The Secrets of China’s Strategic Support Force

In late 2015, media outlets began reporting that China would soon launch military reforms. Earlier, in 2014, Japanese media had reported that China was to transform its seven military regions into five battle zones and set up a joint operations command. According to sources quoted by Japanese reports, the Chinese leadership started planning for these military reforms after the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee in November 2013. As these reports emerged in 2014 and 2015, China refuted the claims, but did not rule out the possibility of making structural adjustments to adapt to modern styles of warfare.

The long-rumored military reforms became real in November 2015 when Chinese President Xi Jinping made important remarks at a meeting of the Central Military Commission (CMC) on military reforms. Xi, who also serves as CMC chairman, provided a basic outline of the military reforms, including the replacement of military regions with battle zones as well as other major structural adjustments. The key point was the establishment of a new military structure with a chain of command that gives orders top-down, from the CMC to battle zones and subordinate units, as well as a new corresponding military administrative structure. In other words, the CMC is to take direct command, while the five battle zones are to be responsible for operations, and each service is to focus its efforts on building combat strength. These adjustments started taking shape in January 2016 and the five battle zones (in place of the existing seven military regions) were set up the next month, marking the most significant change to China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in decades.

From a structural perspective, we can view this round of military reforms as part of a power struggle within the PLA. But whether the structural change of the PLA is mainly intended to centralize power or to develop “integrated joint operations” capabilities for the future battlefield has yet to be determined.

The newly established Rocket Force and Strategic Support Force (SSF), two new services of the PLA, were some of the major changes to the military’s structure. The transformation of the Second Artillery Corps (SAC) into the Rocket Force was not a surprise, as the SAC had already been an independent military branch under the direct control of the CMC. With the mission to “deter against hostile forces in all territories with both conventional and nuclear warheads,” the PLA Rocket Force, like its predecessor, the SAC, is responsible for the stockpile of surface-to-surface strategic and tactical ballistic missiles, which are China’s “lethal weapons” in its nuclear deterrence strategy.

For long-term observers of the PLA’s development, that the SAC was restructured as the Rocket Force was not surprising. The establishment of the SSF, however, was a different story; to many specialists, the SSF represented a major break in tradition. In addition, after China announced its establishment media reports on the SSF have been scarce. The new service is veiled in mystery.

According to information made public by China, the SSF is responsible for intelligence gathering, aerospace development, electronic warfare, and command and control, which are key factors in building integrated joint operations capabilities as well as strategic high points that need to be taken as early as possible. Notably, these four functions used to be the responsibilities of different organizations. Now that they have been incorporated into a single service, the SSF, observers should pay attention to the affiliation of new members originally from different units and the personnel structure of the new service.

Integration of Intelligence Units

Of the four SSF functions listed above, the one that will have the most direct impact on the PLA is in the integration of intelligence resources. The Chinese intelligence community is made up of the Ministry of State Security, the PLA, and the Domestic Security Protection Bureau under the Ministry of Public Security, each of which has its own intelligence units. The PLA, especially the old General Staff Department (GSD), one of the four former command structures dismantled in the recent reforms, is mainly responsibility for foreign intelligence.

The PLA’s foreign intelligence gathering used to be handled by the second department of the GSD, which was mainly responsible for human intelligence. The third and fourth departments of the GSD, which dealt with electronic intelligence and cyber warfare respectively, were also involved in foreign intelligence. In collecting intelligence, these units were assisted by the liaison department of the General Political Department (GPD) and intelligence units of the General Armaments Department (GAD). In this round of military reforms, however, the new GSD has become much less powerful, retaining only the staff functions to serve military leadership. The GSD had long been in charge of operations and intelligence affairs across the services; now it is no longer the number one agency in the PLA. Instead, the current GSD (or General Staff Headquarters) is similar to the joint chiefs of staff system found in the United States. All the intelligence units of the PLA have been moved to the SSF, representing an integration of the PLA’s intelligence systems and a removal of overlapping and redundant organizations. The various intelligence gathering units will become unified under the command and control of the SSF, which directly reports to the CMC.

In the process of the PLA’s reorganization, the role and affiliation of the SSF has become an issue. When the GSD was in control of everything, its second department assigned subordinate units to the seven military regions. These units listened to instructions from the GSD. The second department had seven bureaus, most notably the first bureau, responsible for collecting information on Hong Kong and Taiwan (with five offices in Guangzhou, Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Shenyang); the second bureau, also known as the tactical intelligence bureau, had branches in the seven military regions; and the third bureau, also known as the military attache office, was responsible for sending military attaches to China’s foreign embassies to collect foreign intelligence.

The third department of the GSD, a technology surveillance unit, used electronic technology to gather intelligence. It was responsible for wiretapping, decoding, and reading and analyzing satellite photos. Its collection of signals intelligence relied on surveillance and listening stations distributed in the seven military regions. The air force and navy also had corresponding technology surveillance bureaus, which directly reported to the GSD’s third department. In theory, the commander and staff officers of a military region did not have the authority to interfere with the operation of these units, nor were they affiliated with the province and/or military region where they were located. The personnel, budget, and internal affairs of these surveillance and listening stations were under the control of the GSD.

Cyberspace has become a strategic high point that every country wants to control. Encounters between China and the United States in cyberspace have reached a peak in recent years. Quite a number of information security reports have pointed out that Unit 61398 of the GSD’s third department is a component of China’s cyber forces and that it launches cyberattacks in accordance with the distribution of its resources in a military region. It should be noted, however, that launching cyberattacks or stealing information was not the main task of the GSD’s third department. Its primary mission was to make use of technology to gain information, including the reading and analysis of satellite photos, electronic wiretapping, and the gathering of signals. The Internet was only a medium for a broader mission. After all, back when the third department was first activated, the Internet was not as popular or advanced as it is now.

As some information security reports have argued, the fourth department of the GSD was also involved in cyberattacks. Different from the third department, the fourth department specialized in electronic countermeasures and radar technology. It was initially a communications department under the GSD and was transformed in 1990, becoming mainly responsible for electronic warfare, covering electronic intelligence, electronic countermeasures, and radar jamming. It also managed military communications systems of all sorts and the command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) system of the PLA. Major General Dai Qingmin, who was the first in the PLA to bring up the idea of using the Internet for military purposes to carry out the strategy of “integrated network and electronic warfare,” had served with the fourth department. It is possible that the fourth department was involved with cyberattacks originating in China because of its expertise in electronic technology.

For China’s intelligence operatives, the Internet is largely a means to steal information. All of its intelligence units have their own hackers who launch cyberattacks according to the requirements of their assigned missions. This approach indicates certain problems with the integration of intelligence resources in the PLA. The second, third, and fourth departments of the GSD were second-level, corps-equivalent departments, and so was the liaison department of the GPD, which was initially called the department of “work against the enemy.” The liaison department was responsible for counterintelligence, recruiting defectors, and the three warfares (public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare). In other words, it was actually part of the PLA’s intelligence system.

With so many different units doing the same or similar jobs, the PLA’s intelligence system surely was faced with a certain degree of confusion and contradiction. The redundancy was detrimental to intelligence analysis. Now that all these units have been merged into the SSF, China can achieve the integration of its intelligence resources.

Post-Reform Cyberattacks

Following this round of military reforms, intelligence units and cyber forces have been put under the command of a single service. According to public information, the SSF is to provide support for the informatization of joint operations in the future and is subject to the command of the CMC. It will be in the rear area of a battle zone to support troops on the frontline. What’s noteworthy is that intelligence units and cyber forces have become one in the SSF. The SSF has taken over the former cyber warfare units, implying that they have also been made part of the intelligence system. Human intelligence can be employed to augment hacking activities. Information stolen in such a way is then sent to specialists for analysis, which can enhance the effectiveness of cyber warfare.

Judging from the analysis of recent cyberattacks targeting Taiwan, we can see that the organizations launching the attacks are a little different from those prior to the PLA’s military reforms. The attacks appear to have come from a variety of sources, which indicate that they were launched in cooperation with the intelligence system. Social engineering attacks in the form of advanced persistent threats (APTs) have thus become more powerful.

Another major change is the PLA’s integration of foreign intelligence gathering capabilities. The PLA’s foreign intelligence was previously the duty of the second department of the GSD, which was responsible for human intelligence, and the third department of the GSD, which handled electronic intelligence and cyber warfare. Now these functions have been moved to the SSF, representing an integration of intelligence resources. The liaison department of the GPD and the GAD also had intelligence gathering units, with the latter focusing efforts on collecting technology information. If their intelligence units are to be incorporated into the SSF as well, it will mean that the intelligence system of the PLA would be reorganized as something similar to the United States’ Defense Intelligence Agency or the former Soviet Union’s GRU: an organization directly reporting to the CMC with integrated foreign intelligence gathering capabilities.

The integration of the second and third departments of the GSD is especially important. The cyber forces of the PLA were mostly under the command of the GSD’s third department, made up mainly of hackers with strong technical skills. The second department of the GSD specialized in human intelligence and intelligence analysis. The merging of the two departments will make the cyber forces stronger and their attacks against other countries more rampant.

For example, the APT attack constantly used by China’s cyber forces is an organized espionage activity as well as an attack strategy tailor-made for a specific target. It takes advantage of the target’s personal information, friend circles, reading habits, and social connections. The attackers then pose as friends, teachers, or colleagues who send emails to the target. The emails contain attachments, the subjects of which look interesting to the target or are related to hot topics. The attachments, as Word, PDF, or Excel files, are embedded with malware. Once the target opens the files, their computer will be infected with the virus. An APT attack is not just about computer technique. It depends more on the understanding of the target and the collection of their personal information. The collection of such information is not something a hacker -- who often cares only about information technology -- is good at. The integration of intelligence units, however, will allow the newly-established SSF to acquire human intelligence and computer hacking capabilities at the same time. China’s cyberattacks will become more frequent and its espionage against Taiwan and other countries will become more sophisticated via the joint efforts of these integrated intelligence units.

Information provided by information security companies indicates that from the end of 2015 to early 2016, the attacks launched by China’s cyber forces became slightly chaotic. The period happened to coincide with the PLA’s military reforms. China’s cyber forces might have been undergoing reorganization and restructuring at the time. The cyberattacks from China were back to their usual routines in March 2016. But information security reports from the United States said that China seems to have honored certain agreements signed with the U.S. government, since it has stopped stealing U.S. commercial secrets in cyberspace, an act meant to benefit Chinese companies. According to the reports, China’s cyberattacks have decreased 90 percent, especially after China and the U.S. signed the relevant agreements. Quite a few people interpreted this as a gesture of goodwill from China.

From a technical perspective, however, the so-called agreements do not mean too much, especially in the virtual space of the Internet. It is relatively difficult to track a cyberattack, especially if it is used together with a virtual private network (VPN) or Botnet. That China’s cyberattacks against the U.S. have decreased in recent months might have something to do with the restructuring of the PLA rather than a policy shift resulting from the agreements. It is also possible that China’s cyber forces have developed more advanced attack techniques and that they might be lurking somewhere in the corner, spying on unsuspecting targets.

Joint Operations in Practice

Under the PLA’s structure prior to the reforms, aerospace development was the responsibility of the GAD, which handled rocket bases and all satellite-related facilities. After the inauguration of the Beidou navigation satellite system in recent years, it has become especially apparent that satellite navigation will be the key to joint operations in the future. The PLA knows very well that in an “integrated air and space” war environment in the future, controlling outer space is very important. It would be impossible for the PLA to launch network-centric warfare or put the integrated joint operations concept into practice in the future without the assistance of satellite navigation and satellite communications systems.

However, the old seven military regions had their own separate operations, making it nearly impossible for the air force, the navy, and the SAC to launch cross-service joint operations. Although the PLA has actively tried to materialize the concept of joint operations in recent years, the efforts were usually concentrated on each service’s integration of resources (in the form of cross-region drills and joint maneuvers involving the navy’s three fleets), not true cross-service joint operations.

In a joint operations situation, the first step is to integrate communication links. Only through a common operational picture (COP) on the battlefield can reinforcements arrive in time. Crucial timing could be missed if a request for reinforcements has to be made through the echelons of command. Despite having all the necessary technical support, the previous command mechanism would always be unable to bring joint operations into full play because it retained an army-centric structure that relied too much on the seven military regions. In each military region, the different services acted independently of each other; they tended to become self-centered because they had their own communication links. That is another reason why the SSF is needed today. Only by breaking structural barriers and establishing a new unit integrating communication links across the services can the joint operations objective be reached.

Information made public so far about the new chain of command indicates that units of the different services -- the army, the air force, the navy, and the Rocket Force -- deployed in each of the five battle zones are controlled by the zone commander. It complies with the underlying principle of the reform: the CMC takes command, the battle zones are responsible for operations, and each service focuses its efforts on building combat strength. But there has been no mention to date of the SSF being put under the control of a battle zone commander. This implies that, although the SSF is a service like the army or the Rocket Force, it has a different placement in the chain of command.

From the perspective of joint operations, the PLA has put it bluntly: the SSF is to provide support on the battlefield and ensure the progression of operations, which makes it become an important force for joint operations. The SSF is tasked with providing highly accurate and reliable information and strategic support, offering an “information umbrella” across the services. It is to become one with other services and persist throughout a campaign, a key factor in winning the engagement.

In addition to the integration of intelligence resources across the services, the SSF has also absorbed capabilities such as technical surveillance, electronic countermeasures, space warfare, and even psychological and public opinion warfare. The units that provide the above capabilities have one thing in common: they don’t get directly involved in operations, but are rather responsible for providing combat forces with the information they need to make a decision. They are not fit to belong to a single service; nor are they independent of any service.

Before the reforms, the PLA’s intelligence system was characterized by multi-unit involvement simultaneously, resulting in difficulties in integrating decentralized intelligence resources. Now that the intelligence resources have been integrated, they can be managed and used more effectively. Aerospace units have a similar problem. Satellites or communication links are meant to make sure the C4ISR system works properly. The GAD formerly controlled aerospace bases and testing facilities but the satellite communication links operated by each service were not interconnected. These problems made joint operations a difficult task. With the SSF integrating all relevant resources, the PLA can enjoy local superiority in the aerospace, outer space, computer network, and electromagnetic operational environments. The SSF is entrusted with gathering and transmitting intelligence to ensure that a campaign can proceed smoothly. It is an important force for joint operations and is expected to considerably upgrade the combat strength of the PLA.

Lieutenant General Gao Jin, the inaugural commander of the SSF, once wrote a commentary entitled “Deepening defense and military reforms is a necessary step toward a strong military” for the PLA Daily. In the article, Gao argued that under the condition that nuclear deterrence might be used, integrated network and electronic warfare as well as integrated joint operations would increasingly become a reality. The battlefield would move from conventional space to extremely high, deep, and distant physical space as well as virtual space. All this would occur as asymmetrical, non-contact, and nonlinear operations become more and more sophisticated. Control of information would determine control of the battlespace, greatly changing the key to victory in combat.

Different branches and services of the PLA had developed capabilities to deal with informationized warfare and the three kinds of space (outer space, electromagnetic space, and cyberspace) on their own without cooperating. The newly-established SSF and its integrated joint operations doctrine is aimed at breaking the tradition of having a battle zone commander command and control the units of different services deployed in the zone. The SSF does not follow the orders of a battle zone commander; it is rather commanded and controlled by the CMC. It provides support for joint operations and serves to integrate different systems. It is a force multiplier in informationized warfare.

We can also seek to understand the chain of command for the SSF through the lens of a power struggle in the Chinese leadership. The anti-corruption campaign in the PLA has rooted out Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, both ex-CMC chairmen, which indicates that corruption is absolutely a factor greatly affecting the combat strength of the PLA. Ever since taking office, Xi has been trying hard to eliminate all problematic generals. But it is very difficult to find active generals who have not been connected one way or another with either Xu or Guo in their climb to their current positions.

This might be something that Xi took into consideration as he initiated the establishment of a new service to handle informationized warfare. Under the previous structure, the seven military regions had their own systems, and the CMC chairman (Xi) might be sidelined because the GSD had everything under its control. Now through the SSF, the CMC can use intelligence, navigation, communication, and computer networks to control the battle zones. Without the coordination of these factors, it will be impossible to engage in modern war. So the unique structure of the SSF, compared to the other services, is also likely the result of considerations of power and control.

Personnel Reshuffle and Possible Force Structure

Following the inauguration of the SSF, the PLA has started transferring personnel from various units to the new service. The selection of certain specific generals to lead the SSF indicates a direction for the service. The change in the pay grades of personnel moved to the SSF can also tell us something about the status of the new units.

Given that the SSF has the same status as other services, it is presumed that its commander, Gao, will be admitted into the CMC. Gao spent most of his career in the SAC, where he eventually reached the rank of chief of staff. During his time in the SAC, he participated in the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. In 2013, he became an assistant to the chief of the general staff; in 2015, he took office as president of the PLA Academy of Military Science. Gao has sufficient knowledge about cross-arms operations and all the necessary qualifications to be the commander of the SSF. In charge of intelligence, aerospace development, and command and control systems, which are key factors in building joint operations capabilities, Gao may enjoy a higher status than the CMC Joint General Staff Department, the successor to the old GSD.

Gao, at 57 years old, is relatively young compared with the higher-ranked PLA leaders who had participated in the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979. He is one of the younger generals whose major experience comes instead from the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. With his qualifications, Gao may climb to the top military leadership position by 2022, when the 20th CPC Central Committee will be determined. Commanding the SSF will help Gao become proficient in integrating resources and controlling the information flow across the services.

SSF Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff Major General Li Shangfu started his military career in the aerospace branch. He served at Xichang Satellite Launch Center before commanding the Chang’e 2 satellite launch mission. In January 2015, Li became GAD deputy director. He was transferred to the SSF in January 2016. With Li as the deputy commander of the SSF, the new service must have taken over aerospace functions and duties from the GAD. The position of GAD deputy director is equivalent to that of the deputy commander of a military region, meaning Li’s current position as the deputy commander and chief of staff of a service may be a little lower than his previous one. The implications of this remain unclear.

Similarly, Zhou Zhixin, a member of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, is now the chief of a bureau of the SSF. He served at the aerial surveillance bureau under the second department of the GSD before becoming the director of the Beijing Remote Sensing Information Research Institute. Zhou’s expertise in aerospace development and remote sensing indicates that the SSF has taken control of the two branches.

Also noteworthy is Major General Rao Kaixun, the other SSF deputy commander, who was the director of the operations department of the GSD before taking the current position. One of the PLA’s younger generation generals, Rao can introduce his past command and control experience at the GSD’s operations department to the SSF. Also from the GSD is Major General Yi Jianshe, who was the deputy director of the military training engineering unit of the GSD before becoming the deputy chief of staff of the SSF. Other similar appointments include SSF’s political department director Feng Jianhua, who was with the GPD; SSF’s political department deputy director Chen Jinrong, who was originally the political commissar of the GAD’s logistics department; and SSF’s deputy political commissar Lu Jiangcheng, who was originally the deputy political commissar of Jinan Military Region. These assignments show a certain complexity in the SSF’s personnel structure. It might not be easy for these leaders to work as a team.

After the establishment of the SSF was made public, information indicated that it was to comprise the military aerospace force and cyberspace and information warfare forces. Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center Director Major General Shang Hong, former GAD Chief of Staff, has been appointed as the commander of the aerospace force. GSD’s technical surveillance department director, Major General Zheng Junjie, former president of the PLA Information Engineering University, has taken office as the commander of the cyberspace and electronic warfare forces. Former GAD Deputy Political Commissar Lieutenant General Chai Shaoliang is now the political commissar of cyberspace and electronic warfare forces. But there is currently no public information about these leaders of the SSF. We can only understand their capabilities through their track records.

A corps-level unit of the PLA usually consists of several forces. For instance, the PLA Air Force has the aviation force, radar force, and airborne force, which are categorized as such according to their operations mode and mission types. The SSF deals with tasks in five major areas: intelligence, aerospace, cyber warfare and information, communication, and electronic warfare. It is not yet clear whether the SSF is to have subordinate forces that specialize in the five major areas. If so, the SSF is likely to encounter the problems that will usually happen as different units are merged into one. Units of all levels that are involved in the reorganization might complain about being downgraded or relegated, the beginning of the challenge that is to come.

According to information that has been made public, some units of the SSF are designated as bases, stations, offices, bureaus, and detachments. A few observers think these labels may be part of the organization of the SSF. But judging from the mission types of these units, there is the possibility of a totally different interpretation: that these labels correspond to the different functions of the SSF.

For example, the aerospace force formerly attached to the GAD was mainly composed of satellite launch bases. Although the force is now commanded by the SSF, its subordinate bases should have the same status as they did before the reorganization. It is very likely that the SSF will have an extra commander to lead the aerospace force newly attached to it. In the same way, the PLA Navy commander has three lower-echelon commanders to lead the three fleets of the service.

In addition to the aerospace force, the intelligence units across the services have also been integrated into the SSF. In the intelligence community, there is seldom if ever a unit called a “base.” Intelligence units are usually called stations or offices.

A unit designated as a detachment is very likely associated with the cyber forces that are engaged in stealing information or launching attacks on the Internet. Members of the cyber forces are not necessarily regular PLA troops; many of the recorded cyberattacks might have been launched with the assistance of civilian hackers. In cyberspace, only a few people can launch a large number of attacks within a short period of time. Given that the personnel requirement for a cyber warfare unit is not great, it is possible that a detachment is used as the base for linking all the cyber warfare members of a former military region.

Conclusion

The restructuring of the PLA is an ongoing process, which China says will take five years to complete. So there is still much uncertainty. What can be foreseen is that the PLA (like the militaries of many countries) will take the U.S. military as the reference model in its preparations for future war. But in its military reforms, China claims to have included “Chinese style” elements.

For instance, the establishment of the SSF is very different from what can be seen in the United States, Europe, and even Russia. The SSF is meant to integrate different units with similar functions and provide strategic support. Its establishment solves the problem of overlapping functions and redundant units, but whether it will develop its own problems because of the difficulty in the categorization of component units remains to be seen. It will be a big challenge for SSF Commander Gao.

In actual practice, as the SSF is made up of troops with different backgrounds, they may need some time to get familiar with each other or get used to their new jobs. Although the CMC may have decided on the role that the SSF is to play, putting the plan into practice is still very much a trial and error process. In the execution of military reforms and accompanying personnel downsizing, many service members were forced to transfer to other jobs or retire early. They had to face all the problems that come with career changes; there were even backlashes inside the military. A special office was set up in each military region to handle post-restructuring affairs, such as the removal of personnel and equipment from a unit.

In line with the Chinese government’s policy on the conversion of military-oriented enterprises to civilian production, the PLA stresses the harmonious symbiosis of military personnel and civilians in military-industrial corporations. The compatibility between military and civil corporations is especially high in the development of aerospace technology and cyber technology. But whether these ex-service members will get used to their new jobs in civil corporations or whether they will bring bad habits peculiar to state-run enterprises into their new working environments remains an open question.

Meanwhile, the upheaval is a good opportunity for other countries to recruit agents behind enemy lines. For instance, one intelligence community successfully built links with certain PLA generals who were disgruntled about their promotions, gaining an intelligence advantage as a result. Other countries might also target civil corporations that have business links with the PLA as a means to establish connections from the outside to the inside.