What to Expect From 'America First': A Guide

When Donald Trump won the 2016 U.S. election, U.S. foreign policy analysts were caught off-guard. As an unusually temperamental man with no prior experience in policy, Trump offered little to go on for those of us trying fruitlessly to anticipate his foreign policy direction.

Over time, as he and his transition team began making important nominations to fill cabinet posts and other important staff positions, more data became available, but contradictions remained manifold. For instance, Trump's nominee for secretary of state, former ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson, diverged with Trump on the Trans-Pacific Partnership and James Mattis, Trump's defense secretary nominee, diverged on Russia. Where is this administration taking the U.S. role in Asia and the world?

On January 20, Trump was formally sworn into office as the 45th president of the United States, succeeding the outward-looking internationalist administration of Barack Obama which, by many accounts, was the first U.S. administration to see the world with a fundamentally Pacific-oriented outlook instead of the traditional Atlanticist perspective.

Trump's inaugural address was certainly unusual in its negative tone and, like so many things about his remarkable elevation to the American presidency, outlined a vision of change. Most significantly in the realm of foreign policy, the vision Trump outlined – if followed up with acts of policy – would represent a grand strategic shift in what the United States chooses to do abroad and why it chooses to do so.

In his first formal projection of his administration's foreign policy as president, Trump reverted to a familiar refrain heard throughout his campaign rallies, hearkening back to a dark time of American isolationism with Charles Lindbergh at its helm: "America First."

"Every decision on trade, on taxes, on immigration, on foreign affairs will be made to benefit American workers and American families. We must protect our borders from the ravages of other countries making our products, stealing our companies, and destroying our jobs," Trump noted.

Clarifying specifically what this meant for foreign policy priorities, he continued: "We will seek friendship and goodwill with the nations of the world, but we do so with the understanding that it is the right of all nations to put their own interests first. We do not seek to impose our way of life on anyone, but rather to let it shine as an example. We will shine for everyone to follow."

In those few short sentences, Trump put to rest nearly a century of implicit Wilsonian idealism as a driver of U.S. foreign policy (Wilson unveiled his famous 19 points in January 1918). Trump's "America First" vision didn't entirely discount the post-Truman status quo in American foreign policy. "We will reinforce old alliances and form new ones and unite the civilized world against radical Islamic terrorism, which we will eradicate from the face of the Earth," Trump noted in his inaugural address.

With the exception of the lip service paid to alliances, which Trump had been deeply critical of during the campaign on the grounds of burden-sharing, everything about the new U.S. president's "America First" rhetoric foreshadows important change in how America conceives of its national interest abroad. For instance, the preservation of the amorphous-yet-beneficial "liberal international order," which has long served U.S. interests, may play second fiddle to the conclusion of transactional agreements that help draw foreign investment into the United States.

There is an important caveat to the vision charted in the inaugural address. There remains a strong possibility that all of what Trump outlined will be repeated over the next four years for a domestic audience in the United States, but in actuality, American foreign and security policy will hew to old shibboleths. The machinery of U.S. foreign policy would require sustained and serious presidential attention to move it in the service of fully upending the post-Truman approach to global affairs.

One indicator of just how serious Trump's "America First" plans are will be the comparative levels of influence exercised by various coteries within his administration. On one hand, you'll have a defense secretary with fairly conventional views about the U.S. role in the world that diverge with the president; James Mattis, for example, sees Russia as an adversary and favors strong support for U.S. allies.

On the other hand, you'll have a man like Steve Bannon, Trump’s chief strategist, who reportedly played an important part in crafting some of the rhetoric for Trump's inaugural message. Bannon brings a mélange of Huntingtonian thinking about civilizational conflict, paired with economic nationalism, to the table.

Finally, Trump's pursuit of economic advantage for American industry will also be influenced by a core group of protectionists who are deeply skeptical of a cooperative relationship with China  – a group including Trump's U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, and National Trade Council head Peter Navarro.

Allies, partners, and adversaries of the United States around the world  – and certainly in Asia  – should look closely at how the new U.S. president personally interacts with each of the above coteries within his administration as this will likely determine the extent to which his inaugural "America First" message comes to truly drive U.S. policy.

Another important indicator will be Trump's personal one-on-one interactions with world leaders. He is anticipated to have some of his first meetings with important partners, including the United Kingdom's Theresa May, Mexico's Enrique Peña Nieto, and Japan’s Shinzo Abe. How the U.S. president-elect behaves in these meetings and what assurances are given will again be telling of how much the "America First" message is a deeply held ideological conviction that will come to guide policy and how much it is a convenient shroud for effective domestic political messaging to animate Trump's political base.

Trump's adoption of the "America First" formulation was somewhat an accident. During his campaign, he first discovered he liked the formulation during an interview with the New York Times, when he was first asked if he was an isolationist: “Not isolationist, I’m not isolationist, but I am ‘America First.’ So I like the expression. I’m ‘America First.’”

“We have been disrespected, mocked, and ripped off for many, many years by people that were smarter, shrewder, tougher,” he added at the time.

If American grand strategy is to change under a Trump presidency, then states everywhere will take great interest. In Asia, allies including South Korea and Japan will want to know early if "America First" means they need to accelerate planning for a contingency where U.S. extended deterrence guarantees are no longer guaranteed. For China, the United States' top great power challenger, a transactional and turbulent relationship with the United States could set the stage for a deep diplomatic freeze or even conflict, as the Trump administration prepares to raise the stakes in the South China Sea and reevaluate the “one China” policy.

For other states, like India, Australia, and several important Southeast Asian partners, including Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam, a pragmatic and transactional diplomatic approach from a Trump administration focusing on ensuring outcomes that are palpably favorable to the United States may cause resentment and distancing from Washington. In India's case, two years of accelerated strategic rapprochement may give way, prompting a return to the vestiges of non-aligned foreign policy thinking.

On a tactical level, the best course of action for Asian policy planners in foreign ministries across the region may be to cautiously continue institutionalized business with the United States at a lower level of government, sustaining contact with the State Department, continuing military-to-military exchanges, and avoiding unnecessary high-level tests of the new executive branch's uncertain temperament. Moreover, for states wishing for closer ties with the United States, it would be advisable to privately signal growing concern about China.

Over the coming weeks and months, as the administration begins to make decisions on matters of policy, interact with foreign governments, and conclude important appointments, we'll better understand how likely it is that Trump's "America First" vision represents an epochal grand strategic shift for the United States. In the meantime, the prudent approach would be to do what most analysts have done since events took a turn for the unexpected in November: watch closely and attentively.