Stitching Bangladesh’s Old Wounds

In 1971, after a bloody war of independence from Pakistan, Bangladesh became an independent country. Ethnic Bengali forces in East Pakistan, the Mukti Bahini, aided by India, steadily liberated their country, a process that culminated with the surrender of Pakistani forces in Bangladesh on December 16, 1971.

However, the independence of Bangladesh only came after the tragic deaths--due to war and starvation--of up to 3 million people in East Pakistan, in what has been characterized by many historians and analysts as a “genocide.” These deaths were perpetrated not only by Pakistani forces, but by Bengali militias allied with Pakistan; many of these militias had Islamist leanings and sought to preserve a state that was theoretically founded as a homeland for all of South Asia’s Muslims.

After the war ended, most Pakistani soldiers who had been captured by Indian forces eventually went back to Pakistan. Pakistan itself has never acknowledged that anything approximating war crimes or genocide occurred during the war. The most that has been said in Pakistan regarding the issue was that the country regretted what happened (according to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a former prime minister) and that there were some “excesses” (Pervez Musharraf, a former president and military dictator). Pakistan has never prosecuted individual soldiers and commanders that Bangladesh considers war criminals to this day.

However, many alleged Bengali war criminals who had served in pro-Pakistani militias remained in Bangladesh after it became independent, and eventually rose to positions of power. Attempts at bringing war criminals to justice ended after the assassination of the country’s first leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, in 1975. By 1991, Ghulam Azam, responsible for the killings of many Bengali intellectuals in 1971, was leading a political party, the Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh. Jamaat had close relations with the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), one of Bangladesh’s two main parties.

Bangladesh finally made a decision to prosecute war criminals after Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s daughter, Sheikh Hasina, led her Awami League to power in elections in 2008, becoming prime minister in January 2009. Her party, which won an unshakable supermajority, made the prosecution of war criminals from 1971 a priority as part of its platform. This move was widely supported in Bangladesh, where there was much frustration that nobody had been brought to justice in the course of several decades.

Bangladesh’s government set up a domestic war crimes tribunal, the International Crimes Tribunal (Bangladesh) (ICT Bangladesh) in 2009 to try Bangladeshis who participated in atrocities on the side of Pakistan during the 1971 war of independence. Though not a matter of significant controversy in Bangladesh itself, some foreign observers criticized the fact that the court was not set up to also prosecute individuals from the winning side who committed crimes against Pakistani soldiers and Urdu-speaking citizens.

The tribunal got off to a good start in 2010, with widespread support from international organizations like the United Nations (UN) and European Union. Moreover, most Bangladeshis—86 percent according to a poll conducted by Nielsen in 2013—supported the trials of war criminals, even if they characterized them as unfair. This assessment has some merit because several leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami and the Bangladesh National Party, rivals to the ruling Awami League, were indicted as suspects. This is not to deny that these individuals may have committed war crimes—many had—but casts doubt on the impartiality of the court. This picture was further confirmed in 2012, when the Economist published leaked communications that showed government pressure on the chief justice of the tribunal for a quicker verdict in one case.

Thus, while the prosecution of Bangladesh’s war criminals is approved by most of Bangladeshi society, it has also brought long-simmering political tensions to the fore through politicization and by the fact that a disproportionate number of war criminals are from Islamist groups. From 2012 onwards, Jamaat and its student wing have led massive protests against the trials, demanding their cessation and  the release of Islamist political leaders. These protests have not yielded much fruit, especially as individuals have continued to be tried for war crimes. Finally, in November 2015, two major opposition leaders were executed: Salahuddin Quader Chowdhury, a member of parliament from the BNP, and Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mujahid, a top Jamaat leader. Motiur Rahman Nizami, the leader of Jamaat-e-Islami was sentenced to death in 2014, but the sentence was only confirmed in January 2016, leading to mass protests, strikes, and vows of revenge by his party. Nizami was hanged on May 11, 2016, leading to more moderate protests, a sign that that Islamists realized that this was not a winning cause.

Instead, the war crimes trials seem to have emboldened Islamist violence in other aspects of Bangladeshi life, rather than reducing it. As their political power continues to be clipped by the tribunal, Islamists have tried to assert their influence through other means. From 2013 onwards, for example, secular bloggers have been killed in large numbers by people associated with Jamaat or its allies. The killings increased throughout 2016 as the tribunal stepped up its work. The government of Bangladesh seems to be doing less than it could in order to stop the killings of secular bloggers, perhaps as a sop to Islamists after executing several of their prominent leaders.

While many Bangladeshis have finally received the closure and justice they had been denied for decades, the specific manner in which the ICT tribunal has operated may perhaps not be best for Bangladesh’s long-term interests. Although there were indeed many war criminals in the BNP and Jamaat, these parties will continue to hold a grudge against the Awami league, boycott elections, and, in many cases, resort to violent protests that may further polarize Bangladeshi society. This is especially true of the Islamists. The Awami league must find a way to reconcile with the BNP, or at least convince the BNP to accept the tribunal and rejoin normal politics—something the BNP would be open to, given its desire to remain relevant and the popular support in Bangladesh for the tribunal. Thus, if the BNP ever returns to power (unlikely in the near future), it would prevent a spiraling out of control of counter-prosecutions or politicized revenge trials, if it is understood that the tribunal is not overly politicized.

Despite accusations of heavy-handedness and misrule, the secular Awami League’s rule has been good for Bangladesh, as relations with India have improved and the country has continued its steady and impressive economic growth. If the Awami League can manage the fallout of the tribunal, rein in Islamists, and bring the BNP back into the mainstream, then its legacy is ensured.