Why are Japan’s Opposition Parties Weak?

The Japanese people will head to the polls on July 10 – most likely to hand Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) its fourth consecutive victory. Despite the unpopularity of his signature policies – such as the new security legislation and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – how has Abe managed to stay in power?

The answer to this question lies in the opposition parties’ weakness.

In dissecting why the opposition parties have failed to dethrone Abe, it is useful to divide causes into proximate and ultimate. Proximate causes include the inability of opposition parties to coordinate their offensive, and the incompetence displayed by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) during their brief period in power from 2009 to 2012. Ultimate causes include the lack of ideological organizing principles in Japanese politics, and a system of clientelism and centralized financial networks that close off traditional paths to power for non-LDP aspirants.

Traditionally, the LDP has dominated Japanese politics while a myriad smaller opposition parties split the anti-LDP vote. This has particularly hurt opposition parties’ performance in single-member districts; in the 2013 Upper House elections, the LDP won nearly all of the single-member districts.

Recognizing this, the newly formed Democratic Party (DP), the antique Japan Communist Party (JCP), and several smaller opposition parties have united to field “joint” candidates in single-member districts. So in some single-member districts, the JCP is urging its members to vote for the DP candidate; in other districts, the DP is urging their supporters to vote for the JCP candidate, and so on. Tactically speaking, this makes sense: it means the DP, JCP, and other opposition parties won’t be fighting with each other over limited anti-Abe votes. One reason why the LDP did so well in the “surprise” December 2014 Lower House elections was that Abe didn’t give the opposition time to coordinate their candidates.

But strategically, this could backfire – especially for the DP. This party was formed in March as a merger of the DPJ and the Japan Innovation Party. Though it is obvious the new party was formed in order to better stand up against Abe in the upcoming Upper House elections, it is not quite clear what the party stands for. Because of this, many voters view the DP with suspicion as it is. Add in collaboration with the JCP -- a party that the DP has significant policy disagreements with (e.g., the JCP wants to end nuclear energy immediately, while the DP wants to phase it out in the 2030s) -- and it’s easy to see why voters might be turned off.

According to a Kyodo poll conducted May 28-29, 42 percent disapprove of the DP-JCP partnership, compared to 35 percent who approve. As Tobias Harris points out, that suggests the DP’s gamble – that independents wouldn’t be turned off by cooperation with the JCP – might not be panning out. Abe has gleefully attacked the union, arguing that, “If you [give] your votes to joint candidates of the opposition parties, you endorse” the JCP, including its controversial positions against the U.S.-Japan alliance and Self-Defense Forces.

The one thing that unites the DP, JCP, and opposition parties is the desire to scrap the newly enacted security legislation. But recent moves by China – including the first time a Chinese naval vessel entered the Senkakus’ contiguous waters, and the first time since 2004 that a Chinese naval vessel entered Japan’s territorial waters – will likely only serve to heighten the Japanese public’s awareness about the very real threats they face in their neighborhood. If China continues to aggravate Japan, the opposition’s obdurate refusal to consider necessary security reforms will only make them look more incompetent.

The DJP’s incompetence is the second proximate cause for opposition parties’ lackluster performance. The LDP might not be voters’ sweetheart, but at least they know how things work in Japanese politics and how to get the bureaucracy to work with them. Memories of the DPJ’s ineptness are still too fresh for voters to forgive and welcome the newly-branded DP with open arms.

Ultimately, Japanese politics does not have ideological organizing principles. Yes, there is debate in Japan. There is at times borderline-hysterical debate over security legislation, nuclear energy, and the TPP. But no amount of debate can change the fact that Japan needs to be able to work with other countries to defend itself; or the fact that Japan is resource poor and needs to use nuclear energy at least until an alternative, renewable source can be developed; or the fact that Japan’s farming is uncompetitive and the agricultural industry is dying. To any rational observer, the real debate should be more pragmatic, about the details, rather than about the ideological framework.

Because of this, you don’t have the Paul Ryan dilemma in Japan – you don’t have voters who will support a party no matter how incompetent that it is because they simply cannot stomach the other party. Voters will vote for the DP if they believe the DP is competent and can solve Japan’s problems. In an ideological vacuum, this is the only measure that really matters. In a country with strong and opposing ideologies, such as the United States, an incompetent party can regain prominence on the strength of its “ideas.” Not so in Japan: all the ideas are based on the same general positions.

And perhaps opposition parties suffer most because they do not have the opportunities to foster political talent. Ethan Scheiner dove in depth into the issue of opposition failure in a 2006 study. In his analysis, he pointed out that the LDP does well despite its unpopularity as a party because the LDP has more “quality” candidates. “Quality” candidates are those individuals who served before as local level politicians, and the LDP does better in the aggregate because it just “happens” to have more “quality” candidates running in races.

But this is no coincidence--because of clientelism and the centralized financial system in Japan, local level politicians are incentivized to ally with the ruling national party. Pork barrel politics means that local-level politicians in Japan are evaluated based on how much money they can bring to their district from the central government, which means being reelected at the local level is dependent on cooperating with the central government, and whoever is in power there. Scheiner found a moderately strong correlation between prefectures that are more autonomous-- i.e. not as reliant on the central government for their funding--and the opposition’s dominance in the prefectural government.

What does this mean for Japan’s opposition? Scheiner concluded that the only way that the Japanese opposition can grow the “quality” candidates it needs to win elections at the national level is to decentralize financing of local governments on the back of growing anti-clientelism sentiment. But such a development would likely take decades.

In the immediate future, expect a surprising amount of tactical coordination between the DP and the JCP in the district races, but ultimately, another resounding win for Abe and the LDP.