Japan’s Futile Bid to Join the UN Security Council

In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly last September, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe strongly pushed for UN Security Council (UNSC) reform. As proof this was no mere lip service, on January 25 of this year, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs set up a Strategy Headquarters, led by Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida, to achieve this goal. The UN has always been a pillar of Japan’s postwar diplomacy, and joining the highest echelons of this world-governing body is a cherished dream.

Having Japan on the UNSC – a second “voice” to amplify and echo U.S. preferences – would be in the United States’ interest. However, as it is unlikely that China and Russia will ever allow Japan to join, there is little chance these efforts will pay off in the end. The only viable path forward for the United States is to publicly support Japan’s bid to play a greater role in the UNSC -- while also working privately to redirect Japan’s diplomatic energies toward other pursuits that better serve both the United States’ and Japan’s national interests.

U.S. policymakers do recognize that the UNSC is skewed. Samantha Powers wrote in 2009 (before she became the U.S. Ambassador to the UN), “Permanent membership on the Security Council — granted to the Second World War victors (plus France) — is woefully anachronistic. Britain and France can’t fairly claim two-fifths of the world’s legal authority. The permanent five members once spoke for close to 40 percent of the world’s population. They now account for 29 percent. The world’s largest democracy (India) is excluded; so are regional powerhouses such as Nigeria and Brazil, not to mention the entire Islamic world.”

The United States should do everything it can to not be caught championing the unrepresentative or undemocratic nature of the UNSC. If rational-legal structures are how the United States cements its authority in the international system, then the United States must continue to fight the good fight to make sure that these structures remain true to their core mission.

Furthermore, reforming the UNSC can be seen as a race against time, and a race that the United States can only win by getting ahead of the curve and pushing for changes while Washington still can set the terms. As David Bosco writes in Foreign Policy, the status quo is risky for the United States as the momentum for change could tip in an unfavorable direction if Washington is caught off guard. Bosco argues, “As America’s relative power and wealth slips, it has an interest in achieving council reform sooner rather than later.”

Yet this assumes that there is a race to be won. As any change to the UNSC requires approval from China and Russia, which is unlikely to be forthcoming now or anytime in the short- to medium-term, there is really no finish line to be reached.

Even if the UNSC could be expanded, this would not necessarily be the solution to U.S. woes: not just because it would increase inefficiency, but because adding more permanent members does not do anything to put a dent in the effectiveness of China or Russia’s vetoes. Will it make it easier for the United States to socially legitimate its position on issues ranging from Crimea to the South China Sea if four out of six UNSC permanent members agreed with its position rather than three out of five? Perhaps. But it will not make it any easier for the United States to materially accomplish its objectives.

Japan is the United States’ most reliable ally. Tokyo has gone along with G7 sanctions on Russia despite its desire to negotiate with Moscow on the Northern Territories. Likewise, it has acceded to global sanctions on Iran despite its desire to import natural resources from Tehran. Japan’s preferences in the United Nations align with Washington’s much more frequently than do most other states’. Undoubtedly, having Japan in the UNSC would be a net win for the United States because not only could the United States demonstrate its commitment to a more inclusive ruling body, it could also welcome a valuable friend to the high table. But when it comes to achieving U.S. objectives vis-à-vis Syria or any other hotspot around the world, removing China or Russia would do a whole lot more good than adding Japan.

It is imperative for the United States to clearly communicate to Japan that there are limits to how far public U.S. support can extend. If Japan gets too far out ahead of where the United States is willing to go, it could cause undue friction in the alliance. In 2005, Japan caused the United States a headache by aligning with Germany, India, and Brazil to seek entry to the UNSC. As a contemporary analysis by the Heritage Foundation pointed out, “The voting records of the key Security Council contenders should be cause for concern to the Bush administration as it considers expansion of the Council.” While the United States has endorsed Japan becoming a permanent member since the Clinton administration, supporting India and Brazil was a step too far.

An obsession with UNSC permanent membership may also distort Japan’s foreign policy in undemocratic ways. For example, Malcolm Cook critiqued Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe’s state visit to Japan this past March, and the 600 million yen infrastructure development grant that Japan promised to Zimbabwe, arguing that the “main drivers behind the Abe Administration’s embrace of Mugabe … [are] China’s commercial and diplomatic push into Africa and Japan’s desire to gain more global support for its UN Security Council membership push, which China steadfastly opposes.” Cook criticized this “warping” of Japan’s foreign policy, which he believes will not only help sustain a despotic dictatorship, but is unlikely to even have a meaningful impact on Japan’s bid.

Abe is collaborating with the African Union (AU) because adopting a General Assembly resolution to enlarge the Security Council will require at least 129 nations to support it – and therefore, the 54-member AU is a key component of that strategy (even though all it takes is one P5 veto to axe the measure).

Regarding Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s kowtowing to the United Arab Emirates, SNM Abdi writes, “to bow and scrape before small countries just to get their backing for a permanent Security Council seat – which will never materialize in any case – lowers India’s prestige in the eyes of the world.”

This critique can be directed against Japan as well: bowing and scraping before undemocratic countries tarnishes Japan’s reputation as a champion of liberal values. Here, an unseen but restraining U.S. influence could play an important role in helping to keep the Japanese government’s ambitions in check.

This is the best strategy for the United States to have its cake and eat it too: on a global stage, the United States can point to its support for Japan and argue that it truly wants a more representative UNSC; bilaterally, by discouraging Japan from wasting too much time and resources on the UNSC bid, the United States can work with Japan on more pressing issues. Behind-the-scenes, U.S. policymakers should make it clear to Japan that Japanese diplomatic support would be more appreciated elsewhere, such as in the areas of resettling refugees or pushing for freedom of navigation in international waters.

This strategy may seem hypocritical, but as Martha Finnemore eloquently puts it, the “judicious use of hypocrisy can … provide crucial strategies for melding ideals and interests.” There is simply too much good that the U.S.-Japan alliance can do outside the confines of the UN for Japan to be chasing distractions.