to Taiwan after losing the Chinese Civil War on the mainland in the late 1940s. Those policies led to major cross-strait military and diplomatic confrontations beginning in the 1990s during the later years of KMT President Lee Teng-hui (1988-2000) and during the rule of DPP President Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008). Both leaders were seen by Beijing as moving Taiwan toward de jure independence of China – unacceptable to Beijing.

The Taiwan electorate’s opposition to the turmoil in cross-strait relations was a major reason for Ma’s landslide victory in 2008. And his reelection in 2012 was widely seen as an endorsement of his moderate cross-strait policies aimed at accommodating Beijing. Seeking to foster peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. governments of Republican President George W. Bush and Democratic President Barack Obama strongly endorsed the historic change in direction in the Taiwan government’s approach to China.

Now President-elect Tsai Ing-wen and the incoming Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government seek to preserve peace, economic benefits, and positive interchange of the cross-strait status quo. Reflecting the wishes of the vast majority of Taiwan people, they seek no confrontation with China. However, they refuse to endorse the concept of “one China” seen in the so-called 1992 consensus – an agreement used by Beijing and the Ma government to meet China’s requirement for acknowledgement that Taiwan is part of China as a foundation for cross-strait peace and the more than 20 economic and other agreements reached between the two sides over the past eight years.

Insistence on endorsing the 1992 consensus comes amid Chinese warnings of serious consequences for cross-strait peace and development without it. Beijing’s resolve accompanies continued massive Chinese military buildup across the strait to intimidate Taiwan, tight control of Taiwan’s limited international diplomatic space as an independent government, and use of economic and social interchange to deepen Taiwan’s connection with the Chinese mainland. The negative and positive incentives are all part of a clearly focused Chinese goal of eventually unifying Taiwan with the PRC – anathema to the DPP and most voters in Taiwan. Meanwhile, Beijing’s insistence underlines its deeply rooted distrust of Tsai and the DPP leadership, who are viewed by Chinese officials as seeking ways to block moves toward unification and promote moves toward Taiwan de jure independence.

In sum, the future of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is more in doubt following the election. For China, the election of Tsai and the in-coming DPP government is a clear setback in efforts to move Taiwan toward reunification. Chinese officials from President Xi Jinping on down have warned, in sometimes ominous language, of consequences if the Tsai government does not endorse the 1992 consensus’s one China concept. Thus, the key gap between the two sides is over a statement of principle. Smoother relations may follow a possible compromise over this issue, but opposing interests and resolve on both sides promise a much rockier road in China-Taiwan relations than prevailed under Ma.

The Gap Between Xi Jinping and Tsai Ing-wen

The defeat of the KMT and its accommodating cross-strait policy came as no surprise to Xi and his government. China monitored Ma’s persistently low popularity during his second term and noted the antipathy toward the mainland shown in the student-led mass demonstrations known as the Sunflower Movement in the spring of 2014, followed by the massive KMT election losses to the DPP in island-wide local elections that fall. Known for his boldness and proactive approach to sensitive issues at home and abroad, Xi has shown impatience on the pace of cross-strait integration. He told a senior Taiwan envoy that “the issue of political disagreements that exist between the two sides must reach a final resolution, step by step, and these issues cannot be passed on from generation to generation.” Subsequently, Xi repeatedly showed strong opposition to Taiwan independence and publicly warned fellow Chinese leaders in a reference to the need for Taiwan to adhere to the 1992 consensus that “without a solid foundation, the earth and mountain will tremble.” He then told KMT presidential candidate Eric Chu that opposition to Taiwan independence and firm adherence to the 1992 consensus form the political foundation for cross-strait relations and that without that foundation there would be no peace and development in cross-strait relations.

In his unprecedented meeting with Ma in Singapore in November, Xi repeatedly stressed the importance of adherence to the 1992 consensus – a message widely seen as putting Tsai on notice regarding Chinese expectations. Placing Xi’s and other Chinese statements in formal context, the spokesman of the PRC State Council Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) said on December 30 that “without the political foundation of the 1992 consensus, institutionalized liaison and communication mechanism across the strait will surely be affected, or even collapse; and the ship featuring peaceful development of cross-strait relations will encounter terrifying waves or even capsize.” Underlining the point, the TAO said in response to the election results on January 16, "On important issues of principle like protecting the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity, our will is as hard as rock."

Those seeing evidence that Beijing is not bluffing point to impressive military advances in the protracted effort to intimidate Taiwan and what Beijing views as pro-independence forces centered on Tsai and her associates. According to Lyle Goldstein, they include many hundreds of highly accurate ballistic missiles and land-attack cruise missiles aimed at Taiwanese military targets; using ballistic and other missiles and many submarines equipped with supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles to impede effective U.S. intervention; increasing numbers of amphibious attack ships, including large and medium-sized air-cushioned craft, which substantially widen shore entry areas for Chinese invaders; and developing a large and growing fleet of technically advanced helicopters that widen Chinese options for attack. Ironically underlining Taiwan’s acute vulnerability and military weakness against the China threat, the Obama administration announced it would proceed with a multi-billion dollar arms sale to Taiwan, highlighted by destroyers designed in the 1970s that will hardly alter the bleak military outlook for Taipei.

Against this background, Tsai is more cautious and restrained than she was when running against Ma in the presidential race of 2012. At that time, she asserted that the 1992 consensus “did not exist.”  She now speaks approving of the “status quo” in cross-strait relations involving years of negotiations that presumably includes the talks in 1992 that led to the so-called 1992 consensus. But Beijing remembers her leadership role in what Chinese officials saw as moves toward de jure independence promoted by the Lee and Chen governments. China’s public insistence that Tsai affirm the consensus and its one China meaning are the results of that history.

How Much Trouble Ahead?

The initiative in cross-strait relations in the four months between presidential election and inauguration seems to rest more with Beijing than with Taipei. Tsai likely will continue to keep her cards close as she deals with cross-strait issues. Taiwan citizens voted for government change and a new look at cross-strait relations, but polls show continued strong opposition to actions that would provoke the PRC. Past practice indicates that as the inauguration approaches, business interests at home and abroad, the U.S., Japanese and other friendly governments, and many other domestic and foreign interests groups and representatives will be seeking clarification on how Tsai will manage cross-strait relations. Tsai also may use the coming months to establish or advance secret channels of communications with Xi for use in determining areas of overlap between the two sides that may help to bridge the current impasse over the 1992 consensus. However, such secret diplomacy goes against her consistent commitment that cross-strait policy must be carried out in a transparent way and reflect the interests and aspirations of all Taiwan’s people. Meanwhile, the new legislature now dominated by the DPP will convene next month and without careful coordination with the president-elect could adopt measures that would antagonize Beijing, worsen cross-strait relations and narrow the new president’s room for maneuver even before she takes office.

On China’s side, Xi is an active, decisive, and often bold Chinese leader. He has an array of options to ratchet up pressure along the lines highlighted in the TAO spokesman’s statement in December. Thus, if Tsai continues to fail to meet China’s demands on the 1992 consensus, the various cross-strait links could be slowed, frozen, or ended. The management and the substance of the over 20 agreements between the two sides would be impaired or undermined. Tourist flows from China to Taiwan could be reduced or stopped. Business conditions for Taiwan enterprises in the PRC could be negatively affected. The so-called diplomatic truce of China-Taiwan competition for international recognition could end with China allowing those countries seeking to switch recognition from Taipei to Beijing to do so, and China could dial back the very limited scope of Taiwan’s increased involvement in such international bodies as the World Health Assembly. Intensified Chinese lobbying with many of the parties of the U.S.-led Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) could preclude Taiwan achieving entry into the group. And if deemed useful, the above pressures could be supplemented by tensions caused by military demonstrations and exercises with Taiwan as the target.

While Xi may be inclined to take action soon and apply such negative measures, he may see the wisdom in a “wait and see” approach, at least prior to Tsai’s inauguration. How Tsai and the DPP leaders interpret their landslide victory and whether and how they will challenge Beijing’s goals of closer interdependence and eventual reunification will take some time to become clear. Also, the future of the KMT and its willingness and ability to work with China against the DPP remains very much in question following the shellacking of the January 16 vote. The absence of a strong allied force in Taiwan politics means that PRC options are seriously reduced in trying to influence Taiwan’s cross-strait policy.

The Taiwan issue is so important in Chinese politics that it is often seen as sui generis – not influenced by other developments. However, there have been instances in the past when other developments had a major impact on Chinese behavior toward Taiwan. For example, it’s hard to explain China’s moderation in the face of George W. Bush’s bold resolve to defend Taiwan in April 2001 without considering other developments. Thus, I agree with Douglas Paal and Shelley Rigger who assess China’s likely approach to Taiwan against the background of recent adverse circumstances prompting Xi to curb boldness, which has proven counterproductive for China. Xi now favors moderation and accommodation in sometimes successful and sometimes unsuccessful efforts to ease differences and moderate tensions with the United States, Japan, Vietnam, North Korea, and even the Philippines. The moves seem reinforced by worsening economic conditions that undermine China’s international power and influence, and leadership preoccupations with major internal campaigns to root out corruption, transform China’s economic development framework and revamp the organization of the entire military apparatus.

In sum, while Xi appears to hold the initiative, what he is prepared to do remains unclear. He has shown an ability to carry out a wider scope of dramatic policy actions than any Chinese leader since Mao Zedong. Nevertheless, a comprehensive review of recent determinants indicates that unless provoked, Xi will be more inclined to incremental steps than bold challenges in seeking to advance China’s interests with Taiwan in the next year.

America’s China Policy Debate and the Taiwan Issue

Will the results of the Taiwan elections and greater uncertainty about cross-strait peace and stability lead to a change in U.S. policy and practice toward Taiwan? Despite a significant American debate over China policy and a hardening of Obama administration policy toward China, U.S. government policy toward Taiwan has not changed and seems unlikely to do so for the remainder of the Obama administration. American advocates for closer ties with Taiwan may find the Tsai government more open to their initiatives than the Ma government, which stressed accommodation of China, has been. But whatever support they receive in the U.S. government will depend heavily on which candidate becomes president in 2017 and how seriously U.S.-China relations may deteriorate over the next year.

The American debate over China policy has grown over the past few years. Harry Harding said in the Washington Quarterly that the debate is the “most intense” China policy debate since the Tiananmen Crisis of 1989, if not before. The debate has had some impact during the current U.S.  presidential campaign, particularly as part of a larger foreign policy narrative from Republicans and others who criticize the Obama government for its perceived weakness in foreign affairs.

The China debate highlights differences in U.S.-China relations that have also received more prominent attention in the highly deliberative foreign policy of the Obama administration. The importance of U.S.-China differences has evolved over time. They were generally held in check as the two powers normalized and improved relations in the 1970s and 1980s with a common framework of working constructively together to offset the perceived menacing power of the then-expanding Soviet Union. That framework shattered with the Tiananmen Crisis of 1989, the end of the Cold War, and the end of the Soviet Union. Subsequent efforts to establish a new framework of cooperation failed. They included a try at creating a “strategic partnership” during the Clinton administration, an effort to have common understanding as “responsible stakeholders” during the Bush administration, and the now-failing effort to create a “new type of great power relationship” during the Obama-Xi years.

In the first decade of the 21st century, both sides managed to establish pragmatic understandings that saw the wisdom of emphasizing positive engagement and managing differences for three basic reasons. First, both governments benefited from positive engagement. Second, close interdependence meant that pressuring the other party would hurt both sides. And third, both leaders were preoccupied with many other issues and sought to avoid serious problems with the other.

Incoming President Xi gave those pragmatic understandings lower priority. He coercively advanced Chinese control of claimed maritime territories at the expense of neighbors backed by the United States; ignored U.S. complaints and persisted in cyber-espionage for economic benefit against American companies and in state intervention in economic matters undermining American companies; repressed human rights in ways grossly offensive to American values; and accelerated China’s large and wide-ranging military buildup targeting American forces in the Asia-Pacific region.

Obama for many years rarely criticized China but Xi’s practices prompted a remarkable hardening in U.S. government policy. The president’s wide-ranging and often sharp criticism notably did not include Taiwan. Rather, the president and his administration continued to adhere to an approach inherited from the Bush administration that Taiwan issues should be handled in ways that avoid serious negative consequences for American policy toward China. For example, the president’s signature rebalance policy in the Asia-Pacific region was repeatedly and sometimes harshly criticized by China. The Obama government nonetheless went ahead with a wide range of initiatives with Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and other areas around Taiwan but initial administration statements about the policy failed to even mention Taiwan. In response to various queries, the administration began stating routinely that Taiwan was included in the rebalance policy. In the meantime, it avoided discussing details of what the U.S. and Taiwan were doing, presumably to avoid offending the PRC in ways seen adverse to administration interests.

Thus, the hardening of the Obama government’s stance on various aspects of China policy has not been accompanied by any change or hardening in its policy toward China over Taiwan. U.S. officials highlight progress in relations with Taiwan in ways that are less likely to prompt friction with China. They avoided taking sides against Tsai as they did in using a prominent news leak to voice concerns at her cross-strait policy during Tsai’s run for the presidency in 2012. The delicate cross-strait situation following the January 2016 election very likely will cause the U.S. government to double down on efforts to encourage both Beijing and Taipei to avoid provocations, seek constructive communications, and reach compromise formulas or understandings that will avoid a break in cross-strait interchange detrimental to peace and stability.

Posed against the administration’s treatment of Taiwan in ways that avoid friction with China are Americans seeking to advance relations with Taiwan in three ways that risk antagonizing Beijing. The victory to the DPP government, notably less deferential to Beijing than Ma’s KMT government, raises the possibility that the Taiwan government may be more open and supportive of their initiatives.

Some Americans strongly urge U.S. policy to deal with Taiwan for its own sake, rather than in a manner dependent on U.S. interests with China. They opposed the U.S. government intervention in Taiwan domestic politics in 2012, when it voiced concern about Tsai’s cross-strait policies, and they favor more forthright American government support for Taiwan’s entry into the Trans-Pacific Partnership, more frequent U.S. cabinet-level visits to Taiwan, and the sale of more advanced U.S. military equipment to Taiwan. They also assert that those complaining about Chinese bullying and intimidation of neighbors using military and other coercive means in recent years need to also highlight and condemn China’s two decades of massive bullying, coercion, and intimidation toward Taiwan.

A second group of Americans focus on using Taiwan’s strategic location in opposition to what they see as Chinese efforts to undermine the American strategic position in the Pacific and achieve overall dominance in the region contrary to longstanding American interests. In their view, to counter such perceived efforts requires a clear American strategy working with China’s neighbors involving maritime control and interdiction if necessary. Because of its location at the center of the first island chain, Taiwan looms large in plans to counter Chinese expansion. The plans involve gaining the Taiwan government’s cooperation in setting up monitoring sensors and other means of surveillance, preparing mobile units with anti-ship missiles to deploy to various locations in the first island chain, and preparing the use of mines and other means to deny access to Chinese ships and submarines.

A third group of Americans focuses on the Xi government’s recent coercive expansionism at American expanse along China’s rim and other practices grossly at odds with U.S. interests to argue that America should take action showing greater support for Taiwan as part of a cost imposition strategy to counter Xi’s anti-American moves. In their view, the kinds of steps forward in U.S. relations with Taiwan advocated by the previous two groups should be considered and used as the United States endeavors to show Beijing that its various challenges to U.S. interests will not be cost-free.

Given the deeply rooted American practice of dealing with Taiwan with an eye toward avoiding friction with China, any change in U.S. government practices seems unlikely without substantial change in the circumstances influencing that policy. The election of a DPP government less deferential to Beijing than the KMT government seems unlikely to alter the American government’s Taiwan policy. Meanwhile, despite its recent hardening, the Obama administration remains on the moderate side of the American China policy debate. Most of the Republican candidates and arguably Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton promise stronger resolve against foreign challenges such as those posed by Xi’s China. The likelihood of U.S. Taiwan policy becoming more supportive of Taiwan and less sensitive to Beijing may increase, contingent on the outcome to the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The likelihood also seems to depend on the status and salience of U.S. differences with China amid seemingly more urgent policy matters deserving the attention of the next U.S. administration.