Are We Overhyping China’s Hypersonic Weapons Program?

China has made great strides in researching and developing hypersonic technology in the past two years and has repeatedly tested a prototype of a hypersonic weapon called the DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV).

The DF-ZF is an ultra-high-speed missile capable of reaching up to Mach 10 and said to be specifically designed to evade U.S., Taiwanese, South Korean, and Japanese ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems.

Details about the tests remain murky and there is very little open source information available on the new weapon and its development save that China’s 10th Research Institute, a subdivision of the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation (CASIC) 1st Academy, is in charge of designing and developing the DF-ZF.

The DF-ZF has allegedly been tested a total of seven times. The last two tests occurred in November 2015 and April 2016. All tests occurred at the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center, located in China’s Shanxi province, some 250 miles (400 kilometers) southwest of Beijing. (U.S. government sources refer to the Taiyuan testing facility as the Wuzhai Missile and Space Test Center.) All tests appear to have used a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) transporter erector launcher (TEL) to carry the DF-ZF HGV warhead to the boundary between space and earth’s atmosphere, approximately 100 kilometers (62 miles) above the ground via a ballistic missile.

However, it is unknown what type of ballistic missile has been used in the tests. There are some speculations that the Dong-Feng (DF) 21 two-stage MRBM has been the primary launch platform, although at least in one instance a liquid-fueled missile carried the DF-ZF into the atmosphere apparently ruling out the solid-fueled DF-21.

What exactly occurs after the DF-ZF’s launch and why is it potentially such a formidable weapon?

Once the DF-ZG HGV has been launched into the atmosphere, it begins to glide in a relatively flat trajectory by executing a pull-up maneuver and boosting itself back into the upper atmosphere while accelerating to speeds up to Mach 10.

“The gliding phase enables the HGV not only to maneuver aerodynamically – performing evasive actions and evading interception – but also extends the range of the missile,” I explained previously. Depending on what type of launch vehicle is used, the DF-HGV can extend the warhead’s range by 500-1000 kilometers (310-621 miles).

While the weapon in its initial ascend follows a predictable ballistic trajectory, once it descends through the atmosphere the DF-ZG HGV charts an erratic course preventing conventional BMD systems, which track incoming objects via satellite sensors and ground and sea radar, from locking onto the DF-ZG warhead.

As a consequence, a DF-ZG warhead likely has the ability to penetrate the multi-layered defenses of BMD systems currently in use by the United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region, and strike its target. The DF-ZG warhead, mounted on short and intermediate-range anti-ship ballistic missiles, could also defeat the air defenses of an U.S. carrier strike group.

It is still unclear whether China is developing the DF-ZG for conventional or nuclear use. An analysis by the Jamestown Foundation stipulates that because liquid-fueled launchers are used in China’s nuclear program, a nuclear variant of the DF-ZG warhead is a high possibility. (Liquid-fueled missiles also travel faster than solid-fueled missiles.)

“Whether China arms its hypersonic weapons with nuclear or conventional payloads – or both – will provide more information regarding how it intends to incorporate hypersonic weapons into PLA planning and operations,” according to the 2015 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review report. 

The Jamestown Foundation outlined the possibility that once the DF-ZG becomes operational, it could be inducted into the 52nd Base command of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), given that the command’s units are equipped with DF-ZG compatible launchers including the DF-11A, DF-15B, and DF-21D short and medium-range ballistic missiles.

There has also been repeated speculation that the PLARF’s newest road-mobile intercontinental missile (ICBM), the DF-41, could be armed with a DF-ZG warhead enabling China to hit any target in the United States within 30 minutes, according to some estimates.

One of the apparent weaknesses in the DF-ZG program is the lack of high-performance computing power to design a warhead capable of withstanding the physical force released during hypersonic maneuvering. This allegedly has been slowing down the program, but it is unknown to what degree.

“[T]he lack of computing power slowed down scientists’ effort to create and verify innovative designs for hypersonic weapons (…). A good supercomputer could be used as a ‘digital wind tunnel’ to quickly develop prototypes for test flights and help the decision on the choice of models for production,” the South China Morning Post reported in 2015.

Conservative estimates are that China is about two decades away from deploying a DF-ZF HGV capable of hitting a moving target such as an aircraft carrier. One of the major obstacles remains the PLARF’s still-limited support structure for precision-guided strikes including a particular weakness in detecting, identifying, tracking, and striking moving targets.

However, there is also the possibility that the weapon will be deployed as early as 2020 against stationary targets.