Vietnam’s 12th Party Congress

Vietnam’s quinquennial Party Congress concluded on January 28, and, even though the most competitive leadership contest the country has seen played out behind the red curtain, brought to light the Communist Party’s dirty laundry. While most outside analysts viewed the Congress as a referendum on Vietnam’s future economic direction, it was far more about reasserting the primacy of the party. And the results reflect the two contradictory goals of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP): to maintain its monopoly of power and to continue to grow the economy.

By Vietnamese standards, there was high political drama as conservatives outmaneuvered reformist Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng, the leading candidate to become the party’s General Secretary. Despite an attempt by supporters from the floor of the congress, Dũng could only muster 41 percent support. In the end, incumbent General Secretary, 71-year-old Nguyễn Phú Trọng, won reelection with 80 percent of the votes of the 1,510 delegates.

The Politburo

The focus of most media analysis has been on the conservatives’ victory over Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng. Dũng clearly had made enemies. Party conservatives distrusted his economic reform program, push for faster privatization of state-owned enterprises, and calls for deepened ties with the West in general, and the United States in particular. Dũng actively campaigned for the post, and many feared that he was amassing too much power in a system that prides itself on collective leadership. Several people told me that the party feared the emergence of a Xi Jinping. Dũng carried baggage, tied to misallocation of state resources, a high-level corruption scandal, and well-documented nepotism. Though Dũng oversaw several years of spectacular economic growth and won plaudits for standing up to China during the 2014 oil rig crisis, at the end of the day, his brash style and ambitious reform program alienated too many within a party that has always opted for a more cautious approach to reform.

Dũng is a party man, and he exited gracefully, but not without first protecting his interests. His son, Nguyễn Thanh Nghị became the youngest member of the Central Committee. He inserted key protégés into top positions in the Central Committee and Politburo and maintained a base of support within the Central Committee. And in a country where patronage politics runs deep, his influence will still be felt.

The jockeying for the top slot, and in particular, the success of the so-called “pro-China” faction over the “pro-Western” faction, dominated headlines. But the results of the Congress are far more nuanced. While headlines trumpeted Trọng’s re-election as a win for conservatives, the composition of the new politburo demonstrates the balance and consensus-based approach that remains the hallmark of Vietnamese politics. More to the point, the Politburo’s membership reflects the contradictions inherent in a one-party state’s desire to maintain its monopoly of power at all costs, when, at the same time, it has passed the point of no return in the transformation of its state planned economy and the embrace of market reforms. As such, the Politburo was enlarged from 16 to 19 members to deal with the growing economic and societal complexity. 

Four of the 19 members have police backgrounds, while the minister of national defense, General Ngô Xuân Lịch, has been a career political commissar, without command or operational experience. He is the highest ranking political commissar since General Lê Khả Phiêu was the VCP’s general secretary from 1997-2001. That Lịch was selected at the expense of General Đỗ Bá Tỵ, the deputy minister of defense and the Vietnam People’s Army (VPA) chief-of-staff, who has overseen Vietnam’s significant modernization, is troubling, but also telling.

These appointments – which some reports suggest could be confirmed as early as March by the National Committee’s executive committee, ahead of a session scheduled to begin in May – reflect an inherent insecurity on the part of a party that is resolute in trying to preempt the emergence of a “color revolution” and maintain the party’s total control of the security forces. In mid-2014, a group of party members and army veterans circulated a petition to make the VPA constitutionally bound to defend the state, not the party, setting off alarm bells within the top leadership. The Ministry of Public Security’s dominance on the Politburo is without question, and clearly reflects the VCP’s inherent paranoia.

But it is not all bad news.

Trần Đại Quang, who will be elected president following the National Assembly’s convening in May 2016, has a reputation as being a hardliner due to the continued crackdown on dissent. Yet, the outgoing minister of public security (MPS) was far less thuggish than his predecessors, and under his watch during the critical Trans Pacific-Partnership (TPP) negotiations, the MPS had to be surgical in its targeting of dissent, going after prominent human rights lawyers and online dissent. The MPS could not keep pace with the surge in social media, which is surprisingly freewheeling. Quang endorsed the TPP and made a very successful working visit to the United States in 2015.

The incoming minister of public security, Tô Lâm, is well known to the diplomatic community, and regularly met with them on matters of human rights and the treatment of dissidents. Lâm has been described as relatively pragmatic and professional, not a hardline ideologue. But don’t expect much easing in the targeting of high-profile dissidents and top human rights lawyers and activists.

The other two Politburo members with law enforcement backgrounds are Phạm Minh Chính, a former police lieutenant general and currently the head of the Central Committee’s organization department, and Trần Quốc Vượng, the head of the Supreme Procuracy, making him the country’s top prosecutor.

This emphasis on control and law and order, however, is balanced by an unprecedented degree of economic management experience.

Nguyễn Thị Kim Ngân, the highest ranking woman in the history of Vietnamese politics, will take over the National Assembly. She has consistently received the top votes in National Assembly and Central Committee votes of confidence. She has remained committed to the codification of laws, greater debate and an oversight role for the National Assembly. On the one hand, the National Assembly will continue to play an integral role in creating the legal framework for the economic reform program. But on the other hand, the National Assembly was always at its most raucous and assertive when there were contestations amongst the senior leadership.

In addition to Ngân, the Politburo includes two other senior members of the National Assembly, Trương Thị Mai, and incumbent Tòng Thị Phóng. Although the 11th Politburo also included three members of the National Assembly, this is the first time that three women have been elected and now comprise 15.8 percent of Politburo membership.

Nguyễn Xuân Phúc, a protégé of Nguyễn Tấn Dũng and Nguyễn Bá Thanh, the charismatic Đà Nẵng City party chief who died in 2015, is not known for having bold ideas or much charisma. As deputy prime minister, he was in charge of the economy, which was the fastest growing within ASEAN in the past two years. He is expected to continue Dũng’s drive for increased privatization of state-owned enterprises. But there are concerns about his overall competence and ability to handle a host of economic challenges with such a limited political base or constituency within the Central Committee. There have been plenty of graft allegations surrounding Phúc, too.

Nguyễn Thiện Nhân, the head of the Vietnam Fatherland Front, the umbrella organization for all civil society organizations, unions, and religions, is staunchly in the reformist camp. He was the first Politburo member with a U.S. education, a master’s in public policy. He will be in charge of the TPP provision that will allow for the establishment of Vietnam’s first independent labor union. And while his writ is to control civil society, the reality is that it has burgeoned. Reformers had pushed for Nhân to be the prime minister, and he himself may be looking to broaden his portfolio.

The 12th Politburo also includes a number of technocrats, with extensive economic managerial experience. Vương Đình Huệ, is the Central Committee’s chief economist, and a former minister of finance. Nguyễn Văn Bình, the governor of the State Bank of Vietnam, has received plaudits for his economic stewardship, in particular saving a banking sector that was mired in $20 billion in non-performing loans. The 54-year-old Bình established an asset management body to clean up the banking sector, and, at the same time reined in inflation, a politically sensitive issue in Vietnam. This is the first time that the country’s central banker has been in the top decision-making body.

Đinh La Thăng was appointed the Ho Chi Minh City party secretary. Thăng had been minister for transportation, and he received plaudits for improving Hanoi’s infrastructure. His appointment underscores the leadership’s acknowledgement of the need for greater investment in the country’s critical infrastructure. While the appointment of Thăng, a northerner, to head Ho Chi Minh City may rankle some, Thăng is arguably the most charismatic member of the leadership. He has raised the bar for public accountability, and is known as a pragmatic problem solver.

The Politburo also includes Võ Văn Thưởng, the outgoing secretary for Hồ Chí Minh City, the economic engine of the country. Following the 12th Congress Thưởng was appointed to head the Central Committee’s Propaganda and Education Commission. This was an odd appointment. The position has long been held by the most ideologically conservative member of the Politburo, Đinh Thế Huynh. Thưởng is the youngest member of the Politburo and is not known for ideological rigidity.

After a long absence, the minister of foreign affairs returned to the Politburo. The U.S.-educated Phạm Bình Minh is a proponent of the TPP, advocate of closer ties with the United States, and committed economic reformer. He is the son of Nguyễn Co Thach, who orchestrated the Cambodia exit, the end of diplomatic isolation, and rapprochement with the United States, and who was purged for the sake of normalization of ties with China in 1991. Minh has been highly critical of Chinese aggression in the South China Sea and has openly advocated closer ties with the United States. His appointment is sure to anger Beijing. Minh is the first professional diplomat on the Politburo in 15 years and, along with Nguyễn Tấn Dũng, represented Vietnam at the U.S.-ASEAN summit at Sunnylands this February.

Huong Trung Hai is the new Hanoi party chief. A career electrical engineer who came up through the state electric company, Hai had previously served as minister of industry and has been a deputy prime minister since 2007. The appointment of two technocrats with career experience in critical infrastructure is new, and more of a hallmark of Chinese politics than Vietnamese.

And for all the headlines regarding the conservative’s victory, even the 71-year-old Trọng has endorsed the reform program. He certainly is not going to roll it back. Trọng is conservative, but he’s also not the same man who was elected general secretary in 2011. He’s evolved considerably, endorsing the TPP trade deal, making an unprecedented visit to the United States (as well as Japan) where he met with President Barack Obama and pled for the United States to recognize Vietnam as a “market economy.” As Trọng said at his speech at the conclusion of the Congress, he would “comprehensively increase reforms, accelerate economic growth at a sustainable pace and strive to make Vietnam a modern and industrial country that improves its citizens lives.”

The Party’s economic report called for deepened reform and said that “favorable conditions” to support the private sector were required, as well as faster privatization of state-owned enterprises, and the resolution of the ongoing non-performing loans in the banking sector.  Even General Ngô Xuân Lịch, the VPA’s top commissar, is aware that the country’s dramatic military modernization program, which has given Vietnam the preeminent military in Southeast Asia, would not have been possible without the reform program. In his speech to the Congress, Lịch vowed to continue military modernization and defense of territorial waters.

There is only one member of the Politburo who is truly antithetical to the reform process: the party’s top ideologue, Đinh Thế Huynh. In fact, Huynh was replaced as the long-time head of the Central Committee’s Propaganda and Education Commission, but that may not necessarily be a good thing. He is a standing member of the VCP Secretariat, and in charge of day-to-day operations of the VCP.

Unresolved Issues

The big question is what happens at the mid-term Congress. While Trọng was officially elected to serve a full five-year term, unofficially he is expected to step down mid-term, to make way for a new generation. The front-runner for the position is incoming president Trần Đại Quang. At 54, he is clearly being groomed for bigger things. He was said to have not wanted the presidency, which is seen as too ceremonial without a clear institutional base of power. As the outgoing minister of public security he has the support of the conservatives, but his endorsement of the reform program has not alienated more liberal members. He is a clear favorite to be elected general secretary at the 13th Congress in 2021. The presidency will broaden his international experience.

But hardline conservatives continue to hold out for the party’s top ideologue, Đinh Thế Huynh. Huynh played a prominent role in the conclusion of the Congress and netizens pointed to a widely circulated photograph in the state media, which showed Huynh as standing beside the top four leaders, as evidence for their concern. As one of the leading independent journalists and commentators wrote with alarm, “The rise of such a strongly ideological figure as Huynh, someone with no sign of any interest in political reform, could signal a prolonged chill for those struggling to change the system.” Indeed, it already seems that Trọng is positioning Huynh to succeed him, with Huynh filling in at key ceremonial functions.

But Quang has moved quickly to exert control. By many accounts, he dominated the first Politburo meeting on February 5, which made key personnel appointments that had gone unresolved at the Congress. While Huynh has been in the state media, Quang has been behind the scenes.If Tran Dai Quang were to become general secretary at a mid-term Congress, the question then is who would succeed him as president. There have been calls to consolidate the two positions, as they have done in China, which would give the general secretary a regular international platform. But the Vietnamese have always prided themselves on collective leadership and are likely to reject that kind of consolidation. It simply puts too much power in the hands of one person.