The Philippines: the Elections, the Alliance, and a Rising Power

As elections loom in the Philippines, foreign policy becomes even more pronounced. It is important to be reminded of Republic Act 7157 or the Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991, which mandates that the Department of Foreign Affairs implement the three pillars of Philippine foreign policy: preserve and enhance national security, promote and attain economic security, and protect and promote the rights and welfare of Filipinos overseas. In line with this, the previous administrations of Fidel Ramos, Joseph Estrada, and Gloria Arroyo directed Philippine foreign policy toward development diplomacy and the protection of overseas Filipino workers. The belief was that strengthening the latter two pillars would ensure the first. Thus, internal security was seen as a prerequisite for a more coherent and consolidated nation.

When President Benigno Aquino came to office in 2010, however, external challenges forced him to pay closer attention to foreign policy matters. One of the biggest challenges that the Aquino administration is facing is an emergent and assertive China. Aquino revolutionized Philippine foreign policy when he challenged China’s claim in the South China Sea and filed an arbitration case against Beijing. The small nation is not asking the Permanent Court of Arbitration to rule on the territorial sovereignty aspect of its dispute with China. Rather, it seeks to clarify maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, something that is of utmost importance not just to the Philippines, but also to the coastal states surrounding the South China Sea, as well as all the state parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The court ruled in October 2015 that it had jurisdiction on the case, and a decision is forthcoming later this year.

This backdrop is crucial as the Philippines holds its national elections on May 9, 2016. Five major contenders are in the running for the presidential race: Jejomar Binay, Rodrigo Duterte, Grace Poe, Mar Roxas, and Miriam Santiago. Binay was mayor of the country’s financial center (Makati City) before becoming vice president in 2010. Duterte is mayor of Davao City, reputedly the safest city in the country due to Duterte’s tough approach to suppressing criminality. Poe won senatorial election in 2013 and has had to face issues regarding her citizenship. Questions regarding her status stemmed from her being a foundling, her acquisition of U.S. citizenship by naturalization, and her subsequent re-acquisition of her Filipino citizenship. The Philippines’ Supreme Court ruled recently that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and could therefore run for public office. Roxas is the incumbent administration’s bet. He won a senate race in 2004, but lost the vice presidency to Binay in 2010. Meanwhile, Santiago is a prominent judge and senator who placed second in the 1992 presidential elections.

Added to this mix are the presidential elections in the United States on November 8, 2016. The two frontrunners at present are Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton. Trump’s populist rhetoric is a platform that is more inward-looking. An isolationist America does not bode well for its partners and allies around the world. Clinton, meanwhile, is one of the architects of the rebalance to Asia and a United States under her leadership may be seen by some as advantageous to the region.

These layers of complexity beg the question of the trajectory of the Philippines’ international relations. This ongoing tale hinges on the results of the national elections, and the votes will not only determine the future of the Philippines’ alliance with a great power, but also its relations with a rising power. What role does China play in the presidential candidates’ foreign policies? Consequently, what form will the Philippine-U.S. alliance take after the elections in the Philippines and the United States and the respective changes in leadership? Finally, what other avenues are open for the Philippines – as well as the United States – to achieve cooperation?

The South China Sea Issue

If there is one thing the presidential candidates agree on, it is that China and its assertive behavior in the South China Sea is the Philippines’ top foreign policy priority. Although the issue remained dormant for some time, largely due to the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, tensions resumed in 2009 when China stepped up its naval patrols in Japan’s exclusive economic zone and territorial waters in the East China Sea. It also began to intimidate foreign oil companies operating in the South China Sea. Likewise, it challenged and detained fishing boats from other littoral states, explored and identified sites for future oil drilling, and ultimately prevented other claimants from cementing their positions. In August 2010, China deployed its three major fleets and conducted a live-fire exercise in the South China Sea. To many observers, this show of force was tantamount not only to China claiming indisputable sovereignty in the South China Sea, but a demonstration that it has the capacity to sustain larger naval deployments in this territory.

In March 2011, two Chinese patrol boats aggressively dogged a Philippine-commissioned survey ship that was conducting oil explorations in the Reed Bank. Almost immediately, the Aquino administration filed a protest with the Chinese Embassy in Manila. The embassy responded by reiterating that China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and that the Philippines should first seek permission before conducting any oil explorations in the area, even if this were to fall well within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. With these developments, the Aquino administration beefed up the territorial defense capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The objective was to develop a minimum credible posture for territorial defense and maritime security.

Similar events played out in 2012 in Scarborough Shoal. The Philippine Navy tried to apprehend several Chinese fishing boats before two Chinese maritime surveillance vessels arrived and prevented the arrests. The Philippines then replaced its surface combatant with a smaller coast guard vessel in the hopes of defusing the situation. China responded by deploying the Yuzheng 310. The standoff lasted for months until the United States brokered a deal. Later, China once again deployed its surveillance maritime ships to prevent Philippine access.

Alongside these moves, the Philippines brought its case to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the hopes that the regional organization could persuade China to sign a binding code of conduct in the South China Sea. Failing that, the Philippines proposed the creation of a Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship, and Cooperation where claimant states could clarify their maritime boundaries and turn the disputed areas into enclaves where the parties could jointly develop projects. However, China preferred a bilateral dispute mechanism and hence pressured Cambodia in 2012 to exclude the issue from the ASEAN summit agenda. Cambodia’s decision to omit any mention of the South China Sea in the final communiqué prompted other members of the regional organization to walk out of the summit in protest.

By 2013, the Philippines decided to file a case against China in the Permanent Court of Arbitration under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Philippines asked the Court to determine the maritime entitlements of the Spratly Islands, Scarborough Shoal, Mischief Reef, and other features within Manila’s 200-mile exclusive economic zone. In other words, the Philippines was seeking the Court to determine the validity of China’s nine-dash line. China refused to participate in the process, arguing that its policy on resolving disputes is based on direct consultation and negotiation with the parties involved. Despite this, the Court ruled in October 2015 that it has jurisdiction on the case, and that proceedings could now move forward on hearing the legal merits of the Philippines’ complaint against China.

The Candidates

The significance of the issue to the Philippines’ international relations is undeniable. As a result, the South China Sea features prominently on a majority of the presidential candidates’ foreign policy platforms. While Binay wants to pursue the arbitration case and supports the conclusion of a binding code of conduct between China and ASEAN, his approach is more conciliatory than Aquino’s. His inclination to enter into joint ventures with China and Chinese companies stems from his experience as mayor of Makati City, the country’s financial district. Binay served as mayor from 1988 to 1998, and again from 2001-2010. He claims that during his terms in office, he facilitated the development and improvement of the city’s infrastructure, which then boosted investor confidence and allowed business to flourish. Binay runs on a platform of anti-poverty, based on his personal experience being born poor and rising above it all. He promises to do to the country what he did for his city.

This promise is a double-edged sword, given that the Binay family’s bank accounts are among those ordered frozen by the Philippine Court of Appeals as petitioned by the Anti-Money Laundering Council. After Binay’s terms as mayor of Makati, he was succeeded by his wife Elenita, and then by son Junjun. His daughter Abigail is now representative of Makati in Congress, and his other daughter Nancy is an elected senator. The family faces plunder and graft investigations for allegedly overpriced infrastructure projects in Makati. Other allegations now being investigated by the Senate, the Ombudsman, and the Anti-Money Laundering Council involve rigged bids, the use of dummies, and whether the family’s lavish estate in a nearby province was acquired using public funds.

Binay’s foreign policy platform of reaching joint ventures with China to develop the natural resources in the disputed areas may seem logical, given that business arrangements were part of the core of his management style as mayor. His comment “China has money, we need capital” follows this trajectory. However, the spate of corruption charges he and his family are facing raise questions about his ability to address social inequality.

Duterte’s style may be to China’s liking, given his inclination toward bilateral talks and non-confrontational and less formal approaches in regard to the South China Sea issue. In one of his campaign rallies, he said that if he were elected president he would be willing to sit down with China and urge Chinese officials to set aside their differences temporarily, providing that they could build a railway for the Philippines, similar to the Chinese-funded high-speed railway line project of the Kenya Railways Corporation, which reduced travel time from Nairobi to Mombasa from 13 hours to three. However, Duterte draws the line at China apprehending Filipino fishermen again, at which point, he promises to unleash the full extent of his moniker – “The Punisher” – and dare China to kill him.

Duterte served as mayor of Davao City from 1988 to 1998, 2001 to 2010, and from 2013 until the present. His iron-fisted stance on criminality earned his city a reputation for being the safest in the country. As president, he says he will stop crime and corruption, and that he will fix the government. He is combative, and crooks and thugs stand no chance with him, he vows. There are no second chances, only a line to be crossed. He may be willing to negotiate with China, but if China crosses the so-called line, then what? Duterte’s political will is no doubt strong, but he is vague on the specifics of how he plans to implement his policies.

A former U.S. citizen, Poe admits that her name is her main asset. She is the adopted daughter of the late Fernando Poe, Jr., an actor who ran for president in the 2004 elections. She lived in the United States with her family and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 2001. On her father’s death, she returned to the Philippines in 2005 and reacquired her Filipino citizenship. The citizenship issue hounded her until recently when the Philippine Supreme Court ruled that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and is therefore eligible to run for office. Other than her name, the fact that Poe has not been immersed in Philippine politics as long as her contenders have (she only became a senator in 2013) lends credence to her “clean” image. She is perceived as honest and uncorrupt, and is therefore seen as someone who can turn the country’s economy around. This image was further cemented when she participated in the Senate’s investigations into the alleged corruption of government officials, including Binay. Poe also signed the committee report recommending the filing of charges against Binay.

Poe’s foreign policy platform calls for strengthening the Philippines’ bargaining power. This can be achieved by nurturing the economy and modernizing the military. She argues for joining trade blocs, as well as working with other members of ASEAN in regard to the maritime dispute with China. Poe supports the Philippines’ arbitration case, knowing that adherence to international law is and should be the basis of settling disputes with other countries. However, she emphasizes the need to distinguish the maritime dispute from the Philippines’ overall ties with China. Perhaps due to the citizenship issue, which bogged down her campaign, she has yet to go beyond generalized statements. Now that her eligibility has been settled, she can focus on substantiating her 20-point agenda, which involves fighting for Manila’s rights in the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea via peaceful means and strengthening the Philippine Coast Guard and the Armed Forces.

Santiago has been a legal expert, judge, immigration commissioner, and agrarian reform secretary, and is currently a senator and chair of the committee on foreign relations. She aims to take a more proactive approach in resolving the South China Sea dispute, relying less on the support of the United States and more on collaborating with other Asian countries. She has a wealth of experience in politics, but her health is her biggest challenge. She was diagnosed with stage 4 lung cancer in 2014, but assures her supporters that her illness is “controlled” and her condition “stable.”

Roxas is from a family of politicians. His grandfather and namesake founded the party he now heads. His father relentlessly challenged the Marcos dictatorship, and his brother was a congressman. He has been gearing up for the presidency since 2008. His platform is simple: Under his tutelage, the Aquino administration’s programs will continue. He intends to pursue the Philippines’ claims in the South China Sea through arbitration, as well as push for the conclusion of a binding code of conduct for all claimants in the disputed areas. Like Poe, he also recognizes the other aspects of the Philippines’ relations with China. While Roxas’ desire to be in office is palpable, his experience is very different from that of ordinary Filipinos. He was educated in the United States and was an investment banker there before he became involved in local politics. He is perceived as a bureaucrat; a follower, not a leader.

Clearly, the candidates converge on the China issue. All of them are in agreement that the current administration’s arbitration case should be pursued. Where they differ are the means with which to ensure that maritime claims and boundaries are defined and upheld. Whether the end entails a more conciliatory posture or a more combative approach towards the rising power matters less for now; what can change the game is the upcoming decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. By the time the decision is released, a new president will be in office. How that president will move forward depends much on character and personality, and less on party ideology.

The U.S.-Philippine Alliance

Undergirding the South China Sea issue is the Philippines’ longstanding alliance with the United States. The standoff in Scarborough Shoal pushed the Philippines to negotiate the Framework Agreement on Increased Rotational Presence and Enhanced Agreement with the United States. The agreement allows the deployment of American troops and equipment on a rotational basis in order to avoid the controversial issue of reestablishing U.S. bases in the Philippines. In 2014, the two countries signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which is an updated implementation of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. The EDCA offers a framework for the two countries to develop their defense capabilities through the rotational deployment of American troops in the Philippines. Under the agreement, American forces can use facilities that are controlled by the Philippine military, while the latter’s base commander has unhampered access to these locations. Similarly, American-built infrastructure inside these installations can be used by the Philippines. Any construction or activity within these installations require the consent of the Philippines through the Mutual Defense Board and the Security Engagement Board. While some domestic groups questioned the constitutionality of EDCA, the Supreme Court ruled in January 2016 that the agreement is indeed constitutional, does not require the approval of the Philippine Senate, and can therefore now be implemented.

Among the Philippines’ presidential candidates, Santiago is the most vocal critic of the United States. She argues that the military-to-military agreement between the allies is void without Senate approval. She heavily criticizes EDCA for lack of transparency, while at the same time calls for the scrapping the Visiting Forces Agreement. Duterte has taken a similar stance, saying that EDCA does not guarantee that the U.S. will come to the Philippines’ defense against China over claims in the South China Sea. Duterte’s camp calls for the implementation of EDCA “from a position of strength.” He plans to capitalize on self-sufficiency and to be decisive on the planning of which equipment, technology, and installations would be involved in EDCA-related activities. Poe has taken a more conciliatory tone, arguing that the United States can’t be expected to always come to the Philippines’ aid, the alliance notwithstanding.

On the other side of the Pacific, the U.S. election cycle is also in full swing. Between Trump and Clinton – the front-runners from both parties – America’s Asian allies are more cautious of a Trump victory, considering his inward-looking, isolationist rhetoric. Trump has been very vocal about China, designating the latter as a currency manipulator. He calls for fighting China’s intellectual property theft and practice of using American companies to share technologies with Chinese competitors, as well as ending the country’s export subsidies and lax labor and environmental laws. Most worrying for the Philippines is that he questions why the U.S. spends money on the defense of Japan and South Korea, two of America’s core allies in the Asia-Pacific. In contrast, Clinton supports the United States’ rebalance strategy in Asia, partly to deter North Korea, and also partly to support allies in ensuring the freedom of navigation in disputed areas in the South China Sea.

The best-case scenario then for the continued harmonious relationship between the United States and the Philippines seems to be a Clinton-Poe combo. Based on their respective rhetoric, both can presumably work together towards a shared goal without having to alienate each country’s other bilateral relationships. If anything, a solid alliance provides a firm basis for the creation and maintenance of a dynamic and rules-based regional architecture. This can then give not just the United States and the Philippines, but also China, Japan, and ASEAN active roles in crafting a stable and sustainable region.