Trump, Moon, and the US-South Korea Alliance

Observers in South Korea and the United States have grown anxious over the potential for friction between Presidents Moon Jae-in and Donald Trump. The two countries enjoyed a relatively peaceful and cooperative relationship during the Obama-Lee and Obama-Park eras. Both Obama and his two successive counterparts in Seoul touted that the ROK-U.S. alliance couldn’t get any better. However, this did not imply that the relationship was without its problems. On several occasions, South Korea and the United States had noticeable differences in their policy agendas. For example, the Obama administration was dissatisfied with South Korea regarding the full implementation of the South Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) and South Korea’s active involvement in territorial issues in the South China Sea.

When former President Park Geun-hye visited Beijing in 2015 to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, the United States frowned upon her attendance even though its official comments remained neutral. Washington was also frustrated with Park’s reluctance to deploy the American missile defense system known as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) on South Korean soil to defend against North Korea’s growing missile threat. Even though the two governments went through occasional rough patches, however, they never questioned the each other’s fundamental commitment to the alliance.

This changed in the second half of 2016 when South Koreans began to have serious concerns about the relationship. On the campaign trail, Trump publicly criticized the United States’ one-sided relationship with South Korea. In his speeches and Twitter feed, Trump labeled the KORUS FTA as an unfair deal because of the large American trade deficit with South Korea. He went on to say that the United States would provide security and defense only if South Korea paid for American services. This led many South Koreans to believe that Trump was undervaluing the long-standing alliance.

In the meantime, Park’s involvement in an influence-peddling scandal incapacitated South Korea’s leadership. Her impeachment forced South Korea to remain on the sidelines when Trump was elected president. Soon after being elected, however, Trump appeared to tone down his criticisms of the free trade agreement and military burden-sharing.

It was only recently that Trump’s rhetoric toward South Korea made headlines once again. In an interview with Reuters on April 27, Trump expressed his desire to have South Korea pay $1 billion for THAAD. This went against the previous agreement that Seoul would provide the host site for the anti-missile system and Washington would pay for the operation and maintenance costs. Trump also dealt another blow by labeling the KORUS FTA a “horrible deal” and expressing his intention to renegotiate or terminate it.

As South Korea geared up for a snap election following Park’s impeachment, there was a shift in Trump’s foreign policy in favor of prioritizing North Korea and its nuclear program. Although he mentioned North Korea issues during the campaign, it was not until his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in early April that Trump embraced it as a top priority. After reviewing U.S. North Korea policy, the Trump administration established that its approach to North Korea will revolve around “maximum pressure and engagement” with “all options on the table.”

Some viewed the surprising April 6 airstrike on Syria as a potential warning to North Korea, suggesting that military force was one of the options Trump was keeping on the table. Trump did not deny the possibility of a preemptive strike against North Korea. In another bold move, Trump warned China that if Beijing did not assist with North Korea’s denuclearization, the United States would act on its own. This raised genuine fears for some observers in South Korea, since resorting to military force could lead to immeasurable casualties and damages to the country. At the same time, there were others in South Korea who believed that Trump’s style of negotiation and unpredictability could actually work against the equally unpredictable Kim Jong-un regime in North Korea.

With the beginning of the Moon presidency, many foresee potential for friction on a number of critical issues including THAAD, military burden-sharing, KORUS FTA, and North Korea policy.

Revisiting THAAD

THAAD deployment will be the immediate concern for the both governments. Moon mentioned repeatedly during the election that THAAD deployment should be determined by the next government (now his government), although he did not specify that he would reverse the THAAD decision should he become president. More recently, Chung Eui-yong, the new national security adviser, who leads the National Security Office of the Blue House, said the U.S. missile shield deployment lacked procedural legitimacy.

It now appears that there is a division of labor between Moon and his party. In an interview, the floor leader of the ruling Democratic Party of Korea said that the party would back Moon’s possible push to delay the deployment of THAAD. He also said that the National Assembly’s push to subject the issue to parliamentary ratification and to analyze the issue will help the administration’s negotiations with the United States. The party issued a statement that withdrawing from THAAD deployment and returning the missile defense batteries to the United States must be considered should the new government find any irregularities with how the previous administration implemented the deal. It argued that the new Cabinet will thoroughly investigate the installation process with the defense, environment, and foreign ministries, and will promote parliamentary hearings to clear any suspicions surrounding the process. Both parties consider parliamentary ratification unnecessary.

It is clear that the new government and the ruling party intend to revisit the THAAD issue. A recent visit to the United States by Hong Seok-hyun, Moon Jae-in’s special envoy, reaffirmed this position. During his visit to Washington, Hong informed the White House’s national security adviser, H.R. McMaster, about the controversy over THAAD in South Korea and the need for placing the issue under National Assembly supervision. In response, McMaster told Hong that he was aware of the procedural problem involving THAAD in South Korea.

It remains unclear if Hong and McMaster were referring to the same “procedural problems.” The United States would probably understand that it cannot block the National Assembly’s review process in the form of hearings. Given the lack of communication and transparency in the way former President Park made the decision to deploy THAAD, those “procedural problems” could be interpreted as the subjects of National Assembly hearings. However, if Hong and McMaster were referring to the lack of required ratification or approval from the National Assembly, this is a totally different story. There is no possible way for the United States to acknowledge the ratification process by the National Assembly as a required process for THAAD deployment.

The KORUS FTA and Burden-Sharing

Turning to economics, Trump has mentioned on numerous occasions that he wants to renegotiate the free trade deal with South Korea. In a series of interviews regarding his first 100 days as president, Trump said the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was bad in every way, but went further in his assessment of the KORUS FTA, which was concluded by Hillary Clinton, labeling it a “horrible deal.” He then claimed that he had informed Seoul that he wanted to renegotiate the deal, but didn't specify his contact in the Korean government and how he had discussed his intention to renegotiate.

For comparison, Trump has also repeatedly emphasized the U.S. trade deficit with China and even mentioned the possibility of designating China as a currency manipulator. However, after the Trump-Xi summit, he mentioned that he would use tough trade measures against China as a bargaining chip to secure China’s cooperation in efforts to denuclearize North Korea.

For the Moon administration, the KORUS FTA is a very tricky and delicate issue. In 2012, Moon’s party campaigned against the FTA during the general election. If Trump is correct in his assessment that Korea has been the only beneficiary of the KORUS FTA, defending the trade deal will be difficult for Moon. The core of his constituency did not support the FTA to begin with. It is still not clear how the Moon government will respond to a request by the United States for renegotiation. While there are elements of the trade agreement that both governments are not fully satisfied with, the two countries must understand that the KORUS FTA is not just about the economy. It is also about the their strategic relationship.

On a related note, Trump has argued that allies of the United States should pay for American services. During an interview, he said the following about THAAD: “Why are we paying a billion dollars [to deploy the system]? So I informed South Korea it would be appropriate if they paid.” He continued, “We’re going to protect them. But they should pay for that, and they understand that.”

Trump’s remarks were consistent with his campaign pledge that he would have allies and partners pay for what he has called a “fair share” of defense costs. His comments are seen as a way of setting the negotiating table for the next round of the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) between the two allies, with talks scheduled to begin in late 2017 or early 2018.

It appears that U.S. government officials understand that Seoul is paying enough and contributing a fair share of the costs of hosting American forces in South Korea. Thus, it is very likely that the next round of discussion will be similar to previous negotiations. However, if Trump continues his rhetoric, it will inevitably raise concerns and anti-American sentiments among South Koreans.

The North Korea Problem

Lastly, an issue that has the potential to cast a dark cloud over the two countries’ relationship is how to deal with North Korea. This issue will have the most profound impact on the level of trust between two governments. Generally speaking, Moon is perceived as favoring reconciliation with Pyongyang and opposing the Trump administration's tough approach. The biggest concerns for the United States are Moon's proposals to reopen the Kaesong Industrial Complex or the Mount Kumgang tours, since these moves will undermine the American campaign to put more pressure on Pyongyang. Moreover, these moves violate the sanctions regime established by the United Nations.

North Korea’s continued missile tests will complicate Moon’s approach to North Korea. Therefore, he will likely rely on humanitarian aid or family reunions as a litmus test to see how his administration’s approach to the North will be accepted by the United States and the international community. Pressure can achieve its intended purpose only when there is no outlet. Even a small hole in the pot can make it difficult for the chef to cook his dish as planned. If South Korea plans to loosen the pressure on North Korea, China will use this as an excuse to step back from the American campaign to apply more pressure on the North. The fundamental question, then, is whether the two presidents in Seoul and Washington will trust each other and let the other test his own approach. Without enough trust, deviating from the current path will cast serious doubts on the intentions of the other.

Due to a number of constraints, Trump cannot have all his ideas implemented into real policies. For the same reason, Moon cannot pursue a policy solely based on his ideological beliefs. Eventually, they will have to compromise and will find that their policies do not differ significantly. Without trust and confidence in each other, however, producing results will be extremely challenging.

Thus, the most serious problem ahead for South Korea and the United States is not the differences in policy per se, but the possibility that such differences will lead to mutual distrust and sabotage the efforts made in the relationship over the past decade. Washington has concerns that Moon may become the second coming of Roh Moo-hyun; Seoul has concerns that Trump will make unilateral decisions without consulting its ally, South Korea.

Trump has shown that he is very pragmatic. He has changed his course of action on several issues despite previous comments or tweets, surprising even those in his own government. Moon, despite being in his first month in office, has also shown that his foreign policy approach is not drastically different from the status quo. Despite differences in their own beliefs or ideologies, President Moon and President Trump must understand that they will have to pay special attention to alliance management if they want the alliance to remain vital and effective.