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Japan Seeks to Strengthen Maritime Transportation Capacity
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Japan Seeks to Strengthen Maritime Transportation Capacity

Why did funding for 21 private seamen to be trained as reservists anger the All Japan Seamen’s Union?

By Mina Pollmann

Tucked into Japan’s Ministry of Defense’s (MOD) budget request for fiscal year 2016 is the provision to provide funding for 21 private seamen to be trained as Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) reservists. This budget request was not welcomed by the 25,000-strong All Japan Seamen’s Union. The union formally lodged a protest on January 29 claiming that this measure will lead to “virtual conscription.”

The move to subcontract the SDF’s transportation needs to the private sector reflects both the recent deterioration in Japan’s security situation, as well as the sobering realization that Japan might be understaffed to meet even its most basic transportation needs during times of crises.

As Jeffrey Hornung, Fellow for Security and Foreign Affairs at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, told The Diplomat, “When you consider the ongoing missile launches by North Korea or the invasion of territorial waters/airspace of Japan’s remote islands, it becomes clear why the Government of Japan wants to strengthen its maritime transportation capability.”

It’s doubtful that Japan could afford to provide all the transportation that the SDF needs, even if there was the political appetite for such a procurement, so the recent moves to find private actors to fill gaps in Japan’s security needs makes sense. In 2013, for example, the MOD drew up plans to transport missiles and tanks to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in times of crises, but were hampered by the fact that the MSDF only has three large transport ships. To address this shortage, two private ferries have been contracted by the MOD since 2014. These ferries are to be ready to be at the disposal of the SDF within 72 hours for participation in SDF exercises or humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations; they are not intended for use during wartime.

However, due to an update to the contract, the ferries could be used when an emergency arises, say, concerning the disputed islands in the East China Sea. As SDF law forbids civilians from being deployed to potential combat zones, the government’s plan is to recruit private seamen as MSDF reservists to pilot the ferries if needed.

In Japan, an individual has to pass a national exam to qualify as a maritime officer and operate a private ship. Because operating MSDF ships does not require such a qualification, most MSDF veterans – who make up a significant proportion of MSDF reservists – do not have the skills or training to operate private ships. While it is estimated that 21 licensed seamen are needed to operate each private ship, there are only about ten MSDF reservists who have the requisite national qualification. Hence, MOD now faces the problem of recruiting enough seamen who can operate these private ships. Their solution? Effective as of 2016, any private seaman can become a MSDF reservist by completing a ten-day training course.

The MOD insists that they will not actually use private seamen during times of crisis, but critics remain skeptical. After all, the plan is only being proposed because the MOD fears a shortage in trained seamen to operate these private ships. In a contingency, will they really be able to recruit enough sailors to operate these ships solely from within the existing pool of MSDF reservists?

Politically, the Seamen’s Union will remain the biggest challenge to the government’s plan. In their statement, the union declared, “It is regrettable that the government has been proceeding with the plan that totally ignores the voices of us sailors.”

MOD insists that they will not force anyone to become a reservist, and that they “will ask shipping companies to also respect the personal wishes of their workers” – however, the Seamen’s Union contend that due to the nature of their work, which requires everyone on the team to work seamlessly, it will be nigh impossible for an individual sailor to sing to a different tune. The Seamen’s Union is also concerned about both the overt and subtle pressure companies can apply on their employees to sign on. Channeling the pacifist nature of Japanese society, Shinichi Tanaka, acting president of the union, explains: “We did not become seamen in order to be sent to the battlefield.”

In response to such concerns, Hornung argues that the Seamen’s Union is misunderstanding the way the SDF reserve system works. “Reservists come from two primary sources: retired SDF members and private people with no SDF experience,” Hornung explains. “Importantly, neither are compulsory. Both are entirely voluntary. The MSDF will now also have a ‘reserve candidate’ system so that MSDF can keep reservists with national qualification as maritime officers.”

This back-and-forth between the MOD and Seamen’s Union is an interesting prism that captures just how much Japan has changed – and not changed – since 1945.

Due to the more threatening security situation, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s government has pursued a wide range of security reforms. This has forced the Japanese people to engage in a serious debate about their responsibility to defend – at the very minimum – their own territory. What this debate has revealed more than anything else, however, is how wedded the Japanese people are to their pacifist identity, and how strongly they cling to negative historical experiences to justify present pacifist inclinations.

The Seamen’s Union is particularly opposed to the reservist plan due to the lingering memories of World War II, when 15,518 private ships were sunk, killing 60,609 sailors. A majority of these sailors were drafted to transport soldiers and military supplies. These private seamen were particularly vulnerable because they only had minimal protection. To put it into context, compared to the Imperial Japanese Army’s fatality rate of 20 percent, and the Imperial Japanese Navy’s 16 percent, private seamen suffered a 43 percent fatality rate.

But despite the reactionary rhetoric in response to Abe’s policies, such as reinterpreting the constitution and updating the defense guidelines, Japan is not going become an aggressive military power overnight because it is simply not in Japan’s interest to do so, and because public opinion would not allow it. So, while the Seamen’s Union have every right to respect the memory of their fallen predecessors and vocally caution against repeating such a tragedy, the reality is that the MOD will take care to protect these private seamen, should they ever be even used in such a capacity. Times have changed. Simply speaking, the MSDF of today is not the Imperial Navy of wartime Japan.

This debate also reflects a much more subtle shift in Japanese society. While the abstract discussion over Japanese constitutionalism and the right to collective self-defense has grabbed most of the world’s attention, the more fundamental change gripping Japanese society is visible in the mundane realm of such logistical issues as finding enough seamen to operate ships during crises. These debates – about what the state can and cannot demand of its citizens, and what role citizens should be expected to play in defending their nation – are only likely to increase in frequency in Japan’s near future. 

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The Authors

Mina Pollmann writes for The Diplomat’s Tokyo Report section.
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