Japan’s North Korea Challenge

On March 6, North Korea conducted yet another missile launch. Just a couple of weeks after their last missile launch – which occurred during Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to the United States – Pyongyang launched four ballistic missiles, three of which landed in Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The launch took on a new sense of urgency when Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that the missiles were “test launches” to demonstrate the ability to attack U.S. forces in Japan.

Predictably, the reaction has been strong. In Japan, Abe held a press gaggle shortly after the launch, stating that the missile launch demonstrates that North Korea has reached a new level of threat. Recently, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) announced that it began the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea despite strong opposition expressed by China. When U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson traveled to East Asia in March, North Korea was front and center in his conversations with his counterparts in Tokyo, Seoul, and Beijing.

The urgency of these missiles tests presents Abe with a reality that is difficult to address. With North Korea growing increasingly provocative and unpredictable – in addition to the two missile tests with less than a month in between, speculation swirls about yet another nuclear test by Pyongyang in the near future – the Japanese government faces the inevitable challenge of having to respond to the North Korean threat on the one hand, and ever increasing pressure from China in the East China Sea on the other.

Obviously, Japan has been investing in measures to counter North Korea’s missile threat for the last two decades. After all, it was the first North Korean nuclear crisis in the 1990s that led Tokyo to revise the U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, to better prepare the two allies in their coordinated response the potential crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Since the mid-1990s, Japan has worked closely with the United States on acquiring ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities, including engaging in joint research, development, and production of the Standard Missile (SM) III Block 2A missile to improve the capability of intercepting incoming missiles. Tokyo has also sought to augment its intelligence-gathering capability by moving ahead with its own reconnaissance satellites.

However, the recent uptick in North Korea’s provocations forces another pressing question on Japan. As Japan sets out to revise its National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPO) and the Mid-Term Defense Plan (MTDP), both of which serve to shape Japan’s defense posture (and required acquisition) for a four to five year span, Tokyo will likely have to revisit the question of acquiring an independent capability to strike North Korean missile sites should such a need ever arise. Often referred to as “the origin-of-threat attack (sakugen-chi kougeki), the concept is highly controversial and divisive in Japan, as it suggests, even in a very limited capacity, Tokyo will pursue explicitly an offensive military capability, which goes against its “defense-oriented” posture. It also requires Tokyo to engage Washington in close consultation, as Japan acquiring such a capability needs to make sense within the the overall U.S.-Japan alliance.

In addition to the long-standing investment Japan has been making to counter the North Korean threat, which is a conventional military threat, there now is a rapidly increasing need for Japan to develop the capability to counter China’s assertive action in East China Sea. Indeed, development of such a capability – primarily consisting of acquiring amphibious capability, accompanied by the need to improve “jointness” among the three services of the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF), anchored in improved joint logistics and C4ISR (command and control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities – has been the central priority under the current NDPG and MTDP. With little sign of pressure from China easing, Japan has no choice but continue to invest in the development of such capabilities in earnest as well.

The biggest problem for Japan is that the current trajectory of the Japanese defense budget does not give Japan enough funds to make a “two-theater” investment possible. What is worse, thanks to an almost a decade-long cut in defense spending between FY2003-2012, the JSDF suffers from the hollowing out of the force, with lack of maintenance of its equipment and inadequate opportunities for training for its personnel. Despite the Abe government’s effort in increasing defense spending since FY2014, the margin of increase is so incremental that any additional budget space is absorbed by personnel costs and rising cost of acquisition due to recent acquisition decisions made by Japan (including F35As, V-22 Ospreys, Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAVs), and Global Hawk, to name a few). With the current fiscal environment, a big increase in defense spending cannot be expected, meaning Japan will face a tough trade-off decision in where to spend its defense yen.

With Tokyo already behind the curve in preparing for these two security concerns, both of which are now increasing in urgency, the next 12 to 18 months will be a critical period for Japan as it considers how best to shape the JSDF’s posture to defend Japan from these threats.