China and Pakistan: Blaming the Islamic State’s Victims

On May 24, two Chinese nationals were abducted by gunmen posing as police officers in Quetta, the capital of Pakistan’s Balochistan province. According to the Pakistani daily Dawn, the gunmen were attempting to force a third Chinese citizen into their car when a Pakistani bystander intervened, demanding to see identification from the supposed police. For his trouble, the Pakistani man was shot and wounded.

The story only got worse from there. In early June, the Islamic State (ISIS) claimed that it had killed both the Chinese nationals (later identified as Lee Zingyang [sic], 24, and Meng Lisi, 26, in a statement the Pakistani Interior Ministry provided to Reuters). Both Pakistan and China scrambled to confirm the grisly news; by June 14, Pakistan had issued a statement verifying that the two hostages were, in fact, dead.

The news was a tragedy as well as a potential diplomatic headache for China and Pakistan. Balochistan province has long been troubled by security concerns, both linked to international terrorist groups (like ISIS) and to a home-grown separatist movement of ethnic Balochs. But the province, home to Gwadar Port, is also an indispensable part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which will see China spend $57 billion on Pakistani transportation and energy infrastructure. In a nod to the ongoing security issues, Chinese CPEC workers in Pakistan have been assigned security guards. The two murdered Chinese citizens, who were employed at a language school, did not have this protection.

The news that two Chinese nationals had been kidnapped and murdered by terrorists re-emphasized security concerns about CPEC and thus put China in a bind. Beijing would be loath to comment too strongly, lest it publicly undermine CPEC, but also cannot give the impression of being unconcerned about the safety of its citizens abroad, as a callous approach could spark domestic anger.

Sure enough, early discussions of the incident in Chinese social media focused on questions Beijing would rather not have asked. First, there was talk of whether or not Pakistan should actually be considered a “friendly country,” as it’s often described in China. One social media commentary by user “bullpiano” (which was reposted on the popular Sina News website) put it this way: “Two Chinese compatriots perfectly reasonably went to a friendly country – they couldn’t have expected the end would be this kind of result.”

Others asked whether China should have done more to rescue the hostages, or should be doing more to combat ISIS. China’s Foreign Ministry said Beijing “spared no effort to rescue” the two, but for many Chinese – who are increasingly accustomed to taking pride in their country’s strength – the tragic end to the story was a disappointment.

The commentary from bullpiano noted widespread discussion online as to what China should do now. In particular, there were loud questions as to why China is not attacking ISIS: “Russia is dropping bombs, France is dropping bombs, the U.S. is dropping bombs – why is China, another big country, not dropping bombs?” Bullpiano agreed that literally joining the fight against ISIS would show China is a responsible power, but also argued that it’s precisely China’s noncommittal policy on hot button issues in the Middle East that generally keeps its nationals safer than Europeans or Americans. Such nuanced narratives, however, were in the minority. Some particularly angry commenters suggested that China send soldiers to Pakistan to take revenge for the murders.

For its part, Pakistan, realizing the potential impact on CPEC, moved quickly to assuage Chinese anger over the incident. Within a day of the kidnappings, Balochistan’s chief minister had suspended two local police officers “for not providing security to the Chinese nationals in their areas,” according to Dawn. Nearly a dozen Chinese nationals living in the area were evacuated to Karachi as an extra precaution.

Yet in the week that followed, Pakistan started promoting a new narrative, one that found an eager audience among Chinese media outlets seeking for a way to avoid casting blame on either their government or Pakistan, China’s “iron brother.” According to Pakistan’s Interior Ministry, the two Chinese nationals were actually covert missionaries – and thus tacitly to blame for their own deaths.

“Instead of engaging in any business activity, they went to Quetta and under the garb of learning Urdu language from a Korean national ... were actually engaged in preaching,” a statement from the ministry said, as quoted by Reuters. The statement strongly implied that this illicit religious activity was a factor in the abduction and murder of the two Chinese. Pakistan did not identify the religion supposedly being promoted, but the link to “a Korean national” would imply a Christian missionary connection. 

China’s Foreign Ministry responded by issuing a statement on June 14, saying it would work with the Pakistani government to investigate “reports on Chinese nationals allegedly engaging in illegal preaching activities in Pakistan.”

Chinese media outlets were quick to jump on the scoop, as Quartz noted in a round-up of China’s media coverage. Global Times, the state-owned, hyper-nationalistic tabloid, was true to form with a sensationalist headline: “Exclusive! The truth behind the Chinese people who were kidnapped in Pakistan: As expected, it’s Koreans causing trouble again.” According to Global Times’ account, Korean missionaries have been “repeatedly” kidnapped and murdered in Pakistan and Afghanistan, so “some people changed their tactics to urging Chinese young people to undertake religious activities in highly dangerous regions.” Global Times, unlike the original Pakistani statement, explicitly identified the missionaries as Christians.

It’s not surprising that Pakistan would want to promote the narrative that these two Chinese citizens were at least partly to blame for their own deaths. That slant helps absolve Pakistan’s security forces of responsibility for the murders of nationals from Islamabad’s closest ally, thus keeping CPEC insulated from the fallout. Plus, insisting the two Chinese nationals were targeted because of their evangelism may help other Chinese, those who are in Pakistan solely for business reasons, feel safer. It’s the old “she was asking for it” dodge, as applied to an international terrorist incident. 

The “they were murdered because they were illegal missionaries” angle is politically convenient for China as well. It shifts blame from “all-weather friend” Pakistan and moves it to two more appealing scapegoats: Christianity and South Korea. In China, all religions are seen as potential threats to the state, given the tendency of organized religions to want to keep faith outside government authority. Christianity has thus been the subject of one of China’s many recent crackdowns on non-state sanctioned activities, with church buildings demolished in Zhejiang province for not having the proper permits (or simply sporting crosses that are too large). 

South Korea, meanwhile, is already on China’s blacklist for Seoul’s decision to deploy a U.S. missile defense system, despite strenuous Chinese opposition, and thus makes a convenient target. The involvement of Korean nationals in the alleged preaching operation has been a point of emphasis. On June 15, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lu expressed concern over “reports on these young Chinese people being used by some ROK [Republic of Korea] religious group and engaging in illegal preaching activities in Pakistan,” as though the Chinese citizens in question had no free will of their own. He refused to clarify the phrase “being used by” despite repeated follow-up questions from reporters.

The problem with this narrative – besides the obvious ethical issue of blaming two young Chinese nationals for their own murders – is that it keeps both Pakistan and China from actually having to face pressure over the real security issues that exist along the CPEC route. That may be convenient for now, but ultimately prevents a hard but necessary look at the risks and benefits of CPEC. Like it or not, CPEC passes through dangerous ground, and it’s not feasible for Pakistan to protect every Chinese national 24/7 – security guards or no.

In another sign of that hard truth, even as the ISIS murders dominated headlines, Dawn reported that an angry group of 100-plus locals had stormed a tunnel construction site in Battagram District, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, forcing a halt to work on the CPEC-related project. Their complaint was more mundane than a grandiose declaration of jihad, but potentially more troubling for CPEC’s future: the protesters claimed their land had been seized and homes razed without fair (or in some cases, any) compensation. They promised to stay at the site, preventing any additional work, until their demands were addressed.