Mindanao Martial Law: Lingering Questions

On May 23, 2017, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte placed the whole island of Mindanao under martial law after a group with alleged Islamic State links attacked some parts of Marawi City.

According to the 1987 Constitution, Congress is supposed to convene a joint session in order to review the government’s martial law proclamation. But leaders of both houses of Congress said a joint session is unnecessary since the majority are supporting the president’s decision anyway.

This is unfortunate, since there are questions related to martial law that only defense and military officials can answer in a congressional session. And even if these concerns may not be addressed by the Duterte government, they are worth laying out in greater detail because they will likely be explored or exploited by various parties in the Philippines in the coming weeks.

First, what is the primary basis for declaring martial law in its current form? The proclamation cited several terrorist incidents, some of which turned out to be either false or inaccurate. If the Maute group, which attacked Marawi, is holed up in some barangays (villages), why implement a total city lockdown?

Here, it is worth noting that the Zamboanga siege in 2013 involved hundreds of militants who attacked several barangays in the city but the military was able to contain the situation without declaring martial law or requiring the enforcement of a city blockade.

Second, what is the urgency of placing the whole of Mindanao under martial law? The defense secretary, Delfin Lorenzana, invoked the reported presence of Islamist State militants in some provinces outside Marawi. If this is indeed the case, it is not clear why the scope of martial law could not be restricted to just these provinces alone. And if the military has already claimed that it is now in control of Marawi – with insurgents controlling less than 20 percent of the territory by some recent estimates – it is equally befuddling why it looks like it might be a few more weeks before Duterte is going to lift martial law.

Here again, history is instructive. In 2009, former President Gloria Arroyo declared martial law in Maguindanao province after 58 civilians were ambushed by a private army, but it only lasted for seven days.

Third, some thought should be given to addressing the consequences of martial law, including accountability for government forces. Graphic photos and videos have already surfaced revealing the massive destruction in Marawi. The Maute group is mainly responsible for this, but the military has to be made accountable too for the damage caused by its so-called surgical airstrikes. Some residents are also complaining that the burning and looting of houses were allegedly done by state forces.

Fourth, and on a related note, there needs to be some consideration of the long-term plan for rehabilitation, especially since this is an incident that has already displaced around 46,000 families or 220,000 persons. So far, the government said it has provided 33 evacuation centers, but these can only shelter 18,000 persons. Relief efforts have been intensified, but these cannot be sustained as long as the crisis continues to drag on.

Fifth, there needs to be clarity about the role of rebel groups – if any – in combating the Islamic State threat in the Philippines. Duterte has hinted about the prospect of such groups joining the military, but the military itself is ambivalent about the idea even though it can potentially bolster the peace process. The muddled message on this front so far has not helped.

Sixth, Duterte needs to be careful about how he talks about martial law and its future prospects given the history of this in the Philippines dating back to the era of ex-dictator Ferdinand Marcos. Duterte’s earlier warning that he could extend martial law in the Visayas and even in Luzon has already caused opponents to be deeply skeptical about what his true objectives really are. If he and his government do intend to expand the scope of martial law – which, as mentioned earlier, is already broader than it needs to be – it must do so in a deliberative and consistent manner rather than through the sort of careless, off-the-cuff statements that Duterte is fond of.

Seventh and finally, there must be proper messaging on the actual role of the U.S. military in the Marawi conflict, since ambiguity on this front previously has fed into conspiracy theories that are unhelpful. Already, the Philippine media has been asking some specific questions about this, such as whether U.S. troops are merely providing intelligence and equipment from afar or whether they are actually in Marawi.

Given Duterte’s own critical stance with respect to the U.S. role in the southern Philippines as well as his rather colorful way of speaking, he may not be the best messenger on something that really does require precision. But this is a question that needs answers now.

Few would disagree that these are complicated questions with complex answers. But it is exactly because of this reality that the Duterte government must resist sweeping these issues under the rug and confront them head on. The situation in Marawi is Duterte’s most serious test since he took power last June, and it could have major implications not just for the Philippines’ domestic politics, but also its foreign policy. Questions cannot just be left lingering.