Japan’s Response to North Korea: Old Standbys and New Tricks

In response to North Korea’s fourth nuclear test on January 6 and de facto missile test on February 7, Japan has responded with the tools most comfortable to its pacifist mentality – imposing unilateral sanctions and seeking to strengthen external balancing. This means, in other words, working more closely with like-minded states such as the United States, South Korea, and Australia.

But frustrated by the lack of progress obtained by old-fashioned diplomacy – starkly highlighted by the lack of fresh UN Security Council sanctions due to China’s obstructionism – Japan is also considering some unilateral, defense-focused steps such as improving its missile defense capabilities in partnership with the United States.

Japan partially lifted some sanctions in 2014 when North Korea promised to look into the fate of Japanese abducted by North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s, but most of these were re-imposed following the missile test. These new sanctions bar North Korean nationals from entering Japan, and ban remittances to North Korea except for those less than 100,000 yen and sent for humanitarian purposes. Moreover, North Korean ships and any ship that has stopped in North Korea will no longer be allowed to call in Japan. Additional measures that go beyond the sanctions that already existed prior to 2014 include a freeze on assets held by suspect individuals and organizations in Japan, and a ban on nuclear and missile-related foreign technicians who have been to North Korea from reentering Japan.

Despite the futility of the exercise – given the extremely limited economic leverage that Japan has over North Korea and Japan’s Achilles’ heel, the still-unaccounted-for Japanese abductees – it was an important signal for Japan to show the world its determination to punish North Korea for its provocative acts.

North Korea reacted to Japanese sanctions by dismantling the special committee that it had put together to investigate what happened to the abductees. But this move is largely symbolic and within the realm of what the Japanese government had expected. After all, the committee produced no meaningful results in the year and a half of its existence, and this is the only form of retaliation that the North had left to use against Japan.

In anticipation of the Kim regime’s reaction, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s government went out of its way to gain the understanding of the families of the victims of North Korea’s kidnappings before choosing to impose the harshest set of sanctions recommended. Resolving the abductees issue has been a Gordian knot for Japanese policymakers, and in this particular instance, Abe likely calculated that the benefits of signaling to the world Japan’s seriousness through the symbolism of new sanctions was worth the risk of upending largely symbolic negotiations over the abductees.

U.S.-Japan Alliance

More substantively, Japan is likely to respond to the latest North Korean provocations by reaffirming its commitment to the U.S.-Japan alliance and seeking ways to improve the way the alliance operates. The creation of the alliance coordination mechanism (ACM) under the auspices of the new U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines should help the United States and Japan respond better to such crises in the future. According to James Schoff, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the ACM is “a small node of consistent communication and an agreed upon process to expand that method of interaction, information sharing and decision making during a security crisis that enables a wider range of alliance activities” in a way that focuses on the capabilities that the two sides bring to the table to address common concerns. Schoff notes that the ACM was reportedly used to coordinate Tokyo and Washington’s response to Pyongyang’s nuclear test and missile test, as well as coordinating monitoring of North Korea after those provocations.

As the ACM is only just beginning to be institutionalized and “will be very small and almost imperceptible during peacetime,” crises may be the best way to work through any issues – foreseen and unforeseen. Schoff is confident that the ACM will “evolve based on the needs and experience” of Japan and the United States, and such evolution may require external “shocks” to demonstrate to stakeholders where improvements need to be made. Through such lessons-learned, Japan and the U.S. can better prepare to respond more effectively the next time. The most recent North Korean crisis could be a blessing-in-disguise if it grants an opportunity for Japan and the United States to learn how to better finesse the still-fledgling ACM.

The crisis has not only sharpened the focus on improving how Japan works with the United States. It has also reemphasized the importance of working with other states such as South Korea and Australia.

At a February 10 high-level meeting, top military officers from Japan, South Korea and the United States agreed to respond strongly to the North’s provocations by enhancing trilateral information sharing, strengthening coordination on mutual security issues, and increasing participation in military exercises. On the political side, Abe is set to meet with U.S. President Barack Obama and South Korean President Park Geun-hye on the sidelines of the biennial nuclear security summit in late March, where they are expected to discuss the most recent developments on the Korean peninsula.

When Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida and Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop met in February, North Korea was high on the agenda. Bishop stated, “We stand with Japan and other members of the international community in condemning the North Korean regime for its provocative, destabilizing, dangerous behavior.” Abe and Bishop also praised the growing ties between Tokyo and Canberra, indicating that this is a relationship that will only continue to grow in significance.

Yet unilateral sanctions, better alliance coordination, and external balancing are no longer enough. Progress in the UN Security Council has stalled, and even if sanctions were successfully passed, it is questionable how much real impact they would have. And in this climate of heightened tension, Japan must begin considering unilateral defense options – specifically, upgrading its missile defense system.

Specifically, the defense ministry is planning on jointly developing a Block 2A system with the United States, to improve on the interception range of the Block 1A system, which would decrease the number of Aegis required to defend the entirety of Japanese territory. The defense ministry is also planning to buy two more Aegis ships by fiscal year 2020, bringing the total to eight. They are also weighing the possibility of purchasing the U.S. military’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, a land-based missile defense system. THAAD would add a third-tier to Japan’s defenses, which currently consists of SM-3 interceptors (the first tier) and PAC-3 Patriot rockets (second tier).

What this overview of Japan’s reaction to North Korea’s provocations shows is that Japan is willing to try a creative mix of old and new tricks to defend itself against an elevated threat.

Though the Japanese public has been hesitant until now to rally behind Abe’s comprehensive security agenda, perhaps this irrefutable evidence of North Korean intransigence will finally muster the popular support needed for a more “proactive” Japan in the Asia-Pacific and the world.