Tsai Ing-wen’s Tough First Year

After a year in office, public support for Taiwan’s leader, Tsai Ing-wen, has hit new lows. In many recent polls, the Democratic Progressive Party’s Tsai has approval ratings around 30 percent. According to a poll released by TVBS, a cable TV channel in Taiwan, Tsai's approval rating has plummeted to a record low of 26 percent. Even a DPP poll showed that while 57.4 percent expressed support for Tsai, 54.2 percent expressed discontent with her performance as president so far.

If Taiwanese are not content, what is the problem? Deteriorating cross-strait relations under Tsai’s administration are undoubtedly an important factor, since that trend can and has already damaged a wide range of fields, including trade, people-to-people exchanges, tourism, and diplomacy.

One recent, and damaging, consequence of deteriorating cross-strait relations was Taiwan’s non-invitation to the annual meeting of the World Health Assembly (WHA) held in Geneva in late May. It marked the first time in eight years that Taiwan failed to get a ticket to the decision-making body of the World Health Organization (WHO). The WHO’s spokesman explained very clearly why Taiwan was not invited:

“Cross-strait understanding between Taiwan and China has been the basis for the invitation for the Taiwanese representatives as observers since 2009... The understanding hasn’t been reached until now… The ‘one China’ policy is a UN-wide accepted policy; Beijing is representing the one China.”

Taiwan’s global space was somewhat expanded during former leader Ma Ying-jeou’s eight-year administration, but it is shrinking back to its previous size under Tsai.

What cross-strait understanding does Beijing want to reach?

The answer couldn’t be simpler: Tsai should recognize the 1992 consensus, or the “one China, different interpretations” principle. The consensus is a fundamental precondition for all other cross-strait negotiations – Ma and his Kuomintang Party (KMT) upheld it.

Yet the simplest answer for Ma is the hardest for Tsai.

In order to avoid answering questions about whether she accepts or rejects the 1992 consensus on one China, Tsai employed all her diplomatic skills in her inaugural address:

Since 1992, over 20 years of interactions and negotiations across the Strait have enabled and accumulated outcomes, which both sides must collectively cherish and sustain; and it is based on such existing realities and political foundations that the stable and peaceful development of the cross-strait relationship must be continuously promoted. The new government will conduct cross-strait affairs in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution, the Act Governing Relations Between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, and other relevant legislation.

Tsai emphasized that she respects the historical fact of the 1992 talks, the existing Republic of China constitutional order, the outcomes of over 20 years of negotiations and interactions across the strait, and the democratic principle and prevalent will of the people of Taiwan. And then she urged Beijing to “set aside the baggage of history, and engage in positive dialogue, for the benefit of the people on both sides.”

To Tsai and her party, this expression is a full gesture of goodwill. Some American scholars also praised Tsai for “striving to take into account Beijing’s views without violating her own principles” and blamed Beijing for its “focus on the fact that Tsai had still not clearly endorsed one China.”

But from Beijing’s point of view, Tsai and her party are not trustworthy. Previously, Tsai was one of the authors of the “two-state theory,” which claims Taiwan and China should engage in state-to-state relations. Tsai’s current position does show that she is eager to maintain the status quo Ma gained, but not necessarily to continue Ma’s compromises.

Tsai, however, doesn’t have any cards to play; Taipei lacks any bargaining chips against Beijing.

Beyond low domestic support, Tsai is losing her foreign friends, too. Taipei’s most important supporter – the United States – is holding to an “America First” foreign policy under President Donald Trump. To make things worse, relations between Trump and mainland China’s President Xi Jinping have been much better than expected. In December, then-President-elect Trump shocked the world by holding a phone call with Taiwan’s leader. In late April, however, Trump said he wouldn’t speak to Tsai without first consulting with Xi. Under the current situation, only the most optimistic analysts would believe the United States would displease Beijing for the sake of Taipei.

Tsai’s “New Southbound policy,” an attempt to broaden Taiwan’s relations with South and Southeast Asian nations, is facing unprecedented challenges as well. As demonstrated at the first Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in May, most South and Southeast Asian nations have been pulled to Beijing’s side. Vietnam and China issued a joint statement right after the Belt and Road Forum in which Vietnam declared it will “persistently respect the one China principle, support the peaceful development of cross-strait relations and China’s unification cause, and resolutely oppose any Taiwanese independence activities in any form.” The declaration was such a big blow to Tsai that the DPP had to come forward to defend the New Southbound policy.

Europe is shifting to accommodate Beijing, too. In December 2016, a large phone-scamming ring based in Spain was shut down. Of the nearly 300 suspects arrested, more than 200 were Taiwanese nationals. In February 2017, Spain decided to extradite the suspects to mainland China rather than Taiwan, which was also the first time an EU member state extradited a Taiwanese national to mainland China.

Despite these frustrations, Tsai still maintains her current position in cross-strait relations. On May 19 she said in a public speech that she is not a political strongman but "a leader under a democracy who has a strong will to carry out reforms." Tsai also said Beijing ought to respect the goodwill that Taiwan repeatedly had shown over the past year, because “this is a new era, as the Taiwanese people say so.”

In comparison, Beijing still have many cards left to play.

If the steps Beijing has taken in the past year are already putting harsh pressure on Taipei, it’s hard to imagine how Taipei would feel if Beijing pulled out all the stops to punish Taiwan.

Beijing could impose even more barriers for Taipei to enter global activities, ban mainland students from studying in Taiwan, or cut direct flights across the Taiwan Strait. Although some of these harsh measures might be harmful to both sides, Taiwan would suffer more than mainland China. Plus, Tsai might not be much of a political strongman, but Xi definitely is.

Cross-strait relations have reached their lowest point in nine years, and it can, indeed, get worse. In fact, China’s most hawkish newspaper, the Global Times, recently issued an editorial, arguing “It’s high time to give Tsai an ultimatum.”

Perhaps it’s Taipei rather than Beijing that ought to respect the goodwill from the other side – at least that’s what Beijing believes.

In dealing with Beijing, Tsai might need to consult with her predecessor, Ma. If it is not politically convenient to do so in public, a private talk might work, just for the sake of “maintaining cross-strait peace and prosperity,” as Tsai said herself.