What’s Next for Japan-South Korea Relations?

The deal reached between Japan and South Korea in late December 2015 to “finally and irreversibly” resolve the issue of comfort women – women who were forced to work in Imperial Japan’s military brothels on the frontlines – was a significant achievement for diplomats on both sides of the Tsushima Strait.

As part of this deal, Japan formally apologizes in the name of the prime minister, recognizes “state responsibility” for the atrocities, and offers 1 billion yen (about $8.3 million) for the South Korean government to form a foundation that will provide social and health care services to former victims. Considering the pessimism surrounding the issue, the fact that the two countries reached any agreement at all in 2015 – significant because it was the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II – is a diplomatic victory in and of itself.

The geopolitical motivations that drove Japan and South Korea to reach an agreement are quite clear: the need to cooperate more in the face of an increasingly capable China, unpredictable North Korea, and impatient United States. The three factors are interrelated, of course.

Even as the security situation in Northeast Asia deteriorates, due to China’s exponential defense spending growth and North Korea’s rapid missile and nuclear weapons development, Japan and South Korea’s patron-ally, the United States, is losing its appetite for commitments that will require heroic military efforts due to the quagmire in the Middle East and its own domestic financial troubles. Japanese and Korean leaders overcoming domestic opposition to see this deal through to implementation is important for them to “prove” that they take their own security seriously enough to merit a commitment from Washington.

While the comfort women deal is not the most clear-cut example of burden-sharing, there is a great deal of hype in the United States that this will lead to greater security cooperation between the two. And, indeed, it is reasonable to expect that removing this thorn in the relationship will facilitate more collaboration between Japan and South Korea. However, it is unlikely that whatever these two states can realistically do bilaterally (“realistic” not just in terms of political will, but more importantly in terms of physical capabilities) will tangibly alleviate the United States’ defense burden in the Asia-Pacific.

New Possibilities?

But then, what is the real significance of the comfort women deal to Japan-Korea(-U.S.) relations? Or to put it another way, what does the comfort women deal make possible that would have been more difficult without such a deal? After all, there are limits to institutionalizing the Japan-Korea relationship. For example, under no situation would Japan or South Korea ever become treaty allies – just as Japan wants to maintain its flexibility in responding to a situation on the Korean peninsula, South Korea does not want to be entrapped in a dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which are claimed by both Japan and China.

While keeping such limitations in mind then, what exactly can we hope for next in Japan-South Korea relations?

On the economic front, Japan could play a more proactive role in helping South Korea join the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The rapprochement could also help spur progress toward a China-Korea-Japan Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which was endorsed at the trilateral summit held last November, as well as toward the China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). After a high-level talk on economic affairs in mid-January, Japanese deputy foreign minister for economic affairs, Yasumasa Nagamine, said talks with his counterpart, Lee Tae-ho, heralded bilateral relations entering a “new era.”

On the security front, a good place to start would be reviving negotiations over the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and the Acquisitions and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). These two agreements are pretty standard and a relatively safe bet. A GSOMIA institutionalizes the processes by which the two countries can share classified defense-related information about common challenges, including North Korea’s weapons programs. An ACSA would smooth logistical cooperation between the two countries, such as when they conduct humanitarian assistance/disaster relief and peacekeeping operations together. The leadership in both countries had been willing to sign it back in June 2012, until popular opposition forced Lee Myung-bak’s government to pull out at the very last minute.

Currently, Japan and South Korea share military intelligence on North Korea through a trilateral arrangement that involves the United States. This convoluted arrangement – based on a December 2014 memorandum of understanding that calls on signatories to voluntarily share military secrets on North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs – went into effect in June 2015. Last November, David Shear, U.S. assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs remarked at a speech given at the Atlantic Council, “We look forward to seizing the momentum to operationalize the information sharing arrangement and build a robust and resilient trilateral relationship that will continue to promote regional deterrence.”

But it would be even better for Japan and South Korea to cut out the middleman. As a Japanese Defense Ministry official said to Yomiuri Shimbun, “When a matter of seconds determines success or failure in intercepting missiles, sharing information via the United States may not work well.” As such, last October, Defense Ministers Gen Nakatani and Han Min-goo resumed discussions on sharing intelligence through a bilateral GSOMIA.

Another area of potential cooperation is more bilateral exercises, especially in theaters far away from home. Five days before the comfort women deal was announced, on December 23, Japan and South Korea conducted an anti-piracy drill in the Gulf of Aden off Somalia. The joint drill was to train the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces and Republic of Korea Navy in basic operations, including communications and tactical movements. (Originally, the United States was also supposed to join the drill.) Tellingly, the drill was conducted without prior announcement because of concerns about public sentiment in Japan and South Korea.

As progress was being made on the bilateral GSOMIA and a joint training went ahead (albeit secretly) before the comfort women deal was reached, a comprehensive historical resolution may not be necessary for greater security cooperation between Japan and South Korea. In this regard, North Korea’s test of a nuclear device in early January may end up being a boon for bilateral cooperation, as Japan and South Korea have hastened to reaffirm their united stance to impose tougher sanctions through the United Nations Security Council and build the capacity of Southeast Asian states to better implement sanctions.

Perhaps, even without the deal, if the security situation deteriorated badly enough, Japan and South Korea may have come to terms with each other – at least in the realm of defense cooperation. But that is a question that we have the luxury of pondering only because the deal is behind us. And for that, Japanese and South Korean diplomats deserve credit for putting their countries’ national interests first.

Challenges remain towards implementation, however. This includes the high-profile question over what will happen to the statue that currently sits in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul. The statue, of a young Korean girl, represents the comfort women. Debate is also likely to continue over whether or not the official nature of the 1 billion yen is recognition of Japan’s “legal” responsibility or not, and there is lingering concern that the deal did not respect the wishes of the former victims themselves.

And, as ever, leaders must tread carefully in navigating the emotional domestic backlash. The main opposition party in South Korea has called on the government to renegotiate the agreement and apologize to the former comfort women for the “unilateral” deal. Civic groups, such as the Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan, have mobilized to scrap the agreement. In Japan, a senior politician in Japan landed in hot water for describing the comfort women as “prostitutes” (though he later retracted his comments).

Despite these challenges, it is indeed a new era for Japan-Korea relations. The conclusion of this tortured reconciliation process has the potential to enable a more open acknowledgement of the importance of this relationship. A rigorous and informed debate should lead to the signing of GSOMIA and ACSA. Future joint drills should be announced publicly for what they are – an important exercise with an important security partner. Emerging threats in the region should highlight what Japan and South Korea have to offer each other.

Japan and South Korea should seize every opportunity they can over the next four months to improve relations as they work towards a hoped-for bilateral summit in late May, around the time of the G7 summit in Japan.