North Korea Policy Up in the Air as Political Chaos Reigns

As both the United States and South Korea grapple with massive political upheaval, the future direction of North Korea policy has rarely looked less certain.

In Washington, Donald Trump will enter the White House in January after painting South Korea and other allies as freeloaders, while hinting at the possibility of talks with the long shunned North Korean dictator. In Seoul, a new president is likely within months, following Park Geun-hye’s impeachment over a corruption scandal, potentially ushering in a radically different approach to inter-Korean relations.

On the campaign trail, Trump repeatedly attacked South Korea for relying on the United States to defend it from nuclear-armed North Korea. Claiming the United States gets “practically nothing” for stationing around 28,500 troops on South Korean soil, Trump said Seoul would have to pony up more of the cost or risk defending itself. Within 48 hours of his stunning election upset, however, Trump reportedly called Park to convey Washington’s steadfast commitment to their mutual defense treaty, which was signed after the Korean War.

Signs of ambivalence toward the alliance have emerged in South Korea, too. The frontrunner to succeed Park, Moon Jae-in, is a former chief of staff to late liberal President Roh Moo-hyun, whose tenure was marked by serious tensions with Washington. In his memoir, former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates described Roh, who reportedly saw the U.S. and Japan as Asia’s biggest security threats, as “anti-American and probably a little crazy.” Moon, who would be the first left-leaning South Korea leader in almost a decade if elected, has criticized Park’s sanctions against North Korea, called for greater “balance” in his country’s relations with the U.S. and China, and pledged to reconsider plans for a U.S. missile defense system that has angered Beijing.

“As a key advisor to Roh Moo-hyun, Moon solicited Pyongyang's views about Seoul's vote on a UN resolution to condemn North Korea's atrocities against its people,” Joshua Stanton, a former U.S. Army judge advocate in Korea and the author of the blog One Free Korea, told The Diplomat, referring to claims made earlier this year by Roh’s former foreign minister. “The Roh administration and its supporters routinely trafficked in anti-American and pro-North Korean rhetoric.”

Stanton said the combination of a left-wing administration in Seoul and a temperamental leader in Washington could spell disaster for the alliance.

“Perhaps the panic about Trump's denigration of the U.S.-Korea alliance will prove to be overblown. But if Moon campaigns on an anti-American or neutralist platform, or bends UN sanctions to subsidize a North Korea that will soon pose a direct threat to America, I can easily see Trump's reaction escalating toward a breakup,” said Stanton. “[George W.] Bush put up with Roh's antics; Trump would not put up with Moon's. Koreans should not assume that Washington would have Moon Jae-in's back.”

Advocates of engagement with North Korea, on the other hand, see a potential opportunity to rekindle negotiations on North Korea’s nuclear weapons, which have stalled since 2009, and other contentious issues. Moon has floated a visit to North Korea, which would follow inter-Korean summits by his two liberal predecessors, while Trump has suggested meeting directly with Kim Jong-un, breaking with President Obama’s policy of shunning Pyongyang until it appears willing to denuclearize.

“If there are no talks soon, the North will have 5-7 more nuclear weapons a year from now, may have begun to test-launch an ICBM [inter-continental ballistic missile], and will have a more reliable nuclear warhead,” said Leon Sigal, a former State Department official who has organized unofficial talks between American ex-diplomats and North Korean officials. “That seems like trouble enough to try to negotiate a suspension of their weapons programs.”

Sigal said coordination between Seoul and Washington would be crucial to convincing Pyongyang to halt its weapons programs.

“When we have acted in sync to engage the North, we have made headway on denuclearization,” he said. “When the South has impeded U.S. engagement, we have had major crises.”

Moon’s victory in the next election, however, is far from assured in South Korea’s rapidly shifting political landscape. The Constitutional Court, which must confirm the impeachment motion, could still yet save Park’s presidency, ensuring the next election would not take place until its originally scheduled date in early 2018. Even if it ultimately removes Park from office, the court has 180 days to consider the case, meaning it could delay any election until the summer – plenty of time for Moon’s star to fall or another candidate’s fortunes to rise. On the left, Moon faces a cast of potential challengers including Seoul Mayor Park Won-soon and IT entrepreneur Ahn Cheol-Soo. On the conservative side of politics, which appears on the verge of factional disintegration following Park’s downfall, all eyes are on outgoing UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. While Ban has had little to say on policy in public, he has been widely portrayed as a more likely fit for Park’s Saenuri Party or a center-right equivalent if the party is disbanded.

“We do not know yet for sure whether the liberals will take over next year: the South Korean presidential election is so unpredictable and the Korean people are looking for a new candidate other than those already known because the failures – de facto financing – of progressives with respect to North Korea's WMD problem still resonate to date,” said Nam Chang-hee, a political science professor at Inha University.

With such turmoil in South Korea and abroad, the only certainty seems to be uncertainty, Nam said.

"As next year's surrounding security environment is so uncertain with multiple unpredictable factors – U.S.-China relations, U.S.-Russia relations, a new South Korean president – one thing that is clear is that the spectrum of change and opportunity will be much wider than today," he said.