The Real Problem Behind Japan’s Anti-Conspiracy Bill

On June 15, Japan’s Upper House passed an anti-conspiracy bill, formally a revision to the Law on Punishment of Organized Crimes and Control of Crime Proceeds. It was passed through a procedure called an “interim report” that allowed the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to end the discussions in committee so that it could be passed during this past Diet session. In a last-ditch attempt to stop the bill, opposition parties had submitted a no-confidence motion against the Cabinet on June 14, which was defeated in the Lower House.

The anti-conspiracy law is controversial because it allows law enforcement authorities to arrest and punish people even in the planning stages of a crime. Until now, law enforcement authorities could only arrest and punish people after they have committed crimes. The law invites controversy by criminalizing plotting and preparations to commit 277 different “serious crimes” – including acts with no obvious connection to terrorism or organized crime, such as sit-ins to protest construction of apartment buildings or copying music.

In a June 17-18 survey conducted by Kyodo News, 42.1 percent supported the anti-conspiracy bill, while 44.0 percent were against it. Of the respondents to the telephone survey, 50.7 percent agreed the new law could lead to greater state surveillance.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe explained to reporters the urgency of passing this bill: “It’s only three years until the Tokyo Olympics and Paralympics, and so I’d like to ratify the treaty on organized crime as soon as possible so we can firmly cooperate with international society to prevent terrorism.”

The media obsession following this law is a useful case study to analyze the right-left division in Japan – and how the two sides have a tendency to talk past each other by focusing on different aspects of the same issue.

Yomiuri Shimbun, a right-of-center daily, lauded the revised law as a “big step in [the] anti-terror fight” putting the new law into a context that highlights its positive contribution to public safety. “At a time when acts of terrorism are occurring one after another in Europe and the United States,” the paper declared, “the threat of terrorism striking Japan, which is preparing to host the 2020 Tokyo Olympics and Paralympics, is also increasing.” Yomiuri favorably points out, “Passage of the law has also made it possible for Japan to conclude the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, which will have the advantage of speeding up cooperation with overseas investigative authorities.”

When it comes to drawbacks of the law, Yomiuri focuses on the challenges police will have in implementing it, quoting a senior police official saying the revised law alone is insufficient. “It won’t be easy to apply [the law]… Meticulously gathering evidence will be necessary [to get a warrant when investigating preparations for a terrorist attack], so there will likely need to be careful discussions with prosecutors.”

On the flip side, the left-leaning Asahi Shimbun focused much more on the criticisms against the bill: “Opponents have said current laws already have stipulations that can punish the act of preparing [to commit] such crimes as terrorist acts, and warned that the new legislation could lead to a surveillance state and trample on human rights.” Like Yomiuri’s coverage, Asahi is concerned about the future of how the law will be implemented, but focuses on civil rights: “Many concerns remained unresolved, including whether the general public would be subject to investigations, and whether authorities could expand their interpretation of the legislation.” In a separate article, Asahi also highlighted the opposition of scholars. The 62 intellectuals who called for the abolishment of the new law are from the Association of Scholars Opposed to the Security-related Laws, which formed in 2015 and has 14,000 or so members.

Asahi and the broader anti-LDP coalition within Japan remain staunchly opposed to any initiative that Abe pursues, while Yomiuri and the more security-minded elements in Japan praise the government’s efforts. Such divisions are long-standing – and as both sides continue to talk past each other, emphasizing different issues, ultimately unproductive.

Despite the overhyped media coverage and the protests, the passage of the anti-conspiracy bill, the fourth variation of such a revision, in fact, is really a tempest in a teapot. This is not meant to downplay the significance of the law’s implications, but to point out that, at the end of the day, there was no question that the LDP would eventually succeed in passing it. All the drama in the lead up was nothing but sound and fury.

The certainty of the bill’s passage hints at the greatest issue with Japan’s democracy: the over-dominance of Abe and the LDP. Renho and the main opposition Democratic Party (DP) criticize Abe, but do not offer a competing vision. In the past Diet session, they have been grasping for straws, trying to use various scandals (the issue of the daily logs for the peacekeeping operation in South Sudan, the Moritomo Gakuen scandal, and the Kake Educational Institution scandal) to bring the government down.

Not only is such empty debate unproductive, it also is counterproductive, as it weakens the foundation of stable governance. The Cabinet’s approval rating has dropped 10.5 percentage points since May to 44.9 percent.

The next political hurdle for Abe’s LDP is the July 2 Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election. The metropolitan election will give Abe a good sense of whether the high-handed tactics used to pass the anti-conspiracy bill are still within the realm of the politically acceptable.