Run to the Hills: Saving India-Nepal Ties

One of the less expected developments in South Asia in 2015 was the sudden strategic divergence between India and Nepal, two countries that have long enjoyed close political, strategic, economic, and social ties. The divergence last year began with Nepal accomplishing an important political milestone since it left its monarchy behind and became a republic in 2007.

After years of debate, Nepal's constituent assembly managed to promulgate a constitution in September 2015 with 507 out of 598 members voting in favor of the new document. Shortly after, small political parties, associated primarily with the Madhesi and Tharu ethnic communities, started protests against the document. These communities, which roughly comprise half of Nepal and are geographically clustered in the southern plains bordering India, known as the Terai, alleged that the constitution effectively disenfranchised them and ensured that the country's political elites, based in the hills and Kathmandu, would be able to lock in their preferences over the long term.

Over the next months, these small protests gripped the nation, which was still recovering from a devastating 7.8 magnitude earthquake in April 2015. The protesters’ grievances focused primarily on the constitution's federal constituency delimitations and proportional representation provisions, which they saw as purposefully engineered by Kathmandu elites to deprive them of a say in Nepal's political processes. It just so happened that the Madhesi and Tharu ethnic communities had strong historic, linguistic, and cultural ties with India. New Delhi moreover saw an interest for it to intervene in Nepal, to ensure that the constitution did not sow longer term chaos in an important neighboring state.

India's interest in Nepal's constitutional process was by no means sudden. Indian diplomats had long been monitoring the years-long constitution-writing process in the country. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi took a unique interest in India's neighbors. He had invited leaders from every South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) member to his inauguration in May 2014. In August that year, Modi traveled to Nepal for a two-day visit and gave a 50-minute speech before Nepal's legislature, emphasizing the importance of the constituent assembly and the upcoming constitution. During that visit, the Indian prime minister took care to avoid being seen as an unwanted source of outside influence on a neighboring state's internal politics. He struck a careful balance however, taking pains to emphasize India's stake in its relationship with Nepal.

Given this background, few could have predicted the extent to which bilateral diplomacy between India and Nepal would begin to crumble in the aftermath of the promulgation of the constitution. India immediately opened high-level communication with Nepal's government about the provisions of the constitution that were driving protests. Nepal, in turn, cited the overwhelming majority in the constituent assembly, suggesting that India's concerns were an attempt at external subversion of the its neighbor’s democratic process. New Delhi even leaked a list of seven demands it had issued to the government in Kathmandu to the press, in an attempt to publicize its demands outside of the normal diplomatic process. Shrewd Indian analysts suggested that the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government in India was taking a public stand on its support for India-linked ethnic groups across the border in order to buttress its chances at the polls in the Bihar state elections, which were eventually spectacularly lost by the party.

The real wrench in the works, however, was the unprecedented blockade of trade and traffic across the Nepal-India border. Indian trucks carrying vital supplies for Nepal, including medicine, food, fuel, and other goods refused to cross the border, citing the uncertain political climate amid widespread protesting in the Terai. Kathmandu cited the blockade as an act of state policy, chastising New Delhi for putting the wellbeing of ordinary Nepalis at risk months after the devastating earthquake. India maintained and continues to maintain that the blockade was entirely unsanctioned by the government. Nevertheless, more so than other aspect of their disagreements over the constitution, the blockade accelerated diplomatic drift between Kathmandu and New Delhi.

Complicating matters somewhat was the election of a new prime minister in Nepal in October 2015. Khadga Prasad Oli of the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) succeeded Sushil Koirala of the National Congress party. Koirala's party is known for its historical closeness with India's previously dominant Indian National Congress party, which is currently in opposition. Oli, meanwhile, had a reputation for being something of a populist and had no clear affinity for India. Some Indian analysts even expected him to steer Nepal toward China amid the blockade. In general, Oli's election was taken as a signal in New Delhi that working with the Nepali government would became more – not less – difficult.

The constitutional crisis eventually winded down toward the end of 2015. In early 2016, the Nepali cabinet agreed to back an amendment that addressed three of the core grievances, including proportional representation and constituency delimitation issue. Public messaging from the Nepali government suggested that the persistent protesting, which continued through the winter months, combined with the de facto economic blockade, worked in pushing Kathmandu's hand. Nepal's Minister for Industry Som Prasad Pandey, in December, called on the protesting groups to come to the negotiating table to air their grievances and, above all, "withdraw the protests immediately." India welcomed the development.

The protests have largely died down, but tensions continue to simmer between the distrustful Madhesis, Tharus, and other groups, and the Nepali government. Despite the resolution of the dispute, the damage to the India-Nepal relationship needed to be urgently addressed from the perspective of both countries. To this end, in late February 2016, Oli traveled to New Delhi, hoping to begin the process of renormalizing Nepal's diplomatic ties with India after a difficult few months. Notably, by visiting New Delhi first, Oli kept with a longstanding tradition of Nepali premiers traveling to India for their first trip abroad after coming to office. One notable exception to this rule was Pushpa Kamal Dahal, a chairman of the country's Maoist party and Nepal's 33rd prime minister, who visited China before India. (Dahal had, among other slights toward New Delhi, proposed a scrapping of the 1950 treaty of friendship between the two countries.) In January, reports in the Nepali press suggested that Oli might emphasize the extent to which the constitutional crisis had damaged the India-Nepal bilateral and choose to visit Beijing first. That, however, did not come to pass and Oli wound up in New Delhi.

Oli's time in India was a helpful litmus test for the state of India-Nepal ties after seven months of turbulence. In India, he met with his Indian counterpart, Modi, among other senior officials. In joint remarks delivered by Modi and Oli during the visit, it became clear that the two leaders hadn't entirely resolved their differences over the constitutional crisis. Modi described Nepal's constitution as a "major achievement" for the country, but caveated that declaration by cautioning that it will take "consensus and dialogue" to ensure its success. Oli, meanwhile, described the document as "historic." Indeed, for the Nepali prime minister, the trip was an opportunity to extol the virtues of the nation's constitution. At the end of his visit, the two leaders were unable to issue a joint statement, suggesting that reconciliation would take time and the ground was not set for a concrete bilateral agenda.

Fortunately, realist impulses in both Kathmandu and New Delhi will likely drive this relationship back to its historical equilibrium of closeness and cooperation. India has strong incentives to avoid giving Nepal any reason to look northeast, toward Beijing, which has been more than eager to increase its ties with Kathmandu. Oli is set to make Beijing his second international stop after India. Meanwhile, as the blockade demonstrated, for better or worse, the physical barrier of the Himalayan range means that Nepal's existing connectivity with India is more than an artifact of geographic convenience – it is an economic lifeline. Restoring good ties with New Delhi and continuing to expand commercial ties will deeply benefit Nepal's economy, a goal that remains all the more important as recovery from last year's earthquake progresses.

Ultimately, the restoration of this relationship will come down to the all-too-important currency in diplomacy: trust. The constitutional crisis resulted in the erosion of bilateral trust that had taken decades to establish. Modi and Oli took the first step in February during their bilateral summit, but they'll have to sustain that momentum going forward to put this relationship back on track.