Tillerson in Asia

In March, Rex Tillerson visited Japan, South Korea, and China on his inaugural trip to the Asia-Pacific region since becoming U.S. President Donald J. Trump's secretary of state. The highly anticipated regional trip followed a similar visit by Tillerson's counterpart at the U.S. Department of Defense, James Mattis, who visited Seoul and Tokyo in February with the task of alliance reassurance at the top of his agenda.

Between Mattis and Tillerson's trips, however, much had transpired in the region. Most prominently, North Korea, the most acute security threat in the region today, had shown off a new land variant of its submarine-launched ballistic missile, dubbed the Pukkuksong-2, and later launched four extended range Scud missiles into the Sea of Japan, with three of the ballistic missiles landing within Japan's exclusive economic zone. The latter North Korean launch wasn't a technical test or an attempt to acquire knowhow, but a rehearsal for a preemptive nuclear strike against U.S. assets stationed in Japan.

Meanwhile, in February Trump spoke to his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping, allowing U.S.-China ties to eke forward amid lingering unease from the presidential transition period, when Trump caused concern among China-watchers by receiving a call from Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen and taking to Twitter repeatedly to chastise China for its trade practices. Since the call between the leaders, however, high-level exchanges have picked up, suggesting that the two sides have been able to establish a working relationship, despite broader negativity toward China in the White House. Ahead of Tillerson's trip in March, Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi had visited the United States, laying the groundwork for an eventual summit between the two leaders.

Despite this context, even before he left for Asia, Tillerson's trip was marred by his decision to not have the usual press pool travel with him. More broadly, there were concerns that the Department of State would face chronic neglect by the administration. Just ahead of the trip, the Trump White House announced a budget proposing a 37 percent cut for the department. In Asia too, U.S. allies wondered if Tillerson, an outsider with no foreign policy or government experience to speak of, would in reality end up leading a vestigial State Department with little influence over policy, which would be made in the White House alone.

Amid everything, both Seoul and Tokyo were not only looking for continued assurance from Tillerson during his time in Asia, but also looking to learn just how important he'd be within the Trump foreign policy machine. In Tokyo, Tillerson drew headlines for triumphantly declaring that the Obama administration's policy toward North Korea – so-called strategic patience – was now over and that a "new approach" would be forthcoming from the Trump administration. The secretary, however, didn't expand on what this would mean in practice.

The Trump administration has been reviewing U.S. policy toward North Korea since early February and the governments of Japan and South Korea are looking for a sense of where U.S. policy might end up. While in the region, Tillerson raised eyebrows by airing the prospect of a preemptive strike against North Korea. This was likely intended to serve as a piece of reassurance, highlighting that the United States would use its forward-deployed military in Japan and South Korea to roll back North Korean capabilities unilaterally.

South Korea and Japan, however, represented the easier legs of Tillerson's visit. In Beijing, he would face his first real test as the highest level envoy from the Trump administration to visit the Chinese capital. Tillerson met with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi, Yang Jiechi, Premier Li Keqiang, and President Xi Jinping. Ahead of his arrival in China, Trump had taken to Twitter to note that "China has done little to help" on the North Korean question. While some observers wondered if Trump had coordinated his messaging on North Korea to help give Tillerson some leverage ahead of his trip, the secretary later clarified in an interview that he was caught off-guard by the presidential tweet, which appears to be an enduring feature of this U.S. administration.

Surprisingly, despite the anticipation in December and January that U.S.-China relations would be in for a swift period of turbulence in the Trump era, Tillerson struck a cordial note in Beijing. Indeed, he went too far on some counts. In prepared remarks before his meeting with Wang, Tillerson noted that the U.S.-China relationship had been built on "non-confrontation, no conflict, mutual respect, and always searching for win-win solutions." For seasoned observers of the bilateral, that language is familiar: almost word-for-word, that's what Chinese President Xi Jinping had told Obama in 2014 when defining his proposed “new model of major country relations.” This parallelism diverged not only with the former Obama administration, which saw it necessary to assert U.S. interests on its own terms instead of echoing Chinese language, but also didn't align with what the State Department had indicated Tillerson would be seeking in Beijing – namely, a "results-based" approach to U.S.-China ties.

Moreover, according to Chinese state media, Xi told Tillerson when they met that "it is necessary to respect each other's core interests and major concerns." In the Chinese view, this means an acceptance that there can be no compromise on issues like territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas, and on the question of Taiwan, which China sees unequivocally as a part of the country. Beyond symbolism, Tillerson's mention of "mutual respect" before his meeting with Wang may have indicated to U.S. Asian allies and partners that this administration may turn the other cheek on certain Chinese provocations while narrowing in on North Korea and trade policy. For the previous administration, despite Xi's best attempts, there was a strong policy-based rationale not to concede the "mutual respect" point on Chinese terms.

Still, despite the cordiality in Beijing, Tillerson's trip may not be the real litmus test for how U.S.-China relations will develop through the remainder of Trump's first 100 days in office. Xi and Trump are expected to meet soon and that meeting – among the most anticipated of bilateral summits on the 2017 diplomatic calendar – will be a better indication. Moreover, with reports that the Trump White House is planning its first big push on trade against China over automobile exports and considering a major arms sale to Taiwan, including anti-ship ballistic missiles, there's plenty of room for the U.S.-China state of affairs to revert to their transition-era chill.

In summation, Tillerson's time in Asia amounted to little more than a pro forma meet-and-greet opportunity for two important allies and one competitor. His reassurance on North Korea, while packaged in triumphalism, fell flat without any real details. In China, Tillerson demonstrated an amateurish lack of sensitivity to the symbolism of long-storied terms in the U.S.-China bilateral. Finally, South Korea, Japan, and China remain uneasy about precisely how much influence the secretary will have on the Trump administration's decision-making in Washington. Tillerson may hone his approach in time, but his inaugural Asia tour suggests that he'll have to get up to speed quickly if he is to soothe nerves for increasingly concerned allies and adroitly defend U.S. interests against continued challenge from China.