What Does President Trump Mean for Japan?

The United States and the world are still absorbing the shock of Donald Trump being elected the 45th president of the United States. Japan is no exception. After all, it was Hillary Clinton whom Prime Minister Shinzo Abe chose to meet when he visited New York in September to attend the United Nations General Assembly. Perhaps to make up for it, Abe met Trump on November 17, becoming the first world leader to meet Trump after he gained the status of president-elect.

Such an early meeting with Trump, who is still just beginning the transition process, was a risky proposition for Abe. On the one hand, it allowed Abe to engage Trump in conversation on the issues that Japan considers important, thus helping shape his views toward Japan even before his administration officially starts. On the other hand, seeking a meeting so early could have made Abe look desperate, as if he were trying to recover from his mistake of not meeting Trump when he met Clinton in September. Either way, the meeting gave Abe a chance to at least start trying to develop a personal relationship with Trump, gauging his temperament personally.

Indeed, Japan has a high stake in Trump revisiting his views on some of the policy positions he held as a candidate. For instance, Trump’s strong opposition to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and his pledge to renegotiate trade deals that he considers unfair are quite problematic for the Abe government. Now that the Obama administration has reportedly given up on seeking TPP ratification during the lame duck session of Congress, it is critical for Abe that Trump, despite his campaign promises, comes around to support the TPP.

Trumps’ seemingly antiquated view of Japan as a free-rider on U.S. security guarantees is also a concern for Abe. During the campaign, Trump repeatedly talked about how U.S. allies around the world, including Japan, need to bear 100 percent of the cost of stationing U.S. troops for continued forward deployment in their countries as a security guarantor. While his remarks made it clear that Trump was largely unaware of the reality that Japan already shoulders close to 80 percent of the cost of U.S. troops in Japan in the name of host-nation support (HNS), it would be in Japan’s interest to make him aware of that reality on the ground. Furthermore, it will be in Abe’s interest to personally reiterate to Trump the significance of the U.S.-Japan alliance for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region based on the liberal international order, which the United States’ own prosperity is greatly dependent upon.

Indeed, even if a post-inauguration Trump modifies some of the very radical positions he took as a candidate, the Trump administration could present the Abe administration with new and unsettling challenges. First will be its people. In past U.S. administrations, whether Republican or Democrat, there was always a group of individuals who acted as champions for U.S.-Japan relationship at various level of the U.S. government. These individuals, collectively called “Japan hands,” understood the strategic importance of Washington’s relationship with Tokyo and worked to make sure that the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship would remain stable. In the incoming Trump administration, however, it is unknown how many of those familiar faces Japan will find.

Secondly, precisely because of the likely absence of familiar “Japan hands,” Tokyo will face greater pressure to deliver on its commitments. This is particularly true when it comes to bilateral defense relations. With the U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation revised in 2015 and with Japan’s enactment of its Peace and Security Legislation, Washington would naturally expect Tokyo to play a more robust role in the efforts to maintain a stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. For instance, Japan may see the United States urging Tokyo to participate in freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea more explicitly (Japan currently conducts de facto FONOPs by routing its ships that sail through the area for one reason or another through the South China Sea to show its presence). Tokyo may also face greater pressure to make progress on the relocation of Futenma Air Station in Okinawa.

Finally, because of Trump’s unpredictability in many U.S. policies, both foreign and domestic, Japan may find it more difficult to effectively coordinate various policy matters. For instance, as pointed out above, whether Trump maintains his adamant opposition to the TPP will be extremely important for Abe. However, due to the unpredictability of Trump himself, it is hard for Abe’s government to gauge the ultimate fate of the TPP in the United States  Although many now consider the TPP a lost cause, given Trump’s propensity to shift his positions, there still is a possibility that he and a Republican-led Congress could move to adopt the TPP. However, in the absence of familiar faces in the inner circle of his administration’s foreign policy advisers, it will be extremely difficult for Japan to understand the dynamics surrounding the TPP, let alone shape the Trump administration’s view.

By all indications, the first Abe-Trump meeting was a cordial one, and they seemed to have a good conversation. Abe can only hope that whatever positive impression Trump walked away with on November 17 will stay with him as he completes the transition and begin shaping his administration’s policies.