Inconclusive Peace: The Dawn of the ‘Kabinettskriege’ in the 21st Century?

True to Mark Twain’s dictum that “history doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme,” a new variant of war has emerged resembling the wars fought by Europe from 1648 to 1789 – the Kabinettskriege (Cabinet Wars).

As we move toward greater multipolarity in the international system of the 21st century and the gradual equalization of military power among major states, wars fought for limited political objectives will become increasingly common. Often such wars result in an inconclusive peace that leaves belligerents dissatisfied and the door for future conflicts open.

The Kabinettskriege

The so-called Cabinet Wars were planned and directed by monarchs and their cabinets – in alliance with other states – and were fought by a professional officer corps and small armies for limited political objectives. This form of warfare was made possible by a homogenous political and military culture in Europe.

One of the common misconceptions of the Cabinet Wars is that they were limited wars. That is only partially true in terms of the political objectives of conflicts in the 17th and 18th centuries. Regarding resources used and the loss of property and life, they were anything but limited and more often than not resembled total wars.

The War of the Austrian Succession killed approximately 100,000 soldiers and 400,000 civilians. During the Seven Years War, 500,000 combatants were killed on the battlefield alone. Monarchies during that period were overburdened with public debt, entire regions were depopulated, and famine and disease were a familiar occurrence.

What made the wars so destructive was that the corresponding combatants in Europe at the time shared the same military technology as well as similar tactical, operational, and strategic concepts, often producing indecisive outcomes on the battlefield.

Campaigns were conducted by regular (so-called line troops) and irregular forces (e.g., Grenzers, Pandurs, Cossacks etc.), which complemented the strengths and weaknesses of each other. Military decisions were forced by set piece battles, sieges, and irregular combat (e.g., the Southern Campaign during the American War of Independence).  

Warring parties usually fought as part of an alliance. However, states repeatedly changed their allegiances. For example, during the so-called diplomatic revolution in 1756 on the eve of the Seven Years’ War, Austria abandoned its long-term ally, Great Britain, for its most formidable continental rival, France. These rapidly shifting alliances often nullified military successes on the battlefield.

Throughout the age of the Kabinettskriege, European leaders first and foremost looked to war to achieve their political objectives. These objectives were usually limited and focused on minor territorial gains and violently resolving throne successions, but could also include the dismemberment of whole nations (e.g., the three partitions of Poland).

Kabinettskriege in the 21st Century

As the world once more becomes more multipolar and homogenous in the 21st century, states could also increasingly engage in “cabinet wars” to achieve limited political objectives, including the violent resolution of territorial disputes.

Countries such as Russia and China have been trying to offset the technological and conventional superiority of the United States and its allies through asymmetric means and their methods have become more effective with time. Hybrid warfare – a concept that simultaneously blurs and blends irregular and regular methods of warfare at the tactical, operational, and strategic level – is an example of adversaries trying to counterbalance U.S. military power.

At the same time, the United States is working to maintain its technological and military superiority by implementing the so-called third offset strategy. This strategy tries to merge new with existing military technology, as well as innovative  concepts with old warfighting methods.

Yet, the gradual redistribution of military power in the long-run will be difficult to stop. And while the United States and its allies will remain the most formidable military force for the foreseeable future, they will no longer be able to dominate the globe as they did in the 1990s and 2000s.

The broad dissemination of advanced technology among states in the globalized world, either through blatant reverse engineering of technology stolen via cyber espionage or through legal methods such as arms purchases, will also make advanced military technologies more widely available.

As a result, the United States will find it increasingly difficult to maintain military superiority based primarily on technological advantages. U.S. air campaigns, precision-strikes, and network-centered war can no longer be conducted unchallenged and without opposition.

The relative decline in U.S. power will contribute to the evening of the military playing field and open the doors to military adventurism and the 21st century version of the Kabinettskriege. 

These wars will primarily be conducted by states rather than non-state actors and will be fought for short periods of time, most often over the control of territory, and will likely not involve the occupation of an entire country or regime change. Examples in past include the Sino-Indian War in 1962, the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979, and the Falklands War in 1982.

In recent history, Russia’s military interventions in Ukraine and Syria fulfill all the criteria of a cabinet war: The achievement of finite political objectives by a small force using regular and irregular troops over a limited period of time. Most importantly, however, akin to cabinet wars of the 18th century, the battles were indecisive, with no clear cut victory for either side.

Russia relied on airpower and special operations forces in both instances, merging them with the old Soviet concepts of Maskirovka and Spetsnaz. Like the 18th century monarchs and unlike the United States, Russia ruthlessly conducted its Syrian air campaign, disregarding civilian losses.  And similar to 18th century monarchies, Russia was also not shy of threatening to abandon an ally once divergent political objectives became apparent.

China has also shown its willingness to engage in cabinet wars in the past, as the Sino-Indian War and  the Sino-Vietnamese War illustrate. Beijing could do so again in the future, as long as the conflict does not trigger a full-scale war with the United States and its allies. For example, a military confrontation between China and Vietnam over territory in the South China Sea is a possibility, as are clashes between China and Malaysia in the Spratly Islands.

War as a legitimate form of statecraft looks to be back on the table.