What Would a Trump Presidency Mean for Japan?

The Republican National Convention in Cleveland, Ohio grabbed the world’s attention between July 18-22. People in and outside the United States watched as the tumultuous convention unfolded.

This year’s Republican National Convention was unusual in every sense of the word. It was unusual because so many of the convention speakers, including Speaker of the House Paul Ryan, shied away from openly endorsing the party’s nominee. The convention--which in most years serves as an opportunity to reaffirm the party’s support for its presidential nominee--suffered from daily headlines that suggested exactly the opposite. The convention speeches, particularly those by the nominee’s family members and longtime friends, are often expected to introduce the nominee as an individual with a personality that may be different from their public political persona: this year’s convention speeches by the nominee’s family and friends, including the nominee’s wife, hardly gave a glimpse into the character of the nominee but instead doubled-down on his already very public persona.

Above all, the Republican National Convention this year was unusual because of the presidential nominee himself, Donald Trump. His highly anticipated nomination acceptance speech on July 21 was, in typical style, full of statements laced with simplistic adjectives and adverbs--mentions of “bad” trade deals and Hillary Clinton’s “bad” instincts--promises that everything from restoring safety in the country to reducing taxes “will happen fast”; and a declaration of his plan to make the United States a country of “law and order.” All along providing little information on how he would fulfill those promises.

The level of hatred that permeated the convention was also unlike any other modern party convention. In the days leading up to Trump’s acceptance speech, there were calls to “lock up” the opponent Hillary Clinton (there was even a suggestion that she should be shot for treason). The sentiment among many longtime Republicans after the convention was that the party that they loved, believed in, and worked for all these years is, for lack of a better word, gone.

This presents a major challenge for Japan as it conceptualizes its relationship with a post-Obama U.S. administration. In an ordinary election year, the officials in Tokyo see familiar faces advising both Democratic and Republican presidential candidates. In fact, officials in Tokyo have long lived with the assumption that Republican administrations are more sympathetic to Japan. The flip-side of that coin is the prevalent perception that Democratic administrations are “pro-China,” or less sympathetic to Japan. Despite past disappointments with Republican administrations and overlooking the recent benchmark agreement on the U.S.-Japan alliance, which was struck mostly under a Democratic administration, many in the Japanese leadership remain fixed on the notion that a Republican administration is better for Japan.

But with the ascendance of Donald Trump and what it has seemingly done to the Republican Party, Japanese leaders may finally have to change that long-held mindset. Today, as officials in Tokyo canvass the circle of advisers for Trump and Clinton, the only familiar faces and names they find are on the Democratic side. The longtime friends of Japan and strong advocates for Japan are either nowhere to be seen or heard in the Trump campaign or in some cases, such as former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, have made their intention of not voting for Trump known, largely eliminating any chance of them being appointed to senior positions should Trump win.

The combination of a lack of familiar faces and Trump’s own outlook on the world—one in which he seems to consider everything in business terms, epitomized by the question of whether allies are paying their “fair share”—is extremely unnerving for Japan. Take his interview with David Sanger of The New York Times on July 21, for example. The interview illustrates undoubtedly that he does not see value in the longtime alliances that the United States has built globally. In the Koreas, the only thing he sees is that the United States has borne a disproportionate burden in keeping peace on the peninsula by leaving American soldiers in harm’s way and that the countries in the region have been free-riding on U.S. protection.

From such a vantage point, one can easily see a scenario in which Trump, once elected as president, begins to put pressure on Japan in ways alliance managers in the United States have refrained from. Asking questions such as “How much more can Japan actually do with the revised the U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, especially now that Tokyo enacted the defense reform bills?” and “Why has the Marine Air Station in Futenma not been relocated 20 years after the two government agreed to do so?” would create friction in the alliance.

Interested in seeing the United States “properly reimbursed,” Trump may like to hear that Japan already pays close to 80 percent of the costs of having the U.S. military forward-stationed in Japan. Even in this case, however, he may insist that Japan “pay up” the remaining 20 percent, or pull back U.S. forces from Japan.

Should things ever come to that, it would open a Pandora’s box in the national security debate in Japan, providing a golden opportunity for Japan’s xenophobic “nativists” to push the agenda that they have long waited to push, including wholesale constitutional revision, abandonment of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and building up a much more robust, independent military capability, including nuclear capability. In today’s Japan, their agenda has a very small audience, as the vast majority of Japanese have strong confidence in Japan’s alliance with the United States. With confidence in the alliance as a safety valve for Japan’s security dropping under the influence of a Trump administration in Washington,  the nativist agenda may begin to resonate with the wider Japanese public. Given the tenuous nature of Japan’s relationship with its neighbors, this would only aggravate the security environment in East Asia, which has been already burdened with the threat from North Korea and an increasingly assertive China.

This is obviously not a scenario that officials in either the United States or Japan want to see unfold. However, this presidential election cycle has so far defied every conventional wisdom. One thing is sure. Should Donald Trump win on November 8, the U.S.-Japan alliance will likely enter uncharted territory, much like the rest of Washington’s alliances and partnerships around the world.