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What to Expect from Russia’s Pacific Fleet in 2016
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What to Expect from Russia’s Pacific Fleet in 2016

Russia is steadily expanding its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, despite various budgetary and technical constraints.

By Franz-Stefan Gady

Russia’s Pacific Fleet is slated to grow in size and importance in the years to come. Over the last three years, Russia’s second-largest fleet has for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union received new ships and the operational pace of the Russian Navy in the Asia-Pacific region has accelerated. However, the Pacific Fleet’s two chief tasks—strategic deterrence and coastal defense—will remain unchanged even with the addition of new vessels and a more aggressive combat patrolling schedule.

Russia’s Pacific Fleet currently operates out of four bases, Kamchatskiy, Magadan, Petropavlovsk, and Sovetskaya Gavan. There are purportedly also plans to establish a naval base on the Kuril Islands as well as in Singapore and Vietnam, although in the latter two cases Russia will probably only gain some greater access rights to port facilities and rights to make repairs to its military equipment.

The single most important change in the Pacific Fleet’s military capability in 2015 has been the addition of the Alexander Nevsky, a Borei-class (aka Dolgorukiy-class), Project 955, fourth generation nuclear-powered ballistic submarines (SSBN). The induction of another Borei-class SSBN, the Vladimir Monomak, scheduled for August or September 2016, will likely also be the single most important factor in increasing the fleet’s combat power this year.

In a testimony in February 2016, the head of U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Harry B. Harris, singled out the Borei-class to underline the growing importance of the Russia’s Pacific Fleet: “Russian ballistic missile and attack submarines remain especially active in the region. The arrival in late 2015 of Russia’s newest class of nuclear ballistic missile submarine (Dolgorukiy SSBN) in the Far East is part of a modernization program for the Russian Pacific Fleet and signals the seriousness with which Moscow views this region.”

Yet, while the presence of two Borei-class submarines in the Pacific is major boost for the Russian Navy in region, it is unclear whether the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) aboard the new submarines—the Bulava ICBM, capable of carrying six to 10 warheads—is available in large enough quantities for Russia to be able to noticeably increase the number of nuclear deterrence patrols. (Indeed there is some speculation that the Bulava is not even fully operationally yet.)

In 2012 the Russian Navy as a whole purportedly conducted only five SSBN nuclear deterrence patrols. From 2011-2014, the Pacific Fleet allegedly only conducted four SSBN nuclear deterrence patrols. Nuclear deterrence patrols usually last 60-90 days. In comparison, the United States Navy conducts around 30 nuclear deterrence patrols each year. Thus, even the addition of two Borei-class subs could not significantly increase the number of nuclear deterrence patrols conducted by the Pacific Fleet in the years to come.

According to the website russianship.info, Russia’s Pacific Fleet currently consists of five nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, five nuclear-powered guided missile submarines, and five nuclear-powered attack submarines, as well as eight conventional attack subs.

The Russian Navy’s surface fleet in the region consists of one heavy-nuclear-powered guided missile destroyer, one guided missile cruiser, four large anti-submarine warfare ships, three guided missile destroyers, eight small anti-submarine warfare ships, four guided missile corvettes, 11 guided missile boats, nine minesweepers, four large landing ships, and five landing crafts.

In addition, the Pacific Fleet was expecting two Steregushchy-class corvettes to enter service in 2015, yet the induction date has been postponed and it remains unclear whether the two vessels will join the fleet this year.

Also, while major upgrading and overhaul efforts are currently underway, it remains unclear how many ships of the fleet are, in fact, operational. A conservative estimate, based on recent analyses, puts the number at six surface ships and nine submarines of all kinds.

Two Akula-class multi-role nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), the Kuzbass and Magadan, are currently upgraded and will be fitted with 3M-54 Kalibr (NATO designation: SS-N-27A “Sizzler”) supersonic cruise missiles. In fact, the Kuzbass was slated to rejoin the Russian Pacific Fleet in March 2016. However, this appears not to have occurred yet.

As I reported in a previous analysis, one Delta III-class submarine is currently undergoing overhaul and the other two vessels of the class are currently held in reserve (although some sources list both submarines as fully operational). Out of the five nuclear-powered guided missile submarines, three Oscar II-class vessels are operational with the other two undergoing upgrades. “Out of a total of eight diesel-electric Kilo-class attack submarines, five are operational as of January 2016,” I explained.

The Russian Navy in Asia has also not yet received upgraded Ilyushin-38 maritime patrol aircraft with anti-submarine warfare capabilities, as well as new Pantsir and S-400 Triumf air defense systems, as initially anticipated for 2015.

Thus claims that in 2015, “the [Russian] defense industry companies delivered four warships, four submarines, 52 auxiliary ships, two Bastion coastal missile systems, 27 naval aircraft, and 45 missile-artillery systems to the Navy,” as stated by Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov in March 2016, cannot be taken at face-value. For one thing, one cannot verify the numbers independently. Also, one can assume that the warships and submarines will still have to undergo extensive sea and weapons trials, which can take years, before becoming fully operational.

Consequently, the combat capabilities of the Russian Pacific Fleet of 2016 are—with the exception of the additional Borei-class SSBN—more or less the same as the Russian Pacific Fleet in early 2015.

Despite that, military commanders have noted an increase in Russian naval activity in the Pacific for the past two years. “Russia in the last few months has returned to, I would say, nearly a Cold War level of activity that goes towards our homeland, with long-range attacks, exercises and those types of things,” the then-commander of U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Samuel Locklear, said in April 2015.

Most recently, in March 2016, Russia dispatched a naval group consisting of one large anti-submarine warfare ship, an oceanic rescue vessel, and a tanker from the Pacific Fleet’s base in Vladivostok to participate in two multinational naval drills and to pay port visits in five countries to demonstrate Russia’s resurgent naval power. The Pacific Fleet has also recently conducted naval drills in the Sea of Japan involving 30 vessels of all kinds. The naval exercise included a simulated cruise missile attack. There have also been reports of increased Russian submarine activity in the Asia-Pacific.

However, the next few years will show whether this is just a temporary peak or if Russia has the ability to add new surface warships and submarines, and upgrade Soviet-era vessels in adequate numbers in order not to reduce the combat power of the Russian Navy. As of now, given Russia’s current economic situation -- weighed down by sanctions and low oil prices -- and the still rather limited capabilities of the country’s shipbuilding industry, a reduction in Russia’s naval activity in the long-term may be likely.

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The Authors

Franz-Stefan Gady is an Associate Editor at The Diplomat.
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