Can China Be a Major Player in the Middle East?

In January 2016, Chinese President Xi Jinping finally made his first visit to the Middle East, after nearly three years in office. Xi’s tour took him to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran, highlighting China’s key partners in the region. Just before Xi’s trip, the Chinese government also released its first “Arab Policy Paper,” which sought to define China’s interests in the region. Building on that momentum, the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) held its 7th ministerial meeting in Doha, Qatar from May 12-14 to further define and advance China’s relationships in the Middle East.

The wave of high-profile engagement from China comes with a certain defensiveness. Ahead of Xi’s visit to the Middle East in particular, Chinese media was filled with commentaries refuting views that China is not a major player in the region. While China has been increasing its involvement, Beijing remains extremely reluctant to commit to wading into the mess of regional issues. Anodyne statements on the peaceful resolution of the Israel-Palestine issue or a political settlement of the Syrian civil war are about the limit of China’s involvement in the Middle East’s crucial flashpoints.

This was only further underlined by the CASCF meeting in Qatar, which gathered together officials from the 22 Arab League member states, as well as Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Despite the high-profile attendees, there was scant mention of the major strategic issues plaguing the region: the ongoing conflict in Syria, the rise of the Islamic State, or political instability in Yemen. Instead, the focus was almost entirely economic, with discussions centering on how to advance China’s “Belt and Road” in the region. The Belt and Road, which envisions an integrated infrastructure and trading network from eastern China to western Europe, has essentially become a catch-all for every bit of Chinese economic engagement on the Eurasian continent; the Middle East is no exception.

The ministers held a special session devoted to discussing “the joint construction of the Belt and Road,” according to China Daily. In a congratulatory message from Beijing ahead of the session, Xi praised Arab governments for their “passion” in taking part in the Chinese initiative, which was also high on the agenda during his Middle East tour in January.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi even went so far as to select infrastructure projects as the symbol of China’s cooperation with the Arab League member states. “Camels and sailing boats marked the ancient Silk Road,” Wang said. “Nowadays, the China-Arab cooperative relations can be labeled by railway and port under the Belt and Road Initiative framework.” Wang proposed increased cooperation on “connectivity, capacity cooperation, and cultural exchanges,” which together form the “three pillars” of the Belt and Road initiative in the Middle East.

Yet for all the talk, there’s little concrete progress to show. China has had the most success in Egypt, which has proved an eager recipient for Chinese investment in projects to expand the Suez Canal and construct a new administrative capital. In fact, just before the CASCF, China State Construction Engineering Corp. reportedly agreed to a $15 billion deal to help build Egypt’s new capital, a pet project of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. But China has yet to secure landmark deals with its other main partners in the region, Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Ultimately, China may find that it’s not possible to separate economic investment from security and political concerns in the Middle East. While China has been increasingly vocal about its favored approach to regional issues, its official positions are little more than vague, purposefully noncontroversial, talking points that offer little in the way of actual solutions to complex problems. Having seen issues from the Israel-Palestine peace process to the rise of Islamic State repeatedly defy Western attempts at solutions, China may have simply concluded that steering clear is its best option.

The problem is that Middle Eastern countries themselves are increasingly looking for China to take a more active role in regional security – and Beijing’s partners have diametrically opposed visions for what actions China should take. Iran, with its rocky relations with the West, would like to see Beijing more involved regionally to act as a counterweight to Washington’s influence, presumably to Tehran’s benefit. At the same time, Iran’s irreconcilable rival, Saudi Arabia, is also looking for increased Chinese support. Stung by the Obama administration’s outreach to Iran over the nuclear deal, Saudi Arabia sees the specter of U.S. abandonment looming, and is seeking to hedge its bets by strengthening ties with China.

Given that Iran and Saudi Arabia are directly opposed on nearly every hot-button issue in the region, it would be nearly impossible for China to take up a more active role without alienating one of its main partners (and major oil providers). Both sides view China as a potential “honest broker,” but that’s a role of extraordinary diplomatic complexity, and China has shown little inclination to take it up.

Yet as it seeks to increase its economic footprint in the region, Beijing will face more and more pressure to play a commensurate role in solving security issues. These divergent priorities were reflected even in the polite and optimistic public remarks made at the CASCF ministerial in May. While Wang stuck mainly to his talking points on the Belt and Road, the secretary-general of the Arab League, Nabil al-Arabi, spoke almost wistfully of China’s “great influence” on international relations, saying both sides should “attach even more importance to the strategic cooperation.” Middle Eastern analysts interviewed by Xinhua after the meeting also spoke almost exclusively about China’s potential role in solving geopolitical issues, a topic mostly absent from Wang’s remarks.

China-Middle East relations have been limited for years, due to a lack of emphasis from both sides. Now, the political will for improving ties is there, but priorities aren’t aligned. Even in the midst of rock-bottom oil prices, cash-flush Arab governments are less interested in Beijing’s huge investment coffers than in its geopolitical clout. Meanwhile, China retains a laser-like (or perhaps intentionally blinkered) focus on economics and the Belt and Road initiative, despite the real threat security issues pose to Xi’s grand strategy.

As long as these priorities remain disconnected, China-Middle East ties will follow the pattern of the CASCF meeting – friendly and optimistic, but without real substance.